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ABSTRACT
An Agent-Based Decision Support Framework for sUAS Deployment in Small Infantry Units
Carsten Douglas Christensen
Department of Mechanical Engineering, BYU
Master of Science
Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) will become a disruptive force on the modern
battlefield. In recent years, sUAS size and cost have decreased while their capability has increased.
They have forced a reconsideration of the air superiority paradigm held since the First World War.
Perhaps their most attractive, and worrisome, feature is the huge range of combat roles that they
might fulfill. The presence of sUAS on future battlefields is certain, but the role they will play and
their impact on those battlefields are not.
This work presents a decision support framework for sUAS deployment in small infantry
units. The framework is designed to explore and evaluate multiple sUAS-small-unit deployment
concepts’ impact on small unit effectiveness in a combat scenario of interest. The framework helps
decision makers identify high-level sUAS deployment principles for testing and validation in physical experiments before sUAS are implemented on the battlefield. The decision support framework
comprises the following: 1) a definition of the sUAS-small-unit deployment concept design space
and combat scenario, 2) an agent-based computer model for exploring sUAS deployment concepts,
3) a set of analysis tools for evaluating sUAS deployment impact on combat effectiveness, and 4)
suggestions for synthesizing high-level sUAS deployment principles from the analysis.
In this work, the decision support framework for sUAS-small-unit deployment is used to
explore and evaluate the impact of deploying an infantry platoon with between one and nine unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operating in a reconnaissance role while executing one of several
sUAS patrol pattern variants. In a scenario in which a defending platoon uses sUAS to intercept
and aid in indirect fires targeting against a platoon of attacking infantry, the sUAS were shown to
markedly improve the defending platoon’s combat effectiveness. The framework is used to synthesize several key principles for sUAS deployment in the scenario. It shows that, when fewer UAVs
are deployed, short-range sUAS patrols improve defender combat effectiveness. Conversely, when
more UAVs are deployed, long-range sUAS patrols improve the defenders’ ability to target attacking units with indirect fires, increasing the firepower concentrated against opponents. The analysis
also shows that increasing the number of deployed UAVs improves the likelihood of defending
warfighters surviving the engagement and the defenders’ ability to detect and engage the attackers with indirect fires. Finally, the framework shows that sUAS can force alterations in attacker
behavior, removing them from combat by non-violent, but highly effective, means.

Keywords: agent-based modeling, combat simulation, military decision making, small unmanned
aircraft systems, UAV system design
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CHAPTER 1.

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Definition and Objective Statement
In the spring of 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks, effectively snuffing out

the power of the Byzantine Empire. The city that had inherited the mantle of Western civilization
from the great Latin Romans of the previous millennium, and whose walls had withstood the likes
of Attila the Hun and the heirs of Muhammad for 1000 years, was overrun after a short 53 day
siege and one final, furious assault. Historians have and will continue to discuss the social and
political buildup to Constantinople’s fall in the context of the waning Byzantine economic and
military influence during the early Renaissance. However, one fact is universally undisputed: the
Ottoman’s revolutionary and highly effective use of state-of-the-art gunpowder artillery pummelled
the hitherto unassailable Theodosian walls into crumbling ruins and brought the sentinel city to its
knees [1].
Military history is replete with dramatic examples of the impact of new technology or new
applications of old technology on the battlefield. From the destruction of Constantinople’s walls
by gunpowder artillery in 1453 to the disintegration of the Spanish Armada by English fire ships
in 1588 to the development of “Blitzkreig” tank-war tactics that allowed the Germans to conquer
most of continental Europe within a few months in 1939, history proves that those who find creative
ways to effectively apply technology to revolutionize military strategy and tactics will inevitably
find themselves in a position of power over their opponents.
On January 6, 2018, Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base in Syria was attacked by a small swarm
of 13 apparently homemade small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operated by unknown actors.
Though the attack was quickly repelled, with reports of little to no damage to the base or its
personnel, a subsequent series of attacks continued into 2020, occupying Russian resources and
threatening military personnel, equipment, and infrastructure [2, 3]. Similar, less sophisticated but
more effective attacks by the Islamic State during the height of its power in Iraq in the mid-2010s
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forced a drastic shift in paradigm for major-state militaries. Air superiority, as it had been defined
and maintained since the first World War, was being challenged by off-the-shelf commercial and
homemade small UAVs armed with duct tape-attached explosives [4].
The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) on the 21st century battlefield has
become a focal point of discussions about the future of warfare. Until recently, UAS deployed by
the United States and other major-state militaries have primarily taken the form of large, remotely
piloted reconnaissance and ground support UAVs [5, 6]. However, the growing presence of small
UAS (sUAS), both in military and civilian sectors, has begun to threaten the existing paradigm
for tactical UAS operations by equalizing the modern battlefield. No longer do expensive and
technologically exclusive UAS give major-state militaries an unassailable advantage in airborne
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or firepower [6]. Within the last few years,
small, independently operating rebel and terrorist groups in Syria, Iraq, and Venezuela have employed low-tech, locally operated sUAS to inflict costly damage on state militaries and economies
and target political leaders [2–4,7,8]. Additionally, the growing capabilities and portable nature of
sUAS suggest near-infinite potential for deployment from within small infantry units (i.e., squads
and platoons) to aid in roles ranging from ISR to targeting assistance to fires augmentation [9–12].
Policy makers and military commanders must now consider both how to counter the growing threat
of sUAS and how to develop and implement new small unit tactics that take advantage of the unique
attributes of sUAS [13–15].
With so many possibilities for sUAS-small-unit deployment, a framework for exploring
and analyzing the impact of sUAS on small unit combat effectiveness must be designed to ensure
warfighters are provided with optimal sUAS deployment tactics and technologies to aid them in
accomplishing their objectives. Such a framework could be used to organize and simplify the the
evaluation of sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts by:
1. Defining the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space
2. Exploring the set of sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts
3. Assisting users in analyzing the trends in experimental sUAS deployment concept impacts
on small unit effectiveness
4. Distilling sUAS-small-unit deployment principles from such analyses for future physical
testing and experimentation.
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The benefits of an sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support framework like the one
described above are substantial. It could be used to explore any of a number of potential sUASsmall-unit deployment scenarios or concepts. The benefits to organization and efficiency derived
from the definition of the sUAS deployment design space are extensive. For example, the limits
to the scope of potential sUAS deployment concepts imposed by a well-defined design space can
actually spur the development of more creative and potentially successful concepts than might
be the case if the design space were too broad or ill-defined [16]. Similarly, well-designed and
appropriate tools for predicting and analyzing sUAS-small-unit deployment concept performance
can focus the convergence process for choosing deployment concepts that will optimize small unit
combat effectiveness.
To achieve the desired outcome of providing understanding the impact of sUAS on small
unit combat effectiveness, the framework must first direct decision makers to define the design
space they desire to explore relative to sUAS deployment. That design space consists of three
elements. First, the framework using decision maker must clearly identify two sets of parameters:
one input set for manipulating sUAS properties and deployment applications and one output set for
measuring the effect of sUAs on small-unit combat effectiveness. Additionally, the design space
definition must include the scenario or scenarios in which the sUAS would be employed, including
sUAS roles and relationships relative to warfighters in the units operating them.
In addition to defining the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, one of the core elements of the desired decision support framework is a computer model that can simulate small unit
combat. The range of potential sUAS technologies and implementation strategies is extensive, and
physical experiments and testing are limited to exploring only a small sample of all possible sUAS
solutions. Such limited exploration of the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space will likely
not identify many optimal deployment concepts. Instead, a computer model or models must be developed that can simulate the effects of a broad range of sUAS deployment concepts on small unit
combat effectiveness. Such a model could quickly explore significant swaths of the sUAS-smallunit deployment design space, providing a much higher probability of identifying the best possible
sUAS deployment concepts for future physical testing, refinement, and implementation [17].
To successfully explore and represent small unit combat, the computer model should be
able to simulate interactions and communication between units of warfighters and sUAS at the
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individual unit scale in order to reveal how experimental sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts
could impact warfighter effectiveness and combat outcomes. Additionally, the model must consider the immediate physical environment’s impact on both warfighter and sUAS behaviors and
combat effectiveness [18–20]. In order to determine the goodness of an sUAS deployment concept, the model must also include a means for representing and measuring the effects that various
sUAS deployment concepts have on warfighter performance [21].
The framework must also include guidance for how data generated by the combat computer
model could be analyzed. Desirable combat outcomes can be derived from the design requirements
for a given sUAS-small-unit deployment concept. Fully identifying and exploring the plethora
of interactions between sUAS input variables defined in the concept and combat effectiveness
metrics measured within the model involves sorting through massive data sets. The subsequent
analysis of those interactions to determine their impact on the desirability of combat outcomes is
a key component to the function of the proposed sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support
framework. Consequently, methods for exploring and sorting the potential impact of variable
interactions and for evaluating their significance must be included in the framework.
Finally, the framework must consider the needs of the human warfighters who will physically operate and test sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts that the model and analysis identify as
having the potential for positive impact on small unit combat effectiveness. The human brain, while
excellent in performing qualitative and high-level analysis, is a poor computer. Because sUAS will
be deployed in the context of a complex modern battlefield that includes unpredictable and evolving human variables and geopolitical circumstances as well as traditional factors like time-tables,
maneuvers, and tactics, the framework will have to provide decision-making warfighters with a set
of principles that are intuitive, simple, and flexible [22, 23].
The objective of this thesis is to create and test an sUAS-small-unit decision support framework that meets all of the needs and requirements outlined above. The framework is designed to
allow for the exploration and simulation of sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts, to guide analysis and evaluation of sUAS impact on small unit combat effectiveness, and to deliver intuitive,
simple, and flexible principles for optimal deployment by sUAS within a given combat scenario
to warfighters. The framework consists of four steps, each of which advances decision maker
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comprehension of the impact of sUAS on small unit combat effectiveness. The four steps are as
follows:
Step 1: Definition for the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, including input sUAS
deployment concept variables, small unit combat effectiveness metrics, and a combat scenario wherein sUAS could augment small unit combat capabilities
Step 2: A computer model for simulating and exploring the sUAS deployment design space
Step 3: Analysis of model-generated data evaluating the impact of sUAS deployment concepts on combat outcomes in the combat scenario
Step 4: Synthesis of the analyzed data into a set of scenario-, design-space-, and modelspecific principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment
In this thesis, the sUAS-small-unit decision support framework is first presented theoretically. The framework is universal in nature—it can be applied to any number of possible sUASsmall-unit deployment concepts or even outside the immediate context of sUAS-oriented combat
operations. Then, it is presented in practice. Each of the four framework steps is demonstrated
in the context of defining, modeling, analyzing, and synthesizing information about sUAS deployment in a specific combat scenario. The application of the framework is intended to showcase
its ability to synthesize critical sUAS application principles in the context of a specific combat
scenario.

1.2

Thesis Organization
The above introduces the need for an sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support frame-

work, the requirements for that framework, and the objectives of this thesis relative to addressing
that need. Chapter 2 introduces background information relevant to the work presented and Chapter 3 summarizes the technical approach to the research presented in this thesis. Chapters 4 and
5 contain excerpts from works submitted by the author for publication in peer-reviewed academic
journals that sponsor the ongoing international conversation surrounding the value of modeling
and simulation in military and aerospace applications. Together, they demonstrate the case study
application of the framework to explore and analyze the impact of sUAS technology on small unit
combat effectiveness in the context a specific test combat scenario. Chapter 4 specifically treats the
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development of an initial definition of the design space and of the combat scenario and details the
agent-based model for the framework. Chapter 5 fully defines the sUAS-small-unit design metrics,
presents an in-depth exploration of sUAS impact on small-unit combat effectiveness within the
context of the scenario presented in Chapter 4, and provides a synthesis of identified relationships
between sUAS metrics from that analysis into scenario-specific application principles for sUAS
deployment. Chapter 6 presents an evaluation of the decision support framework’s ability to help
decision makers identify critical information about sUAS deployment impact on small unit combat
effectiveness as well as a discussion of the framework’s limitations and potential future development. Because Chapters 3-5 consist of the primary technical content for this thesis, more detailed
summaries of their content are provided in continuation.
Chapter 3 presents the technical approach and project development plan for the decision
support framework. It explains the distinction between the framework itself and the implementation of the framework in the context of the case study sUAS-small-unit deployment combat
scenario explored in Chapters 4 and Chapter 5. It also summarizes the framework design requirements, the case study sUAS deployment design space explored in this work, and a high-level map
of the decision support framework. Its purpose is to inform the design and analysis decisions
presented in the ensuing chapters.
Chapter 4 describes the implementation of the framework in the context of a static-defense
combat scenario (in which the defenders maneuver only within a limited range to protect a specific
area from attacker incursions) that is used throughout this work and an agent-based model (ABM)
created to simulate and explore the uses and impacts of sUAS in that scenario. The ABM is
based on principles of small unit tactics derived from many of the US Marine Corps and US
Army operations and tactical manuals described in Chapter 2 as well as the experiences of veteran
warfighters from both of those branches [24, 25]. It also provides an initial analysis used to both
verify the model’s functions and inform the extended analyses discussed in Chapter 4. The majority
of the content in this chapter has been submitted for publication in the Journal of Defense Modeling
and Simulation.
Chapter 5 drastically expands the initial analysis conducted in Chapter 4. Whereas Chapter
4’s analysis was conducted as an initial exploration intended primarily to verify the model’s functionality, the methods and analysis presented in Chapter 5 represent an exploration with the intent
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to identify inter-variable relationships among two sUAS concept variables (the number of defender
UAVs and the sUAS patrol pattern variant used for each simulation run) and 33 combat effectiveness metrics in the context of the static-defense scenario (i.e., the chapter presents an exploration
of the static-defense scenario design space). The set of scenario-specific application principles presented at the end of the chapter are derived from the analysis of the model data gathered from that
model exploration. The majority of the content in this chapter has been submitted for publication
in the journal Expert Systems with Applications.
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CHAPTER 2.

BACKGROUND

This chapter’s purpose is to provide context critical to understanding the larger academic
and industry conversations surrounding sUAS technology, computer modeling as a means to explore complex systems, and current military decision-making processes. The background information presented herein is not intended to be comprehensive in nature; rather, it should be viewed as
an attempt to help readers feel comfortable with the concepts and techniques discussed and applied
throughout the rest of the thesis. As is generally the case, the best work is built upon a strong foundation laid by those who have come before and buttressed by the work of those laboring alongside.
This chapter intends to showcase the efforts of those individuals.

2.1

Model Development
One of the key components of the sUAS-small-unit decision support framework presented

in this thesis is its second step, the development of a computer model for simulating and exploring
the sUAS-small-unit design space. Thus, this section provides context for the development of such
a model and the various system components that it needs to include.

2.1.1

UAS Classifications and Existing Military UAS Solutions
Definition of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) categories varies between organizations.

However, one method is to simply categorize them in four groups based on weight and physical
size: very small (i.e., miniature, micro, or nano), small, medium, and large. Very small and sUAS
are typically defined by their ability to be carried and operated by one or two people, whereas
medium and large UAS are typically slightly smaller than or the same size as piloted aircraft [26].
This research considers both the very small and small categories and refers to them collectively as
sUAS.
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Current UAS implementation in the US military covers the spectrum of UAS sizes and
combat roles [27]. Larger UAS are typically used at the strategic and operational levels to support
ground operations, conduct aerial reconnaissance, and target enemy combatants [28, 29], whereas
sUAS are typically deployed at the tactical (squad and platoon) level, with sUAS like the AeroVironment RQ-11 “Raven” and RQ-12A “Wasp” serving in situation-awareness or surveillance roles
across the military branches [30–32].

2.1.2

UAS Operational Parameters
This work preliminarily explored a sample of 40 commercial and military UAS and re-

vealed over 20 commonly referenced UAS design and performance parameters. Of the 20 characteristic parameters, the most universally provided were cruise speed, weight, endurance range, and
payload capacity. Consequently, the high level UAV definition used in the computer model presented herein relies on these four chief characteristics to define a UAV, assuming that other details
can be included as necessary in future deployment concept analyses and evaluations. Among the
UAS products consulted were those produced by AeroVironment, Altavian, DJI, FLIR, Parrot, and
Yuneec that are highlighted in Table 2.1.

2.1.3

Battlefield Physical Environment Factors
The physical environment that surrounds combat is often at least as influential in its out-

come than the specific tactics used by the combatants. The allied Greeks defeated the Persians at
Plataea in large part because they held elevated and broken terrain that eliminated the advantages
of the Persian cavalry [47], the Arabs were able to destroy the Mongols at Ayn Jalut by luring
them into a narrow valley surrounded on three sides by troops concealed in heavy woods [48], and
various Afghan guerilla groups have made ingenious use of mountainous terrain to harass and exhaust occupying forces from the NATO alliance, the Soviet Union, the British Empire, and Mughal
India, among myriad others [49].
Physical environment factors heavily influence both warfighter and UAS performance. Topography often impacts the range at which warfighters can detect enemies and can provide a
decisive advantage during engagement [50, 51]. Physical barriers restrict troop movement [52].
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Table 2.1: A sampling of commercial and military fixed wing, multi-copter, and helicopter UAS
with selected design parameters. “AeroVi.” is an abberviation of “AeroVironment” and
“End.” is an abbreviation of “Endurance.”
Make
AeroVi.
AeroVi.
AeroVi.
AeroVi.
Altavian
DJI
DJI
DJI
DJI
DJI
DJI
FLIR
Parrot
Yuneec

Model
RQ-20B Puma AE [33]
RQ- 11B Raven [34]
Vapor 55 [35]
Wasp AE RQ- 12A [36]
nova F-7200 [37]
Matrice 210 [38]
Matrice 600 Pro [39]
Mavic 2 Pro [40]
Mavic Air [41]
spark [42]
Inspire [43]
Black Hornet PRS [44]
Anafi [45]
Mantis Q [46]

Cruise (km/h) Weight (kg) End. (min) Payload (kg)
47-83
6.3
>180
N/A
32-81
1.9
60-90
0.18
N/A
14.5
45-60
2.27
37
1.3
50
N/A
56
7.8
90
1.7
41
4.6
38
1.6
32
10
16-32
6
25
0.9
31
N/A
25
0.43
21
N/A
25
0.3
16
N/A
25
4
23-27
N/A
21.6
0.03
25
N/A
25
0.32
25
N/A
25
0.48
33
N/A

Weather events like wind, snow, rain, temperature, and dust storms govern the tides of military
history and modern military doctrine [53].

2.1.4

Battlefield Modeling and Simulation Techniques
In a design space as expansive as that surrounding sUAS and small unit combat, there

are millions of possible combinations of scenarios and sUAS applications. Physically testing every possible combination, or even the set of most likely combinations would require inestimable
quantities of physical resources and time. In such cases, the use of designs of experiments to quantitatively define the design space and tailor-made computer models to reliably simulate the system
and quickly explore the design space are extremely useful [17, 54, 55].
Agent-based models (ABM) are a type of computer model wherein a set of independent
“agents” interact with other agents and the environment in which they exist. Each agent possesses
unique characteristics that define its actions and is governed by a set of rules that limit its interactions with other agents and the environment. The environment operates similarly, with a set of
defining characteristics that determine how and when it is allowed to act with the agents operat-
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ing within it. As an agent-based simulation progresses, the interactive and often stochastic nature
of the agent-agent and agent-environment interactions results in observable, emerging behaviors
among agents and groups of agents. These emergent-behaviors, sometimes unpredictable by other
means, can be measured and used to describe complex, nonlinear system dynamics and explore the
impacts of various agent or environment characteristics on the other agents [56].
ABM has frequently been employed to explore the complex and internally stochastic environments, relationships, and processes common to military decision-making, with many potential
applications [57]. Because agents can be programmed to respond generally to a wide range of
inputs, ABM is especially valuable for simulating human behavior in a complex, dynamic environment [58, 59].
Multiple examples of ABM as platforms for simulating battlefield behaviors and activities can be found in the literature. These include various models of troop maneuvers and tactical
scenarios [60, 61], aspects of autonomous vehicle caravans in combat environments [62], and intelligent weapons systems [63]. ABM has also been used to explore the benefits of providing
independently operating units with increased access to battlefield information [64, 65] and in reducing civilian casualties during military operations [66,67]. Each of these examples include roles
like convoy escort, surveillance, information-gathering, and target tracking and identification that
could potentially be filled by sUAS.
Of particular relevance to this work are ABMs that explore tactical combat situations and
sUAS combat applications. Such models emphasize the actions of individual warfighters and small
units of warfighters [68]. They also explore possible applications for sUAS when deployed in
coordination with ground forces [69].

2.2

Military Doctrine and Decision Making
Because the framework is primarily intended for application within a military context,

it is crucial to understand the current state of military thinking regarding small unit operations,
decision-making processes, and the use of computer models to develop those decision-making
processes. This section summarizes those three areas.
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2.2.1

United States Military Doctrine
The small unit mission parameters addressed by this work execute primarily at the tacti-

cal military organizational level. These parameters are divided into two main categories, offense
and defense, though each is comprised of a near-infinite number of sub-categories. As per the
US Army’s publication “Offense and Defense,” there is both an art and a science to tactics, the
art consisting of decision-making in preparation for, and in response to, uncertain situations and
the science consisting of knowledge of the capabilities, techniques, and procedures characteristic of friendly and opposing forces [50]. The work presented herein attempts to imitate primary
principles of tactical art and science for both offensive and defensive activities by corresponding
the principles discussed in “Offense and Defense.” It also adheres to the principles of fires (lethal
and non-lethal effects such as small-arms and artillery delivered by warfighters against opposing
elements) principles and control discussed in “Fires” [70]. In terms of the details of tactics, this
work confines itself to high-level tasks like seizing or retaining an objective, breaching an enemyheld structure or perimeter, and disrupting an enemy’s activities, leaving the details of squad- and
platoon-level maneuvers to other models [71].
In addition to ground-based operations, this work concerns itself with sUAS operations.
Whereas the entire concept of sUAS incorporation into small unit operations is much newer than
ground-only principles, this area is less defined. To that end, the exploration of sUAS applications
in this work attempts to stay true to principles discussed in the 25-year plan for UAS employment
published by the US Army [72] and the personal experiences of warfighters who have used sUAS
[25]. To a large extent, the roles discussed in the 25-year plan and by veterans involve using sUAS
in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) roles, all of which in harmony with doctrine
surrounding the operations process already in practice in the US Army [73].

2.2.2

Military Decision-Making Process Models
One of the challenges present for battlefield decision makers is that the military decision-

making processes (MDMP) models used by various branches of the military are constantly changing as a result of emerging theories and developing technologies. For example, between 1993
and 1997, three distinct MDMP models were published by the US Army, each with varying levels
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of change in terms of the suggested decision-making process [74]. Such volatility in the framework for battlefield decision making is perhaps necessary and is not called into question in this
work. However, the ever-changing state of decision-making theory and requirements should be
accounted for in the development of decision-making tools involving new technology applications
like small-unit-deployed sUAS.
Though a prescriptive process works incredibly well in scenario testing and matches well
with the historical and psychological criteria for helping tactical and operational decision makers,
its effectiveness falls off sharply in practical integration because of imperfect implementation by
human decision makers and the inherent inflexibility of a prescriptive process [75]. The development of MDMPs from the beginning of the 21st century has reflected this observation, pushing for
increased flexibility and adaptability in the decision-making process. For example, the revisions
of “Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process” in the early 2010’s emphasized that commanders
can not make decisions linearly, following a purely prescriptive process [73]. Instead, the revisions
and surrounding literature argued that commanders needed to balance a conceptual, high-level
comprehension of a situation with the detailed planning process required to solve it [76, 77].
This new trend towards flexibility reflects the ideas of WWII fighter pilot and the arguable
father of modern strategic warfare, John Boyd, who advocated quick, flexible warfare based on
the principles of situational awareness and his OODA (Observation Orientation Decision Action)
Loop [78–80]. Effectively, the norm in MDMP has now shifted towards a descriptive process in
which decision makers are encouraged to exercise a degree of flexibility within a less rigid set of
rules and principles.

2.2.3

Computer Models as an Aid to Tactical Decision Making
One of the many uses for combat computer modeling is to use the computing power and

insight (at least within the context of the modeling environment) of the computer to observe and
synthesize vast amounts of data that are simply inaccessible to a human decision maker. At the
highest level, computer models can be used to explore and optimize new tactics and to explore the
features that should be included in future decision support models [81, 82]. In the area of sUAS
deployment, such models can be used to help operators plan optimal deployment techniques [64]
and to inform the development of future tactical decision support systems (TDSS) [83].
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TDSSs are one of the primary and most powerful forms of computer model decision support
tools. They use a combination of constructed models and real-time sensor input to synthesize
vast data sets and present it on-demand in a form that is useful to a human decision maker [84].
Experiments using such models have been used to demonstrate that information collected from
a small fleet of sUAS and properly presented to tactical decision makers can not only increase
warfighter survival rates, but also provide increased knowledge of the developing situation and
environment in such a way that model-users have a decided advantage over non-model-users in
terms of threat reaction time and mission completion [85, 86].
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CHAPTER 3.

3.1

APPROACH

Approach Summary
The sUAS-small-unit deployment decision Support framework development process pre-

sented in this thesis incorporates the system-level equivalent of the stages of product development
processes described in Fundamentals of Product Development, hereafter referred to as Fundamentals [16]. This section describes the technical approach to developing the desired framework and
each of its steps as described in Chapter 1. The technical approach includes the following:
• Outline of the project development plan outline
• Summary of the framework requirements and warfighter requirements for sUAS implementation
• Summary of the sUAS deployment variables and small unit combat effectiveness metrics
• Description of the scenario designed for sUAS-small-unit deployment testing in the context
of the model
• NetLogo GUI introduction
• Overview of the sUAS-small-unit deployment decision Support framework
The structure for the project plan borrows heavily from the principles taught in Fundamentals. Specifically, it employs the division of each stage of product development into a set of
end-of-stage outcomes that are further subdivided into intermediate outcomes. The hierarchy of
outcomes for each stage of system development is both an intuitive means of measuring project
progress and a method for organizing high-level goals into focused, achievable, small-scale tasks.
Such a system promotes organization and an easy means for maintaining project accountability.
Because warfighters are the sUAS end users in small infantry unit sUAS applications, not
considering their needs and opinions during the development of a framework that aids in decision making relative to sUAS-small-unit deployment would be beyond negligent. In addition to
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academic literature review, two warfighters, one active duty and one retired, were extensively interviewed during the development of this framework [24, 25]. Their opinions, along with those
reported in the literature, are presented in this chapter as general high-level requirements for
sUAS-small-unit deployment. They inform the definition of the sUAS-small-unit design space,
the computer model, and the nature of the principles that are the ultimate framework output. Many
of these requirements are identified individually or in the context of the technical content contained in Chapters 4 and 5, but are not always explicitly identified as design requirements in those
chapters. The full set of framework and warfighter sUAS-small-unit deployment requirements are
provided in this chapter for ease of reference and to improve understanding for the motivation
behind design decisions within the framework’s development process.
The sUAS-small-unit deployment design space is comprised of three types of information.
First, the sUAS deployment variables that can be manipulated in the form of sUAS deployment
concepts. Second, the combat effectiveness metrics used to evaluate the impact of sUAS deployment on combat outcomes. Third, the combat scenario in which sUAS are deployed and which
provides context to sUAS impact. The sets of sUAS variables and combat effectiveness metrics
are fully summarized in the Methods section of Chapter 5, but are presented here in summary.
The combat scenario considered in this work is defined in detail relative to its integration into the
computer model in the Methods section of Chapter 4. In addition to the technical detail presented
in that chapter, however, it is useful to view the scenario and its application within the model from
a high-level perspective. Consequently, it is included in this chapter as well.
Finally, this chapter concludes with a high-level description of the sUAS-small-unit deployment decision Support framework developed and employed in this thesis. The framework itself is
intended to be simple and intuitive and is based heavily around the product development principles
described in Fundamentals [16]. Its implementation in the context of a specific sUAS-small-unit
deployment scenario is described in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. As with the project design requirements, however, the framework components are not always explicitly defined as such in those
chapters. Thus, the summary description of the framework provided in this chapter is useful for
comprehending the scope and structure of the framework.
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3.2
3.2.1

Project Plan
Project Scope
The project plan incorporates two stages of system development. Stage 1 generates the first

framework step outlined in Chapter 1 and described below and implements it in the context of a
specific sUAS-small-unit deployment scenario. It incorporates outcomes and research activities
that produce a definition of the framework’s end-users and purpose for the research, development
of requirements definitions, definition of the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, and definition of the combat scenario for sUAS experimental deployment. Stage 2 generates the second
through fourth framework steps outlined in Chapter 1 and described below and implements them
in the context of a specific sUAs-small-unit deployment scenario. It incorporates outcomes and
design activities for framework development in the form of an agent-based computer model, experimental design, scenario and sUAS experiment analysis, and synthesis of analysis results into
a set scenario-specific application principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment in the experimental
combat scenario.
The stated objective of the thesis is to produce a decision support framework for sUAS
deployment in small infantry units. The framework’s purpose is to aid warfighter decision makers
in defining the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, developing a model for evaluating the
impact of sUAS experimental applications within that space, and analyzing model-generated data
with the goal of distilling principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment from the model for a specific
sUAS-small-unit deployment scenario. The research is foundational in focus, and emphasizes
defining exploration and analysis tools in the context of a concept exploration framework rather
than a finished decision-making product for immediate integration into the combat space. The four
steps of the decision support framework for sUAS-small-unit deployment are provided below for
reference.
Step 1: Definition for the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, including input sUAS
deployment concept variables, small unit combat effectiveness metrics, and a combat scenario wherein sUAS could augment small unit combat capabilities
Step 2: A computer model for simulating and exploring the sUAS deployment design space
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Step 3: Analysis of model-generated data evaluating the impact of sUAS deployment concepts on combat outcomes in the combat scenario
Step 4: Synthesis of the analyzed data into a set of scenario-, design-space-, and modelspecific principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment
To test and showcase the framework’s ability to direct the exploration of sUAS-small-unit
deployment within a specific combat scenario, the thesis also presents as a case study the framework’s application to sUAS deployment in a static defense scenario (the scenario is summarized
later in this chapter and described in detail in Chapter 4). The work resulting from applying the
four framework steps to the static-defense scenario is presented in Chapters 4 and 5. It is critical to
understand that the work presented in those chapters is not a full representation of the framework,
but rather an instance of one of its many potential applications. In other words, the framework
steps listed in the Chapter 1 apply generally to any of a number of sUAS-small-unit deployment
scenarios, whereas the work presented in Chapters 4 and 5 pertains specifically to the static-defense
scenario that acts as a case study for framework implementation within the thesis.

3.2.2

End-of-Stage Outcomes

Stage 1
1. A list of warfighter needs and requirements for sUAS-small-unit deployment
2. A list of requirements for developing a computer model for exploring sUAS-small-unit applications
3. A formal definition of the sUAS-small-unit design space
4. A definition of the combat scenario that will be used for framework testing, verification, and
design space exploration
Stage 2
1. A computer model that reasonably represents the combat scenario and fills all model requirements defined in Stage 1
2. An experimental plan for testing the scenario within the model over a range of input and
output variables
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3. Analysis data from the experiments described in the experimental plan
4. A set of principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment that can be tested physically and validated for warfighter training

3.2.3

Intermediate Outcomes
The high-level outcomes listed in Section 3.2.2 are further subdivided into the lower-level

outcomes described in this section. These outcomes represent a set of focused tasks that, when
achieved by means of any number of appropriate research and design activities, will inform the
design of the framework steps introduced in Chapter 1 and generate the project outcomes described
at the beginning of this chapter. The accomplishment of each of the intermediate outcomes for each
primary end-of-stage outcome signifies its completion.
Stage 1
Outcome 1
(a) Interviews with active-duty and retired warfighters to determine their experience with
sUAS and perspective on small-unit combat operations
(b) Search and compile literature surrounding roles that sUAS could fill in the small-unit
context
(c) Iteratively develop sUAS-small-unit requirements and deployment concepts with warfighter
consultants
Outcome 2
(a) Search and compile literature surrounding military-oriented modeling practices and
trends
(b) Search and compile published military manuals for small-unit and sUAS operations
and tactics
(c) Iteratively develop model requirements
Outcome 3
(a) Identify metrics of sUAS capability and operation from commercial UAV OEMs
(b) Determine which sUAS metrics will be held constant for experiments and which will
be manipulated, determine range of value manipulation
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(c) Identify the means by which militaries measure combat effectiveness from military
publications
(d) Iteratively define combat effectiveness metrics
Outcome 4
(a) Explore military operations culture, jargon, attitudes towards operations presentation,
and predominant operational paradigms in previously gathered literature
(b) Identify the paradigm for state-actor military operations (e.g., “department of defense,”
not “war office”)
(c) Identify correlations between military operations paradigms and potential sUAS applications. Create a list of possible combat scenarios for model development and framework testing.
(d) Define combat scenario, agent types, and scenario dynamics (this and subsequent outcomes assume that an agent-based model will be created, an assumption that reflects
the requirements that were identified in outcome 1.2.c)
Stage 2
Outcome 1
(a) For subsequent intermediate outcomes 2.1.b-2.1.e, search and compile military manuals and literature surrounding environmental considerations in combat
(b) Identify the primary functions for agents and agent-to-agent interactions in the model
(c) Define the environment in which the scenario will be conducted and its components
(d) Identify environment-to-agent interactions in the model
(e) Design in-model tools to measure and record combat effectiveness metrics during
model runs
Outcome 2
(a) Determine desirable experimental outcomes relative to the needs and requirements of
warfighters for sUAS-small-unit deployment. Identify the variables that must be manipulated to impact those outcomes and the metrics that define them.
(b) Design experiments to verify model correctness and explore sUAS applications
Outcome 3
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(a) Determine statistical methods for exploring data, identifying key relationships between
input variables and combat effectiveness metrics, and observing the impact of sUAS
deployment input variables on combat effectiveness metrics
(b) Outline analysis plan for model verification and sUAS-small-unit deployment principle
identification
(c) Conduct analysis
Outcome 4
(a) Identify inter-metric relationship trends and lessons learned from each analysis activity
over the range of combat effectiveness metrics
(b) Identify causal relationships between sUAS inputs and combat effectiveness metrics
(c) Synthesize most significant and common lessons into a set of sUAS-small-unit deployment principles

3.3

Project Requirements
The summary of project requirements listed in the following subsections are explained

in more detail in Chapters 1, 4, and 5. Supporting references from the literature and warfighter
interviews are included here, though a more full account of the supporting information is provided
in those chapters and in Appendix A.

3.3.1

Framework Requirements
Design-Space [16, 17]
– Must identify sUAS deployment variables
– Must identify small unit combat effectiveness metrics
– Must define the combat scenario for sUAS-small-unit deployment
Computer Model [17–21]
– Must simulate small unit combat interactions
– Must simulate environment impacts on small unit operations
– Must represent the actions and impacts of individual units and UAVs
– Must allow for testing multiple sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts
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– Must be able to observe and record the impact of sUAS deployment on small unit
combat effectiveness and combat outcomes
Analysis [17]
– Must consider and explore the full range of inter-variable relationships between all
sUAS deployment variables and small unit combat effectiveness metrics
– Must identify correlative and causal relationships between said metrics
– Must be able to identify key trends in inter-variable relationships
Principles [22–24]
– Must be intuitive to warfighters in the context of their experience and training
– Must be simple to facilitate quick comprehension, understanding, trust, and application
– Must be flexible to reflect the need for improvisation and interpretation in a dynamic
combat environment

3.3.2

Warfighter Requirements for sUAS-Small-Unit Deployment
Requirements from Warfighter Interviews [24, 25]
– Must help in identifying the location and operations of opponents
– Must be easy and intuitive to deploy, operate, and maintain
– Must not draw undesired attention from opponents
– Must not endanger the lives of operators or other warfighters
– Must be accepted by warfighters as useful to the mission objectives
– Must not distract from primary mission objectives and maneuvers
– Must not include autonomous weapon systems
Requirements from Literature [23]
– Must be operated by a human decision maker
– Must be operated locally
– Must be easy and intuitive to operate
– Must increase situational awareness
– Must have reliable communications protocols
– Must be trusted not only to officers, but to non-commissioned warfighters
– Must not be technologically exclusive to warfighters
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– Must not include autonomous decision-making or weapons systems
– Must be used in close air support roles (ISR, target acquisition and tracking, etc.)
– Must not increase risk to ground troops

3.4

Summary of the sUAS-Small-Unit Deployment Design Space Variables and Metrics
The set of sUAS operational concepts that could be tested via the sUAS-small-unit deci-

sion Support framework is extensive. For the purposes of this thesis, two variables were chosen to
represent a set of up to 54 deployment concept variants: the number of UAVs operated by the
defenders and the sUAS patrol method used in their operation. Each of the concept variant
differs only slightly in practical terms from the others, but could result in significantly different
impacts on warfighter combat effectiveness. For example, four UAVs conducting short-range circular patrol patterns might result in more or less contact with attacking units than eight UAVs
conducting long-range lawnmower patrol patterns, which could dramatically impact the outcome
of an engagement. More in-depth descriptions of these variables are provided in Chapters 4 and 5.
Similar to the number of sUAS operation concepts, the size and definition of a set of metrics
for evaluating small unit combat effectiveness could vary widely depending on the output information requirement by an individual experiment. For the purposes of the scenario analyzed using the
framework presented in this thesis, a set of 33 combat effectiveness metrics were considered. They
are listed below in summary and fully defined in Chapter 5 (this list also includes the two sUAS
operational concept variables discussed in the previous paragraph).
sUAS Operation Concept Variables
– Number of UAVs
– sUAS Patrol Method
Combat Effectiveness Metrics
– Cumulative UAS Flight Time
– UAS Contacts with Attackers
– Surviving Defenders
– Surviving Unmanned Aircraft System Ground Control Unit (UAS-GCU) Defenders
– Surviving Attackers
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– Attackers Neutralized by Indirect Fires (IDF)
– Attacking Squads that Achieved the defending area of responsibility (AoR)
– Attacking Squads that Achieved the AoR Intact
– Percent AoR Remaining
– Mission Completion Time
– Percent Time Attackers Were Tracked by Defenders
– Angle from Defenders to Attackers (at setup)
– Maximum Attacker Dispersal
– Maximum Defender Dispersal Before Attackers Reach AoR
– Maximum Attacker Dispersal Before Attackers Reach AoR
– Maximum Defender Dispersal After Attackers Reach AoR
– Maximum Attacker Dispersal After Attackers Reach AoR
– Distance of First Contact
– Time of First Contact
– Time of First IDF
– Time of Last IDF
– Total IDF
– Percent Long-Range IDF
– Percent Medium-Range IDF
– Percent Short-Range IDF
– Range of Closest IDF
– Range of Furthest IDF
– Time of First Defender Direct Fires (DF)
– Time of First Attacker DF
– Time of Last Defender DF
– Time of Last Attacker DF
– Total Defender DF
– Total Attacker DF
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3.5

Summary of the Combat Scenario and its Integration into the Computer Model
The computer model used as the basis of this work is an agent-based model described in

detail in Chapter 4. The model’s purpose is to allow for a number of sUAS deployment concepts
to be tested in various combat scenarios. For this work, the model incorporates a static-defense
combat scenario (in which the defenders maneuver only within a limited range to protect a specific
area from attacker incursions) between attacking and defending platoons of infantry. Hereafter
follows a description of the model’s key features and the scenario used for this analysis.
The agent-based nature of the model allows for a degree of attention to detail that illuminates the actions of an individual agent (e.g., an infantry squad or UAV) at near-continuous
intervals. Agent types within the model include infantry rifle squads, infantry UAS ground control
units (UAS-GCU), and UAVs. Each agent exists in, and interacts with, a simulated environment
that imitates topography, natural flora, and man-made structures. As agents interact with each other
and their environment, the variables that describe their physical and operational attributes change.
For example, if an infantry squad is moving up a slope in a wooded, populated area, the slope,
flora, and human structures will impede its movement, while the flora and structures will also provide it with defensive bonuses and better cover from detection by opposing agents. Similarly, a
UAV being operated by a UAS-GCU will have a much easier time locating opposing units in open
terrain than in ground covered by flora or structures. All of the model’s features represent at a high
level the physical and operational environment in which infantry must maneuver, communicate,
and conduct combat activities. The agent-agent and agent-environment interactions in the model
are based on various publications by the US Army and US Marine Corps as well as the individual
experiences of veteran warfighters [24, 25, 50–52, 70–72, 87].
The static-defense combat scenario under exploration involves a red-team-blue-team situation in which a platoon (four squads of nine warfighters each) of defending infantry is tasked with
protecting a geographical area of responsibility (AoR) from incursion by a numerically superior
platoon (five squads of nine warfighters each) of attacking infantry. The attackers’ task is to overrun the defenders’ AoR or destroy the defending platoon. All infantry units are limited to engaging
with direct fires only. To aid them in their defense, however, the defending team may be provided
with between zero and nine UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and indirect fires
(IDF) targeting. The addition of this sUAS, controlled by a UAS-GCU embedded within the pla25

toon in place of a standard rifle squad, allows the defenders to target attacking units with indirect
fires once they are detected by the sUAS. The scenario includes a 360◦ range of potential attacking
platoon starting positions at a variety of distances to allow for the possible influence of direction of
attack on combat outcomes (see Appendix B). The scenario is designed to showcase the potential
impacts of sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts on small unit combat effectiveness.

3.5.1

NetLogo User Interface

Figure 3.1: The NetLogo model user interface. Turquoise boxes are user inputs; tan boxes are
model outputs; and the map is in the center, with agent and environmental components defined in
Chapter 4.

NetLogo allows for two forms of user inputs: indirect, via a designed graphical user interface (GUI), or direct, through the program code. The GUI is particularly useful for live demonstrations and visualizing model behaviors. A screen shot of the NetLogo GUI developed with the
model presented herein is shown in Figure 3.1. The direct method of input was used to conduct
the analysis discussed in subsequent sections, as it allows for multiple model runs near simultaneously via the implementation of a design of experiments via NetLogo’s native “behavior space”
automation environment.
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3.6

Overview of the sUAS-Small-Unit Deployment Decision Support Framework
As described in Chapter 1, the sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support framework is

designed to provide decision-making warfighters in small infantry units with the information they
need to effectively deploy sUAS in combat scenarios. While this thesis does not and could not identify all of the scenarios or possible deployment concepts in which sUAS might help warfighters,
it does explore one possible scenario and several concepts. The exploration of that static-defense
combat scenario through the definition of a scenario-specific design space and agent-based model
represents a single instance, a case study, of the framework’s implementation.
The sUAS-small-unit decision support framework presented in this thesis allows for a methodical, organized, and efficient approach to sUAS deployment concept exploration. It encourages
decision-makers to identify scenarios in which sUAS may be useful, define specific variables for
sUAS operation and small unit combat effectiveness, and to explore that scenario-variable design
space through an intentionally designed computer model. Following completion of those steps, the
framework provides decision makers with tools and a pattern for analyzing the impact of sUAS on
small unit combat effectiveness within the specific combat scenario and deriving from that analysis
application principles for optimal sUAS deployment within the combat scenario under exploration.
The objective of the framework is to allow warfighter decision makers to derive information about
the impact of sUAS deployment on small unit combat effectiveness within a combat scenario and
distill that information into testable, applicable principles for sUAS deployment within the context
of the combat scenario. Such information would give the decision makers, and the warfighters
they represent, an advantage akin to that held by the artillery-equipped Ottomans at Constantinople when they are required to use sUAS on the battlefield. Figure 3.2 shows the framework’s high
level structure and work flow.
The framework guides the sUAS deployment concept exploration and analysis process in
four steps, as presented in Chapter 1. First, the sUAS-small-unit design space must be defined. This
is accomplished by identifying the set of sUAS concept variables, the set of combat effectiveness
metrics, and the combat scenario. Second, the design space must be explored via computer model.
This is accomplished via building a model (in the case of the case study presented in this thesis, an
agent-based model) that represents the scenario and can be exercised via a design of experiments
of all of the sUAS concept variables and combat effectiveness metrics defined in the design space
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Figure 3.2: High-level structure and work flow of the decision support framework for sUAS-smallunit deployment.

definition. Third, the data generated by the model should be explored and analyzed from high
to low level of detail using a correlation matrix or similar tool to identify high-level correlations
and graphical or other statistical tools to explore lower-level correlative and causal relationships.
Fourth, and finally, the results of the data exploration and analysis should by synthesized into a
set of scenario-specific application principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment that can be easily
understood and employed by warfighters during physical concept testing and implementation. The
principles are not considered to be academic, theoretical, or universal in nature; rather, they are
intended specifically to aid in sUAS deployment decision making within the context of the scenario
under examination and within the limits of the design space definition and model assumptions.
As noted above, this thesis does not and could not identify the full spectrum of possible
sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts. Instead, it explores as a case study a single test scenario
in the form of the static-defense combat scenario summarized above and discussed at length in
Chapters 4 and 5. To evaluate that scenario, the decision support framework was employed to guide
the process of defining the sUAS deployment design space relative to the test scenario, to develop
an agent-based model for exploring the scenario design space, to analyze the design space, and to
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synthesize principles for the application of sUAS within the confines of the scenario and limiting
assumptions of the model. The case study represented by this demonstration of the framework’s
functionality relative to the specific test combat scenario is presented in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER 4.

4.1

FRAMEWORK AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction
A pressing need exists to discover and analyze the system-level impacts of sUAS technol-

ogy on current and future multi-domain combat environments. The first challenge to determining
which of the multitude of sUAS deployment concepts are useful and advantageous is to constrain
the set of possible solutions to a specific design space. Half of that constraining process is to determine which sUAS concept variables should be tested and how their impact on small unit combat
effectiveness ought to be measured. The other half of the constraining process is defining the context, the scenario, in which the concepts should be evaluated. Using the requirements identified in
Chapters 1 and 3 for the design space section of the sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support
framework, this chapter provides an initial look at the input and output variables that might be
included in the design space definition and fully defines a combat scenario in which to examine
the impact of sUAS on small unit combat effectiveness.
An attempt at physically testing even the basic set of sUAS deployment concepts identified
for exploration in this chapter would be time and resource intensive, and physically testing only a
small sample of sUAS deployment concepts would likely not identify very many optimal configurations. Consequently, this chapter also defines an agent-based computer model (ABM) that can
simulate the effects of a broad range of sUAS deployment concepts on combat effectiveness. The
model is based on the operations and tactics manuals published by the US Marine Corps and US
Army and was developed in concert with veteran warfighters. Because the model is a high-level
representation of actual warfighter actions in the combat scenario also defined in this chapter, it
can quickly explore as the full sUAS-small-unit design space for the scenario and associated set
of design space variables. This computer modeling approach promises a high probability of identifying the a set of optimal sUAS implementation strategies and deployment principles for future
physical testing.
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This chapter presents the use of the first three stages of the decision support framework
that is the focus of this thesis to define, explore, and analyze the impact of sUAS on small unit
combat effectiveness in a static-defense combat scenario wherein a platoon of defenders must
protect a defined geographic area from a platoon of attackers. The first framework stage, design
space definition, is represented by the definition of the static-defense combat scenario and its input
and output metrics. The second stage’s development occupies the majority of the chapter, with a
detailed description of an agent-based model used to explore the specific static-defense scenario
under examination. Finally, the third framework stage, incorporating data exploration and analysis
of results from the model, is used to verify the model’s correctness and lays the foundation for a
deeper exploration presented in Chapter 5. The design space definition, agent-based model, and
high-level analysis presented in this chapter do not constitute the first three stages of the framework
itself, but rather are instances of its application to explore a specific scenario and design space.

4.2

Methodology
This section offers a description of the agent-based approach used to model battlefield

interactions between opposing small (i.e., platoon or squad level of organization) infantry units
and to simulate the impacts of various strategies for employing small-UAVs at that level. To
that end, it outlines why an agent-based approach was taken and presents the scenario used to
exercise the model. The various types of agents represented in the model, how they operate,
and the environment in which they operate are described. The section concludes by detailing
the experimental setup for an initial exploration of the model’s capability to 1) simulate multiple
combat scenarios and sUAS implementation strategies and to 2) provide data from which tacticsinforming decisions may be drawn.

4.2.1

Model and Scenario Summary

Agent-Based Modeling Approach
The model presented herein is based on the principles of agent-based modeling. Its primary objective is to simulate the interactions between small ground-based and airborne (individual
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UAVs) opposing forces. It also includes a high-level representation of the physical operating environment and its impact on agent operations. These interactions and impacts are based on sets of
rules defined for each agent and physical environment component.
The model employs random numbers, i.e., random seeds, to imitate the high degree of
randomness present in an actual battlefield system. Beginning with the random seed number generated for a given simulation run, the location and parameters for each aspect of the environment
and the decisions made at each time step by every in-model agent are informed by these randomly
generated numbers. Thus, the decisions of each agent are informed by the general rules laid out
in the model for all agents, but the specific reaction to a situation or impact of an agent’s action
is determined by the set of randomly generated numbers. The general objective for the model is
to create multiple experimental setups, changing the inputs to the system (i.e., the random seeds
and method of UAS implementation), and to observe the emerging behaviors that result from the
range of possible inputs. To understand trends in these emerging behaviors, multiple experiments
must be run in the model with different, randomized initial conditions, the results of which must
be subsequently compiled and analyzed using statistical methods.

Scenario Definition
The modern combat mission is an incredibly complex set of objectives and requirements,
with the constant need for decisions regarding tactics, maneuvers, fires, equipment supply and
use, and personnel resources. Though the model presented herein does not claim to fully account
for all of these factors, it does represent many of those critical to the scenario. It uses a staticdefense combat scenario to explore the impact of sUAS on small-unit combat effectiveness. In the
simulation scenario, a platoon of defending infantry, consisting of four rifle squads, is tasked with
protecting an arbitrarily defined area of responsibility (AoR) from a position of strength atop a
dominating terrain feature (i.e., relatively high, protected ground). A stronger platoon of attackers,
consisting of five rifle squads, is tasked with either taking control of 80 percent of the defenders’
AoR or eliminating the defending platoon in its entirety. In the scenario, the attackers know the
location of the defending AoR but not the location of defending squads within it. The defenders
know the general direction from which an attack will come (e.g., north, south, east), but nothing
more about the attackers’ strength or deployment. In some simulations, one of the defending
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rifle squads is replaced with an unmanned aerial system ground control unit (UAS-GCU) that
operates a single surveillance UAV used to patrol in and around the defenders’ AoR and has the
ability to order indirect fires on any detected attacking elements. The agent and environment
definitions, parameters, and interactions considered by the model for this scenario are explained in
the following sections.

4.2.2

Agent Definitions and Procedures
Model and results validation is one of the challenges generally faced in developing a model

that represents a complex systems-of-systems and deals with sensitive or secret information. The
described qualitative approach to quantifying various agent parameters negates some of the need
for numerical validation, moving the primary emphasis to concept and principle validation. First,
the model inputs, and thus results, are qualitatively comparative. The exact firepower brought to
bear by a given squad against another, the probability of inflicting a casualty based on the disparity
in squad-to-squad combat strength, or the probability of detecting an opposing unit based on how
far away they are and the type of terrain they are moving through, are all stand-ins for actual data
that cannot be reasonably acquired or publicly shared. Likewise, the casualty rates or number of
indirect fires placed during a specific engagement may not perfectly reflect reality.
To accommodate these limitations, the agent parameters described in this section serve as
qualitative markers to enable difference comparisons between two different scenarios. For example, in a given scenario, Tactic 1 was employed by Blue Force 1 against Red Force 1, and in the
same scenario, Tactic 2 was employed in Blue Force 2 against Red Force 2, with all other variables
held constant. Blue Force 1 experienced 20 percent fewer casualties during the simulation than
Blue Force 2, but Red Force 1 was able to capture 75 percent of Blue Force 1’s area of responsibility, as opposed to Red Force 2 capturing only 33 percent of Blue Force 2’s area of responsibility.
Thus, a trade analysis can be conducted to determine which outcome, and thus which tactic, is
more desirable given the scenario.
Because data on the level of detail necessary to validate this model and its results is inaccessible, this model’s appropriateness and basis in reality is primarily validated by two other
means. First, the parameters and procedures for each agent type are drawn as much as possible
from US military publications detailing, among other things, general principles of offense and
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defense [50], principles of platoon-level tactical tasks and maneuvers [71, 73], and area-specific
rules of engagement [87]. The second means of validation is via consulting with combat veterans
throughout the model development process. These individuals provide invaluable insight into the
realities of combat that tactics manuals simply cannot. For this work, two individuals, Capt. Nick
Baker, USMC and Ret. Maj. Mark Duffin, US Army and National Guard were consulted. Through
a series of informal discussions, Capt. Baker provided unclassified information and insight into
proper symbology, unit organization, combat tactics (deployment, maneuvers, and fires), and translation of these concepts into the modeling environment [24]. Maj. Duffin oversaw the operation
of AeroVironment Raven RQ-11 UAVs during Operation Iraqi Freedom and provided unclassified
information and insight into their common uses during that time as well as general consultation for
model development [25].

Attacking and Defending Rifle Squads
Rifle Squad Parameters

The rifle squad is the basic ground unit in the simulation for both the

defending and attacking teams and is composed of nine warfighters (US Army standard) armed
with small arms and body armor. All unit attributes are represented in the model by a set of unitdefining parameters that modify each squad’s interactions with the environment and with other
agents in the simulation. A list of these squad parameters is provided in Table 4.1. As a simulation
progresses, the parameter values change with each time step to represent a squad’s increased or
decreased abilities relative to the number of warfighters it can field during combat interactions and
the environment’s impact on its capabilities.
Each parameter (with the exception of number of warfighters per squad) is a quantitative
representation of the qualitative attributes of a squad within the model, allowing for a high degree
of flexibility in the way that squads are represented. In the case of the scenario being used in
this work, attacking and defending squads initially operate with parity relative to their numerical
and combat capabilities. However, in a hypothetical case, squad types representing mechanized
infantry might be desired. In that case, ϒa,wep might be changed to 1.5, V0 to 2, and ϒV,arm to 1, with
a new additive defensive parameter called “Defense Adder Vehicle (αde f −v )” might be created in
order to represent the relative differences in firepower, speed, and armor between mechanized and
normal infantry. Cases where local militias or insurgent groups or, as will be discussed in the next
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Table 4.1: Rifle squad parameters and their initialized values for attacking and defending squads.
Parameter
Number of Warfighters (Nw )
Attack Multiplier Weapons (ϒa,wep )
Attack Factor (A)
Defense Multiplier Armor (ϒd,arm )
Defense Adder Structure (αd,s )
Defense Adder Flora (αd, f )
Defense Factor (D)
Combat Strength (C)
Speed Base (V0 )
Speed Multiplier Armor (ϒV,arm )
Speed Multiplier Terrain (ϒV,ter )
Speed Factor (V )

Initial Value
9
1
Nw ϒa,wep
1
0
0
Nw ϒd,arm + αd,s + αd, f
A+D
1
0.8
0
V0 (ϒV,arm + ϒV,ter )

section, UAV-operating infantry, are desired within the simulation can be easily accommodated as
well.
Attacking Rifle Squad Procedures

In the scenario, the attacking team consists of five, nine-

warfighter rifle squads. As stated, their primary objective is to either secure 80% of the defending
team’s AoR (representative of overrunning the defenders’ position) or eliminate all squads on the
defending team. Their decision-making process reflects these goals. At every time step, each
attacking squad proceeds through the logic tree shown in Figure 4.1 from Decision aA through
each subsequent decision (aB-aH), a process that ultimately determines which action (a1-a8) they
will take during that time step. Note that, though the agent-based model used in this thesis is
stochastic in nature, the decision trees are entirely deterministic—agent deviation from the logic in
the tree is not accounted for, though it could be in future work. The deterministic attribute is shared
by the decision-making processes for all agents within the ABM used in this thesis to examine the
static-defense scenario. Brief descriptions of the decisions and actions that correspond with Figure
4.1 are given in Table 4.2.
Following is an example of how the decision-making process for one attacking rifle squad
might proceed. Attacking Rifle Squad 1 (AR-1) begins the simulation at an arbitrary distance from
the center of the defending AoR and in close proximity to the other four attacking rifle squads.
They do not detect any opposing squads (aA) or UAVs (aB), none of their allies need support (aD),
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and they are not already located within the defending squads’ AoR (aE), so, along with the other
attacking squads, they proceed to move towards the known center of the defending AoR (a4). They
repeat this process for some time until, at some point, they detect a defending UAV flying overhead
(aB) and, observing that there are no structures in the immediate vicinity that would provide refuge
from detection by the UAV (aC), proceed to move away from the vicinity of the other attacking
squads (a2) in an effort to simultaneously avoid detection by the UAV and minimize the risk of their
allies being caught in any indirect fires that the UAV operators might direct at them. After moving
for some time, they lose contact with the UAV (aB) and continue towards the defending AoR (a4).
Upon reaching the general vicinity of the opposing force’s AoR (aE), they begin to secure the area
(a5) along with their allies, who had continued to move towards the defending AoR while AR-1
was moving away from the UAV. At some point, one of the other attacking squads makes contact
with the platoon of defending squads and, being outmatched in combat strength, contacts the other
attackers, including AR-1, asking for support (aD). AR-1 and the other attacking squads that are
not engaged with the defenders move to support their ally in need (a3). Upon reaching the general
vicinity of their ally in need, AR-1 makes contact with the defending squads (aA), finds that they
are on an even footing strength-wise (aF), and proceeds to engage them with direct fires (a6). At
some point, the skirmish turns against the attackers and, AR-1, finding themselves outmatched
(aF) but near a building that would give them a strong defensive footing (aG, aH) retreats to that
point. From this point, the simulation would continue until either the defending or attacking force
accomplished one of its primary objectives.
Defending Rifle Squad Procedures In the simulation, rifle squads make up three to four of the
four-squad platoon of defenders (in simulations with defending UAVs present, one rifle squad is
replaced by a UAS-GCU squad). The defenders’ objectives are to intercept the attacking elements
and prevent them from overrunning their position while not being eliminated by the attackers
themselves. The primary role of the defending rifle squads is to support each other as they make
contact with attackers—they will not pursue retreating attacking squads and, for this simulation,
will remain in close proximity to each other at the center of their AoR in order to maximize their
ability to overwhelm incoming attacking elements and minimize their own casualties. Additionally,
the model assumes that defending rifle squads do not have the capability to call indirect fires onto
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Figure 4.1: Agent procedure logic for attacking rifle squads. Reference Table 4.2.

attacking elements, as that duty is relegated to UAS-GCU squads. The authors recognize that
this assumption is not always correct in the context of modern combat, but employ it as a means
to simplify the assignment of responsibilities between defending elements. At every time step,
each defending rifle squad proceeds through the logic tree shown in Figure 4.2 from Decision
dA through each subsequent decision (dB-dE), a process that ultimately determines which action
(d1-d5) they will take during that time step. Brief descriptions of the decisions and actions that
correspond with Figure 4.2 are given in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.2: Symbol key for attacking rifle squad procedure logic. Reference Figure 4.1.
Decision Definition
aA
Opponent ground unit detected
aB
Opponent small-UAV unit
detected
aC
Cover nearby to shield from
detection, fires
aD
Ally in need of support
aE
Positioned within opponent AoR
aF
Combat advantage maintained
aG
aH

Action Definition
a1
Retreat to nearest cover
a2
Retreat away from allies

Cover nearby
Nearby cover provides combat
advantage

a3

Move to nearest ally in need

a4
a5
a6

Move to opponent AoR
Secure local opponent AoR
Intercept opponent, engage
with direct fires
Retreat to cover
Retreat outside of opponent
AoR

a7
a8

d4
No

No

dD

Yes

dE

Yes

d5

No

d3

Yes

dC
Yes

START

dA
No

d1

Yes

dB

No

d2

Figure 4.2: Agent procedure logic for defending rifle squads. Reference Table 4.3.
Defending UAS-GCU Squads
UAS-GCU Squad Parameters The unmanned air systems ground control unit (UAS-GCU) is
the sole operator of UAVs in the model. Their basic parameters are the same as those for defending
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Table 4.3: Symbol key for defending rifle squad procedure logic. Reference Figure 4.2.
Decision Definition
Action Definition
dA
Opponent ground unit detected
d1
Move to nearest ally in need
dB
Ally in need of support
d2
Hold Position
dC
Combat advantage maintained
d3
Engage with direct fires
dD
Cover nearby
d4
Retreat to cover
dE
Nearby cover provides combat advantage
d5
Retreat to allies

and attacking rifle squads, referenced in Table 4.1. There are, however, a few small differences.
First, UAS-GCUs are assumed to be more easily detectable than normal rifle squads, as their
operation of UAVs have been reported to provide enemy elements with improved certainty of their
location [24]. This disadvantage is represented in Table 4.7. Second, the maximum number of
UAVs that a UAS-GCU can operate becomes an additional parameter, Nu , and cannot exceed the
number of warfighters in the squad, Nw . Finally, when operating one or more UAVs, a UAS-GCU
squad’s combat capabilities are diminished linearly by the number of UAVs they are operating,
down to zero if all squad members are operating a UAV. The equation for the attack factor in Table
4.1 becomes A = (Nw − Nu )ϒa,wep .
Defending UAS-GCU Procedures

When UAV capabilities are an option for defenders in the

simulation, UAS-GCU squads compose one of the four squads in the defending platoon. Rather
than taking a pure infantry role, UAS-GCUs have two special roles. Their primary role is to
deploy and operate small UAVs that they have carried with them into combat to patrol, search
for, detect, and track attacking units. Additionally, they use the information gathered from UAV
surveillance to order indirect fires (IDF) against attacking elements. Indirect fires are assumed to be
assets operated above the platoon level and thus operated by some independent unit external to the
immediate simulation space but accessible by the model agents through radio or other extra-lineof-sight communications. In the event that they or the other defending squads are directly engaged
by attacking elements, they will forgo their primary objective as UAV operators and behave as a
normal rifle squad, but with the added ability to direct indirect fires at attacking elements that are
not too close to other defenders. At every time step, each defending UAS-GCU squad proceeds
through the logic tree shown in Figure 4.3 from Decision cA through each subsequent decision
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(cB-cH), a process that ultimately determines which action (c1-c8) they will take during that time
step. Brief descriptions of the decisions and actions that correspond with Figure 4.3 are given in
Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Agent procedure logic for defending UAS-GCU squads. Reference Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Symbol key for defending UAS-GCU squad procedure logic. Reference Figure 4.3.
Decision
cA
cB
cC
cD
cE
cF
cG
cH

Definition
Opponent ground unit detected
Ally in need of support
Maximum number of UAVs launched
UAVs tracking opponents
Combat advantage maintained
Enemy within indirect fires range
Cover nearby
Nearby cover provides combat advantage

Action
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8

Definition
Move to nearest ally in need
Launch UAVs
Patrol with UAVs
Engage with indirect fires
Abort UAVs
Engage with direct fires
Retreat to allies
Retreat to cover

Defending UAVs
UAV Parameters

The last agent-type represented in the model is the UAV itself. Unlike squads,

which represent a group of individual warfighters, each UAV agent represents one small UAV,
deployed and operated directly by a member of a UAS-GCU squad. In the scenario presented in
this work, UAVs are only employed by the defending team. However, UAS capabilities could be
extended to the attackers with little difficulty by modifying the decision-making algorithms for
attacking UAS-GCU squads and attacking UAVs. Additionally, UAVs operate exclusively as tools
for surveillance. Again, though, extending UAV-payload capabilities to include weapons systems
or other logistical functions within the model could be accomplished with minimal difficulty.
UAV parameters are represented in Table 4.5. As with the ground-based agents in the
model, distance, time, and speed are dimensionless and can be converted into real-world equivalents as desired. In the model, UAVs employ a unicycle motion model—they have a constant
velocity, no turning constraint, and a heading adjusted as per the requirements of their assigned
patrol method (Figure 4.4) or tracking route.
Defending UAV Procedures

UAVs are assumed to be operated directly by a member of a UAS-

GCU. Though the model does not specify the level of autonomy that UAVs employ in flight while
proceeding through their patrol routes or tracking presumed attacking elements, it does assume that
they are directly connected to a member of the UAS-GCU from which they originated. The UAV
itself cannot authenticate the presence of an enemy and directly ask that it be targeted by indirect
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Table 4.5: Parameters and their initialized values for defending UAVs. θ and Top depend on the
patrol pattern (and thus type of UAV) determined by the experiment.
Parameter
Air Speed (Sair )
Heading (θ )
Payload Type (L)
Maximum Range in time steps (Ttot )
Patrol Pattern (P)

Initial Value
4
variable
0 (surveillance)
100
variable

fires. Instead, the human user must, as is standard practice, authenticate the information received
from the UAV before deciding to act upon it [87]. This decision-making process is handled at a
high level in the model by the general assumption that, if the UAS-GCU is engaged by an enemy
or moving, it cannot operate its UAVs. Consequently, if the UAS-GCU is engaged by an opponent,
its UAVs will self destruct (alternative assumptions could be that UAVs would hover in place or
land if they have no fuel or that they would autonomously return to the UAS-GCU; however, these
assumptions are not included in the scenario tested in this work).
While deployed and not tracking attacking elements, UAVs engage in one of six types of
patrol routes, depending on the simulation input parameters. These are shown in Figure 4.4 and
categorized as follows: long or short range concentric circles around the operating UAS-GCU,
long or short range deteriorating radial lawnmower patterns emanating from the operating UASGCU, and long or short range random flight in the general area around the operating UAS-GCU.
When deployed, they launch at a random angle within the 180-degree arc facing the general area
of deployment of the enemy squads (representing that the defenders know generally from which
direction the attackers will approach, but not specifically). When they lose contact with an enemy
element they were tracking, UAVs begin an expanding concentric circle search pattern beginning
at the location of lost contact in an attempt to reestablish contact with the attacking element.
In the model, UAVs have defined operational and maximum time spans. The maximum
time span for all UAVs is fixed at 100 time steps. The operational time span, however, is determined
by the type of patrol route assigned for a given simulation, with generally shorter time spans (25-50
time steps) given for short range routes and generally longer time spans (50-75) for longer range
routes. UAVs typically return to their operating UAS-GCU once their operational time span is met,
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Figure 4.4: Three general patrol route patterns for patrolling UAVs (left to right: deteriorating
concentric circles, deteriorating radial lawnmower, and semi-random). Each pattern is applied in
long and short range versions.
but will stay deployed for up to the maximum time span if they are tracking an opponent. Once
a UAV has reached its maximum time span, it will crash. The model assumes that, when UAVs
return to their UAS-GCU, their expended battery (or empty fuel tank; the exact method of fueling
is not defined by the model) is swapped for a full one and they are redeployed. For this simulation,
if a UAV crashes or self destructs, it is also assumed that the UAS-GCU carries a sufficient number
of extra UAVs to continue deploying them until the end of the simulation.
At every time step, each defending UAV proceeds through the logic tree shown in Figure 4.5
from Decision uA through each subsequent decision (uB-uD), a process that ultimately determines
which action (u1-u5) they will take during that time step. Brief descriptions of the decisions and
actions that correspond with Figure 4.5 are given in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Symbol key for defending UAV procedure logic. Reference Figure 4.5.
Decision
uA
uB
uC
uD

Definition
Operating UAS-GCU is safe
Opponent ground unit detected
Operational fuel spent
All fuel spent

Action
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5

Definition
Abort
Return to operating UAS-GCU
Patrol
Search for lost opponent
Track opponent

Agent-Agent Interactions
The primary forms of ground combat interaction represented in the model are communication between friendly forces and fires (direct and indirect) between opposing forces. Commu43
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Figure 4.5: Agent procedure logic for defending UAVs. Reference Table 4.6. At decision uB, if
the condition was met at the current time step, the UAV proceeds to decision uD; if the condition
was met at the previous time step but not at the current time step, then the UAV executes action u4;
if the condition was not met at the previous or the current time step, the UAV proceeds to decision
uC.
nication also occurs between friendly UAVs and ground forces when UAVs are deployed with
the defending elements. Finally, once a defending UAV has located an attacking element, it will
shadow its movements in an attempt to maintain contact in order to facilitate defending ground
force maneuvers and the guidance of indirect fires at the attacking element. The model assumes
that all friendly forces have both line-of-sight and extra-line-of-sight communications methods and
that communication is always perfectly reliable.
Attacking Squad-Attacking Squad

Communication between attacking squads primarily takes

two forms. First, attacking squads constantly update each other with each squad’s location. Second, when confronted by defending ground elements, an attacking squad will inform the other
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attackers of the defending element’s current location and, if outmatched in terms of combat power,
ask that the other attacking elements maneuver to come to their aid.
Attacking Squad-Defending Squad There is no modeled communication between attacking
and defending ground forces, only engagement by means of direct and indirect fires. When attacking squads detect defending squads, they will move to engage them with direct fires unless they are
at a disadvantage, in which case they will retreat towards the nearest friendly squad. When defending squads detect attacking squads via UAV surveillance, the defending UAS-GCU will use the
information from the UAV to engage the attackers with indirect fires, the caliber of which depends
on the range at which the enemy is detected (large, medium, or small). When defending squads
detect attacking squads via line-of-sight, the defending rifle squads will engage the attackers with
direct fires, as will defending UAS-GCUs. Defending UAS-GCUs also have the option of engaging line-of-sight detected attackers with indirect fires if the attackers are a safe distance away from
other defending ground elements.
The relationship governing the effect to which one squad’s direct fires cause casualties in
another squad is given in Equation 4.1. It is based on the difference in combat strength between
the two squads, as defined in Table 4.1, and follows a sigmoid curve. The sigmoid curve equation
represents the idea that, if the difference between two squads’ combat strengths is small, the probability of inflicting casualties on an opponent is close to 50/50. If the difference between combat
strengths is large and unfavorable, a squad’s chance of inflicting casualties on an opposing squad is
very small. If the difference is large and favorable, the chance of overwhelming the opponent and
inflicting casualties is very large. As with the other equations used in the model, this relationship
is qualitative in function and does not attempt to accurately reflect actual casualty rates so much as
the principle of firepower superiority.

Pc =

Csel f −Copp + 1
4(10 + |(Csel f −Copp )|

(4.1)

where Pc is the probability of inflicting a casualty on the opponent and Csel f and Copp are the
combat strengths of the squad conducting direct fires and the targeted opposing squad, respectively.
The other numerical values in the equation are used for model tuning. After Pc is calculated, it is
compared to a number between zero and one (randomly generated using the second of the random
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seeds discussed in the experimental setup). If Pc is less than the random number, a casualty is
inflicted on the opposing squad; if it is not, then no casualty is inflicted.
Equation 4.1 and the decision-making process for casualty infliction associated with it is
also used for determining the effect of indirect fires directed by a defending UAS-GCU at an
attacking squad. If attacking squad are more than 25 cells (375 m) away from a defending squad,
then it will be targeted by large-caliber IDF. If Pc is less than the random number, then the same
random seed is used to generate an integer between zero and five. The targeted squad takes the the
casualties at the number of the random integer. If the attacking squad is between 15 and 25 cells
away (225 m to 374 m), then it will be targeted by medium-caliber IDF, but only between zero
and 4 casualties will be taken if Pc is less than the random integer. Finally, if the attacking squad
is between five and 15 cells away (75 m and 224 m), it will be targeted by small-caliber IDF and
between zero and three casualties will be taken if the criteria are met. The exact caliber of each
type of IDF is not specified, though it is assumed that short-range (75-225 m) would be provided
by mortars, not artillery. It is also assumed that squads that are reduced to less than two members
by IDF will become functionally irrelevant in a direct-fires combat scenario and are consequently
removed from the simulation entirely. These relationships are qualitative and meant to represent
the advantages of detecting opponents at the furthest distance possible.
Defending Squad-Defending Squad

Defending squads communicate with each other in much

the same way that attacking squads do. All defending squads communicate their current location
to their allies. Additionally, when they detect an attacking element and determine that they are at a
disadvantage, they will ask the other defending squads to move to their aid.
Defending UAV-Defending Squad

UAVs only communicate directly with their operating UAS-

GCUs. That communication consists of the UAV informing the UAS-GCU of the location of
attacking units it has detected and whether or not it has maintained contact with those elements.
The UAS-GCU communicates with the UAV by telling it what path or patrol route to take, how
to respond if it loses contact with an attacking element, the UAS-GCUs current location, and
when the UAV should either return to the UAS-GCU or abort. In reality, any of these forms of
communication might be handled either automatically or manually by the UAS-GCU or the UAV.
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At the level of communication depicted by the model, however, the exact implementation does not
necessarily have to be defined because of functional similarly.
Attacking Squad-Defending UAV

For the model and analysis described in this work, the only

interaction between defending UAVs and attacking squads is line-of-sight observation. When a
UAV detects an attacking element, it follows it by mirroring its movements. When an attacking
element detects a defending UAV, it will attempt to evade it by moving away from its allies towards
any form of nearby cover, unless it is already engaged with a defending ground element. In other
versions of the model or for different analysis, other interactions between UAVs and opposing
ground forces might include either offensive actions taken by the UAV against the ground forces
or defensive actions in the form of counter-UAS measures taken by the ground forces against the
UAV.

4.2.3

Environment Definitions and Parameters
One of the most influential factors in combat is how its participants take advantage of the

environment within which they are fighting. This model takes a layered approach to simulating
the effects of various terrain and other environment features, stacking the effects from natural
topography, flora, and human-built structures on the movement and operations of each agent. The
basic attributes of each environment component in the model and their interactions with each type
of agent are described in this section. Each of the layers described is illustrated in the exploded
map in Figure 4.6.

Map and Time Definitions
The simulation world is composed of a square matrix of 160 by 160 cells, each cell representing a 15m by 15m space in the real world. Consequently, the simulated battlefield is 2400 by
2400 meters, or 5.76 km-squared. Additionally, the model measures time in time steps with each
step representing 10 seconds of real world time.
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Figure 4.6: Exploded map, showing the composite map and each of the five layers (three
environment- and two mission-related) in the model. From bottom to top: 0) Composite of all
five layers, 1) Topography, 2) Flora, 3) Structures, 4) Ground Unit Operations and Scenario, 5)
UAS Operations.

Terrain Features
Topography

An abstract, arbitrary elevation value between zero and one is randomly generated

for each cell. Those values are then smoothed such that a near-continuous gradient between and
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across patches is developed, with relatively high ground indicated by elevation values closer to one
and low ground indicated by values closer to zero (Figure 4.6 “Layer 1”).
Flora Natural barriers such as trees and rocks are collectively represented in the model by passive agents called “flora” (Figure 4.6 “Layer 2”). A desired number of flora center locations are
randomly located on the simulation map. More flora centers will result in a more obstacle-cluttered
simulation space. From each flora center, surrounding flora are generated radially in an outward
direction to a predetermined distance. The abstract density of each flora agent varies randomly
between values of zero and three and, as with the topography, is smoothed slightly to represent
a more continuous density gradient. The primary roles of flora within the model are to slow the
motion of agents, restrict their visibility, and provide defensive barriers during combat.
Structures

A variety of man-made structures are present on almost any contemporary battlefield.

The model takes a simplified approach to representing these structures, approximating them a set
of “neighborhoods” of desired number and density. The neighborhoods are randomly distributed
over the map to represent the general density of human development in the simulation space.
Within each neighborhood, a fill density is prescribed, with the density representing the percentage
of the cells spatially encompassed by the neighborhood that will contain a structure (Figure 4.6
“Layer 3”). Structures primarily represent buildings or other obstacles, impeding movement while
increasing the defensive capabilities of agents housed within them.

Interactions Between Agents and Environment
Ground Unit-Environment Interactions

Ground units (attacking rifle, defending rifle, and de-

fending UAS-GCU squads, for the scenario presented in this research) interact with and are impacted by the simulation environment in a variety of ways, as outlined in the following paragraphs.
When ground elements move across the simulation space, their speed is directly affected
by their environment. For this model, only the topographical gradient directly affects movement,
though the density of flora or structures around a unit could also be made to impact speed with
little difficulty. Consequently, ground elements move more slowly across steep ground than they
do over more level ground. The base speed equation for each ground unit in the simulation is
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updated at each time step and is given in Table 4.1. The “Speed Multiplier Terrain” (ϒV,ter ) factor
is updated as in Equation 4.2:
ϒV,ter = λt (h+ − h0 )

(4.2)

where ϒV,ter is the speed multiplier for terrain, λt is a correction factor preliminarily determined through the model tuning to be equal to 5, and h+ and h0 are the normalized elevation
values between zero and one for the cell directly ahead of an agent and the cell the agent currently
occupies, respectively.
Flora and structural features will boost a ground unit’s defensive capabilities via the “defense adder flora” (αd, f ) and “defense adder structure” (αd,s ) ground unit parameters defined in
Table 4.1. Again, these values are updated at each time step. For the model presented in this work,
the qualitative values associated with these variables are αd, f = 2 and αd,s = 5.
In addition to impacts on speed, ground units will experience an increased probability of
detecting opponents when situated on high ground. Additionally, a ground unit occupying the same
space as flora or a structure decreases the probability that an observing ground unit will detect it.
The base equation for detection follows a normal probability curve, as shown in Equation 4.3.
Attacking ground units also use this equation to detect defending UAVs.


(xd − µd )2
Pd = λd q
exp −
2σd2
2πσ 2
1

(4.3)

d

where Pd is the probability of detection, λd is a preliminarily determined correction factor,
σd is the standard deviation for detection probability, xd is the distance between the detecting agent
and the candidate agent for detection, and µd is the mean of the probability curve (for the purposes
of this work, µd is always zero).
The values for Pd largely depend on how the detecting agent and the agent potentially being
detected are interacting with their immediate environment. The correction factor was determined
preliminarily through the model tuning process to be λd = 2.5σd for ground units detecting other
ground units and λd = 5σd for ground units detecting UAVs. The standard deviation default value
is σd = 2.5. Adaptations of the default standard deviation are given in Table 4.7. In the table, all
conditions given are relative to the agent that is a candidate for detection (e.g., the candidate for
detection is located in a structure). In the model, these conditions are checked in order as presented
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and may override each other. ρ f is a qualitative measurement for the density of flora, between zero
and three. ∆h is the difference in elevation between the detecting agent and the candidate for
detection (the difference in elevation between agents does not apply to UAV detection by ground
units).

Table 4.7: Conditions for and adaptations of ground unit detection standard deviation (σd ).
Condition
Default
Located in flora
Located in structure
Is UAS-GCU
Difference in elevation
σd < 0

Equation Adaptation
σd = 2.5
ρ
σd = σd − 2f
σd = 0.5
σd = 1.5σd
σd = σd + 2∆h
σd = 0

The value of Pd will always be between zero and one. After Pd is calculated, a random
number between zero and one is calculated. If the random number is less than Pd , then the detecting
agent has successfully detected the other agent and will adapt its behavior as per its operating
procedures.
The final form of ground unit-environment interaction is the effect that the environment
has on the probability that a ground unit will lose contact with another agent that it has already
detected. This process is very similar to that used for ground units detecting other agents. The
method for calculating the probability of losing contact is an inverse normal distribution equation
given by Equation 4.4.


(xl − µl )2
Pl = 1 − λl q
exp −
2σl2
2πσ 2
1

(4.4)

l

where Pl is the probability of losing contact, λl is a preliminarily determined correction
factor, σl is the standard deviation for the probability of losing contact, xl is the distance between
the detecting agent and the agent with which contact might be lost, and µl is the mean of the
probability curve (for the purposes of this work, µl is always zero). For ground units, λl = 25 and
σl = 10; both values were determined during the model tuning process and provide the net effect
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that it is more difficult to lose contact with another agent after it has been detected than it is to
detect it in the first place.
UAV-Environment Interactions

Similar to ground units, airborne agents (defending UAVs, for

the scenario presented in this research) are also affected by their environment. The model generally
assumes that they operate at an altitude that situates them above the highest topography, flora,
and structures. Consequently, UAV speed and detectability are not affected by the simulation
environment. It follows that, if UAVs were to enter combat with ground or other airborne agents,
they would not receive any defensive bonuses from the ground-based environment because they do
not interact with it.
The primary form of UAV-Environment interaction comes from the effect that flora and
structures have on a UAV’s ability to detect ground units moving through them. As the UAVs in
the scenario are operated locally by warfighters in a UAS-GCU, the model assumes that the ability
for the warfighter operating a UAV to detect opponents moving through flora would be limited.
Similarly, the model assumes that a UAV cannot detect opponents moving through structures. This
UAV handicap stems from the current practice of not directing indirect fires into structures where
opponents may be sharing space with undetected civilians [87]. The base equation for UAVs
detecting ground units is Equation 4.3, the same equation used for ground units detecting other
agents.
As is the case with ground units, the values for Pd for UAVs depend on how the agent
potentially being detected is interacting with its immediate environment. The correction factor in
Equation 4.3 is still λd = 2.5σd for UAVs, but the standard deviation default value is σd = 4.5. The
adaptations to the standard deviation for detection σd are also somewhat different from those used
by ground units and are given in Table 4.8. The method for determining whether or not the UAV
successfully detected the other agent uses random numbers in the same way described for ground
units in this section.
The effect of the environment on UAVs losing contact with agents they have detected also
uses Equation 4.4 and the same preliminarily determined values. Again, this simulates the net
effect of it being much harder to lose contact with an already-detected agent than it is for the UAV
to detect that agent in the first place.
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Table 4.8: Conditions for and adaptations of UAV detection standard deviation (σd ). All
conditions are relative to the agent that is a candidate for detection (e.g., the candidate
for detection is located in a structure). In the model, these conditions are checked in
order as presented and may override each other. ρ f is qualitative measurement
for the density of flora, between zero and three.
Condition
Default
Located in flora
Located in structure
σd < 0

4.2.4

Equation Adaptation
σd = 4.5
σd = σd − ρ f
σd = 0.5
σd = 0

Experiment Setup
The experiment used in testing the model explained herein took the form of a design of ex-

periments examining the impact UAV implementation by the defenders and, if UAVs were used by
the defenders, UAV patrol pattern on the model outputs shown in Table 4.9. UAV implementation
has two levels (no UAVs, 0; one UAV, 1) and UAV patrol pattern has six levels (described in Figure
4.4). In total, there are seven possible UAV arrangements: 1) no UAVs, 2-7) one of the six UAV
patrol patterns. These seven scenarios were each tests across 10,000 unique random seeds that determined starting locations and behavior for each agent and a single random seed that determined
environment setup. In total, 70,000 unique simulations comprised the design of experiments.

4.3

Results and Discussion
Two analyses were conducted to verify the model’s adherence to its objective, which is to

represent the impacts that deploying UAS at the small unit level could have on those units’ combat
effectiveness. The first analysis compares the number of casualties taken by defending platoons
that deploy UAS and those that do not deploy UAS. The second analysis compares the effects of six
different patrol patterns on defender casualties, detection of attacking units, and the employment
of IDF against attacking units.
These analyses reveal first that the model adheres to its purpose, providing insight into the
effect of UAS deployment over multiple metrics. The first analysis shows that UAS deployment
can positively impact defending warfighter survival rates in the scenario used for this analysis,
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Table 4.9: Model outputs and units of measure for each for the design of experiments.
Model Output
Mission duration
Remaining defenders at mission end
Remaining attackers at mission end
Percent unoccupied defending AoR
Time of first contact
Distance of first contact
Percent of time with attackers detected
Time of first IDF
Time of last IDF
Range of furthest IDF
Range of closest IDF
Attackers neutralized by IDF
Number of large caliber IDFs
Number of medium caliber IDFs
Number of small caliber IDFs

Unit of Measure
Time steps
Warfighters
Warfighters
Percent
Time step
Cells
Percent
Time step
Time step
Cells
Cells
Warfighters
Rounds
Rounds
Rounds

wherein a defending platoon equipped with a single sUAS must defend against a superior attacking
force without sUAS. The second analysis shows that different tactics for UAS deployment can
positively or negatively impact various metrics for combat effectiveness, laying the groundwork
for a trade analyses that could help train warfighters and warfighter leaders on the best ways to
deploy UAS in order to achieve a desired outcome in a given situation.

4.3.1

Impact of UAS
Of primary importance to any analysis involving UAS implementation on the battlefield is

the question of whether or not the UAS employed positively impacts the outcome of combat for
those employing it. For this analysis, the principal metric used is the survival rate of defending
warfighters.
Figure 4.7 shows results of the 70,000 model runs, 10,000 of which did not include UAS
deployment with the defending units and 60,000 of which did. For this analysis, different strategies
for UAS deployment were ignored and the results of all UAS-based simulations were aggregated.
The bulges around nine, 18, 27, and 36 warfighters are a result of the natural discretization of
warfighters into squads of nine individuals. In the model, casualties are not typically spread evenly
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Remaining Defenders at Simulation End
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Figure 4.7: Violin and box plot summary of warfighter survival statistics for non-UAS- and UASequipped defending platoons.

Table 4.10: Summary warfighter survival statistics for non-UAS- and UAS-equipped defending
platoons.
Metric No UAS UAS
Max
36
36
Q3
27
33
Med
25
27
Mean
23.5 25.1
Q1
18
18
Min
0
0
St. Dev.
7.8
9.6

over the four defending squads; instead, one or two squads that are most heavily engaged with the
attackers tend to take heavy casualties while the other two squads take lighter casualties. The set
of summary statistics for non-UAS- and UAS-equipped defenders is shown in Table 4.10. UASequipped platoons had a median survival rate only two warfighters better than non-UAS-equipped
platoons. Of greater interest, the trend towards increased warfighter survival in UAS-equipped
platoons seems to be much higher, as evidenced by the 33-to-27 survivor upper quartile advantage
they exhibit over non-UAS-equipped platoons.
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To determine the exact odds of increased warfighter survival among UAS-equipped platoons, a generalized linear model was created. The proportion of survivors to initial platoon
strength was measured against whether or not each defending platoon deployed UAS. The analysis
shows that the odds ratio for higher individual warfighter survival is 1.22 times greater for UASequipped platoons than for non-UAS-equipped platoons. A 95% confidence interval between 1.21
and 1.23 for the odds ratio and p-value of p < 0.0001 indicate with a high degree of certainty that
these results are statistically significant. The increased odds of warfighter survival are undeniably
favorable and practically significant.

4.3.2

Impact of Patrol Pattern

Impact on Defending Warfighter Survival
Similar to the first analysis, the second explores the impact of different tactics in deploying
UAS from small units. As described in Figure 4.4, three distinct patrol patterns with short and

Remaining Defenders at Simulation End

long-range variants of each were evaluated of their impact on the metrics described in Table 4.9.
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Figure 4.8: Violin and box plot summary of defending warfighter survival statistics for each of the
six UAV patrol pattern variants.
56

Table 4.11: Summary defending warfighter survival statistics for each of the six UAV patrol
pattern variants. “S” signifies short-range route variants and “L” signifies long-range
route variants.
Metric S Circles S Mower S Random L Circles L Mower L Random
Max
36
36
36
36
36
36
Q3
33
35
34
34
32
33
Med
27
27
27
27
25
26
Mean
24.4
23.5
25.7
25.1
26.4
25.3
Q1
19
21
18
19
18
18
Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
St. Dev.
9.7
10
9.4
9.6
9.3
9.3

The first component of this analysis compares the impact that each of the six UAV patrol
patterns has on warfighter survival in defending platoons deploying UAS. Figure 4.8 shows results
for the 60,000 model runs that included UAS-equipped defending platoons, with 10,000 runs for
each of the six patrol pattern variants. The set of summary statistics for each patrol pattern is shown
in Table 4.11. As Figure 4.8 shows, the six patterns provide similar results. From the visualized
results and summary statistics, it is difficult to decide which patrol pattern is most beneficial in
terms of warfighter survival, though it does seem that the short- and long-range random patterns
produce worse results than the others by a small degree, and the long-range mower pattern seems
to perform worst of all six. The short-range mower and long-range circle patterns seem to increase
survival rates marginally over the other patterns.

Table 4.12: Generalized linear model results (odds ratio, p-value, and 95% confidence interval
(CI) lower and upper bounds) for the effect of five patrol patterns relative to the sixth (longrange mower) on the odds of defending warfighter survival. “S” signifies short-range
route variants and “L” signifies long-range route variants, “OR” is an abbreviation
of Odds Ratio, and “L 95%” and “U 95%” stand for the lower and upper
95% confidence interval bounds, respectively.
Pattern
S Circles
S Mower
S Random
L Circles
L Random

OR P-Value
1.26 <.0001
1.46 <.0001
1.23 <.0001
1.32 <.0001
1.13 <.0001
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L 95%
1.25
1.45
1.22
1.31
1.12

U 95%
1.28
1.48
1.24
1.34
1.14

To better understand the impact of each patrol pattern on warfighter survival among the
defenders, a generalized linear model was created to compare them, with the long-range mower
pattern used as a reference, as it apparently performed worse than the other five variants. The
results of the model are shown in Table 4.12. As was predicted based on the visual analysis, the
best performing patrol pattern is the short-range mower pattern, with an odds ratio of 1.46 relative
to the long-range decaying mower pattern. The second best pattern for defender survival odds is the
long-range decaying circles pattern, with an odds ratio improving the odds of individual warfighter
survival by a factor of 1.32 relative to the long-range decaying mower pattern.

Analysis of Other Factors
This section briefly considers two additional combat effectiveness metrics: the defending
force’s ability to 1) detect and track the location of attacking units and 2) employ indirect fires
against known hostile targets. In both cases, it is assumed based on the results of the preceding
analysis that deploying sUAS with the defending units will aid in these endeavors, and the analysis
seeks to determine which UAV patrol pattern is most useful in these circumstances.
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Figure 4.9: Violin and box plot distribution representation of the range at which the defending
force first detects an attacking squad.
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Figure 4.10: Violin and box plot distribution representation of the percent of mission completion
time for which the defending platoon knows the location of at least one attacking squad.

Figures 4.9 and 4.10 summarize the impact of the six UAV patrol pattern variants on the
defenders knowledge of the location of attacking elements. The box-plot representation of the
distribution of ranges (measured with meters) at which an enemy unit is detected for the first time
in each simulation is shown in Figure 4.9. It illustrates that, even though the short-range decaying
mower pattern has a shorter flight time and reduced patrol radius compared to the long-range patrol
variants, its median range for initial detection of an enemy unit is not only competitive with theirs,
it is much better than two of them. Figure 4.10 similarly shows that the short-range patrol pattern
variants on average allow the defenders to maintain contact for a larger fraction of the mission
completion time than the long-range variants do.
Figure 4.11 summarize the impact of the six UAV patrol pattern variants on the ability
that the defenders, specifically the UAS-GCU, have to employ IDF against the attackers. Figure
4.11 shows the distribution for each patrol pattern variant of attackers neutralized by IDF. As was
the case for defending warfighter survival odds, the short-range decaying mower and long-range
decaying circles patrol patterns prove to be the most effective at allowing IDF to be directed at the
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Number of Attackers Neutralized by IDF
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Figure 4.11: Violin and box plot distribution representation of the number of attackers neutralized
by IDF directed by the defending UAS-GCU at attacking units.

attackers. Likewise, the long-range decaying mower pattern appears to again be the least effective
variant.

4.4

Conclusions
The design space definition, agent-based model, and analysis presented in this chapter are

primarily foundational—they represent a vangaurd component of the more extensive analysis of
the impact of sUAS deployment from small infantry units in the static-defense scenario in Chapter
5. The results of this initial analysis provide a strong argument for the use of sUAS in the presented
scenario, showing that sUAS significantly increase the odds of warfighter survival. Additionally,
sUAS are shown to extend the defenders’ capabilities relative to contacting, tracking, and neutralizing potential threats. The analysis of the six sample UAV patrol pattern variants suggests that,
when a single UAS is employed, rather than spreading out its patrol with long-range excursions
over a constricted area, focusing its surveillance capabilities in a close-range, concentrated pattern
yields strong results, though some long-range surveillance can also be effective if it is more widely
distributed. These observations suggest that a mixed approach to UAV patrol pattern planning
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could be effective, with a combination of short- and long-range patrols proving to be most effective. These results suggest the critical contribution that sUAS can provide to defending forces and
the catastrophic consequences for attacking forces that cannot counter sUAS observational capabilities. Such conclusions also indicate that further analysis is necessary to understand the impact
of sUAS in other scenarios and when employed with other capabilities.
The demonstrated ability to experiment with different sUAS tactics and technologies and
provide insights into their usefulness and impacts is a resounding argument in favor of using the
decision support framework for sUAS-small-unit deployment presented in this thesis. The ability
to simulate human behaviors and combat situations in a living environment side by side with experimental technologies like sUAS provides a dominating advantage in future warfare preparation.
The decision-support framework demonstrated in part in this chapter allows for a methodical, organized, and efficient approach to sUAS deployment concept exploration. It encourages decisionmakers to identify scenarios in which sUAS may be useful, define specific variables for sUAS
operation and small unit combat effectiveness, and to explore that scenario-variable design space
through an intentionally designed computer model. The next chapter expands on the design space
definition and analysis introduced in this chapter, further employing the framework to suggest application principles that will allow decision makers to preemptively equip warfighters with the best
possible sUAS technologies within the context of the deployment scenario and agent-based model
presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5.

5.1

FRAMEWORK SIMULATION DATA EXPLORATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction
The human decision maker on a modern battlefield is faced with a complex array of vari-

ables, many of which are uncertain or completely unknown. Compounding the challenges surrounding decisions involving unpredictable human variables, geopolitical circumstances, and traditional factors like time-tables, maneuvers, and tactics, the advent of sUAS in increasing numbers
and roles increases the difficulty of the decision maker’s role [22]. One of the potential challenges
presented in implementing new sUAS technologies is making information on how to best use sUAS
in combat readily available, usable, and accessible to the warfighters who will use them [23, 88].
The difficulty in creating policy and training materials for sUAS deployment at the smallunit level is that there are so many potential tactical applications for sUAS and so many situations
in which they could prove useful that it is difficult to fully define, let alone explore, the full realm
of possibilities. Because it is infeasible, or at least inefficient, to physically test every possible
sUAS application in every possible scenario, the high flexibility, speed, and power provided by an
agent-based computer model like that presented in the previous chapter becomes very important
and suggests such a model as an excellent preliminary design space exploration tool [17].
The ability of the computer model to simulate, monitor, and measure a broad range of
factors that are quantitatively overwhelming to a human decision maker is key. When employed
within the context of the sUAS-small-unit decision support framework presented in this thesis, the
model presents the opportunity to analyze the relationships between factors and identify situationspecific trends that might not be observable in physical testing by human operators. In doing
so, the framework and scenario-specific model remove the quantitative burden of analysis from
the decision-making warfighter, allowing he or she to instead focus on the qualitative aspects of
decision making, observing the trends in a developing situation, and using the model-derived information to augment the decision-making process. Additionally, the framework provides a means
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by which to rule out suboptimal tactics for a given scenario based on the combat effectiveness
metrics and the value that the decision maker associates with them, reducing the field of possible
approaches to implementing sUAS, further simplifying the decision-making process.
The framework walks its user through the process of generating data using a computer
model and deriving trends from those data through graphical and statistical analysis, allowing
the user an excellent opportunity to explore the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space. This
chapter demonstrates the analysis process in the context of the static-defense scenario and agentbased model introduced in Chapter 4. However, the linchpin in that process is the delivery of
the information to the warfighter. Without an effective delivery system that is intuitive, quickly
accessible, and flexible to an individual decision maker’s situation, all the advantages provided by
the computer modeled data can quickly become disadvantages, drowning the decision maker in
information and paralyzing their process. Thus, it is critical to present a simple, intuitive set of
ideas, or application principles, that can be easily understood and applied by the decision-making
warfighter.
This chapter builds on the initial analysis presented in Chapter 4 with an in-depth analysis
of the static-defense scenario (in which the defenders maneuver only within a limited range to
protect a specific area from attacker incursions) design space’s two sUAS concept variables and
33 combat effectiveness metrics during a static-defense combat scenario. 137,500 unique simulations are run to explore the design space in a Monte Carlo experiment. In each simulation, the
number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) the defenders deploy and the selected sUAS patrol
pattern for those UAVs is varied. The purpose of this analysis is to derive sUAS deployment principles centered on improving warfighter survival, battlefield awareness, and firepower capability
from an analysis of the relationships between the sUAS concept variables and the set of combat
effectiveness metrics. In doing so, it provides insight into battlefield trends that influence optimal
sUAS deployment tactics in the static-defense scenario. The results of the analysis are then synthesized into a set of scenario-specific application principles that can be used in physical testing by
warfighters to more efficiently explore potential small-unit-based combat applications for sUAS.
As in the previous chapter, the work accomplished in this chapter is a specific instance
demonstrating the sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support framework’s capabilities. The
framework could be used to guide decision makers’ investigation of a variety of different deploy63

ment concepts in either the static-defence scenario and associated agent-based model presented
herein or in other scenarios or other models.

5.2

Methodology
This section begins with a brief description of the simulation environment and setup used

for this analysis. It then describes the experimental design used to explore the impacts of sUAS
deployment tactics on small-unit combat effectiveness. It concludes by detailing each of the metrics recorded during each combat simulation run, explaining what they represent and why they are
important. They are broadly categorized into five groups: 1) defender tactical variables, 2) UAS
metrics, 3) unit metrics, 4) temporal metrics, and 5) spatial metrics.

5.2.1

Environment Setup

Figure 5.1: The simulated map with annotations for key environmental elements: (A) topography,
which is darker for lower elevation and lighter for higher elevation, (B) flora, (C) man-made structures, (D) defender AoR, (E) platoon of defending infantry squads, and (F) platoon of attacking
infantry squads.
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The simulated map chosen for this analysis includes a sampling of the potential environmental components that exist in the model. Figure 5.1 provides an annotation for the map that
identifies the model’s visual representations of topography, flora, human structures, the defending
AoR, and squads of infantry. This map situates the defending platoon and their AoR roughly at the
map’s center, allowing for the attackers to approach them along a variety of vectors. The environment heavily impacts warfighter effectiveness, so by holding the environment setup constant across
the entire experiment and recording the direction of approach by the attackers and the locations of
key events in the simulations, the impacts of environmental components like topography and flora
density on simulation outcomes can be observed. For example, sUAS may be very effective at
increasing the defending team’s battlefield awareness when the attackers approach over the open
ground in the top-center region of the map in Figure 5.1, but not when they approach through the
wooded areas or the heavily developed region in the bottom-center region or top-left regions of the
map, respectively.

5.2.2

Experimental Setup

Table 5.1: Variable names and number of levels for the design of experiments.
Variable
Levels
Attacker Location Seed 2500
sUAS Patrol Pattern
6
Number of UAVs
10

The design of experiments used for this analysis employs three variables with levels as
summarized in Table 5.1. The first variable, “attacker location seed,” is a seed number for a series of random numbers that determine 1) the starting location of the attacking platoon relative to
the defending platoon and 2) agent decision making and decision effects within the model. This
input has 2500 levels, represented by every integer between 1 and 2500, and determines 2500
unique starting locations for the attacking squads, starting spatial distributions for the attacking
and defending squads, and psuedo-random events like the probability of taking casualties while
exchanging fires with opponents or of detecting enemy agents during the simulation. The attacker
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location seed functions as a Monte-Carlo simulation variable, allowing for a thorough representation of the range of initial distances and vectors in a 360◦ arc along which attackers might approach
the defenders in the simulation map. A similar seed number is held constant across the entire experiment and determines the topographical layout, distribution of flora and structures, and location
of the defending platoon’s AoR for each simulation, as described in the previous subsection.
The second and third variables, “sUAS Patrol Pattern” and “Number of UAVs,”f represent
the six sUAS patrol pattern deployment variants described in the following section and how many
UAVs are at the disposal of the defending team. Additionally, in each simulation, the defending
team may have access to between zero and nine UAVs when the UAS-GCU is at full strength. In
the event that the defending team does not have access to sUAS technology (zero UAVs), then no
patrol patterns will be tested.
For each of the 2500 attacker location seed values, 55 simulations are run. First, a single
simulation runs where the defending team has no UAVs and thus cannot use any particular patrol
patterns. Subsequently, the simulation is repeated for each of the 54 combinations of the six sUAS
patrol patterns with between one and nine UAVs. There are a total of 137,500 simulation runs
during the experiment.

5.2.3

Combat Effectiveness Metrics
The term “combat effectiveness” is challenging to define. In practical application, the

question of a unit or warfighter’s effectiveness on the battlefield is largely dependent on the mission
and objective given them. There are, however, a few primary metrics that are undeniably important,
like the warfighter survival, the unit’s awareness of the battlefield around them, and their ability
to concentrate superior fires to eliminate threats posed by enemies [70, 71]. There are three other
categories of ground-unit-specific non-primary metrics: 1) temporal, 2) spatial, and 3) fires. After
the primary and three covariate groups focused on ground unit measures, a fifth category is defined
for sUAS metrics that includes temporal, spatial, and other quantitative measures. Metrics within
the latter four categories are covariates that are related to the values of the primary metrics, though
each of the primary metrics may also be used to define the other primary metrics. In this section,
when a variable is introduced, it is italicized for emphasis.
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Defender Tactical Variables
Two variables directly control the defenders’ tactics, as seen in the experimental setup.
sUAS patrol pattern is one of six path variants used by a UAV while searching for attacking squads.
There are three types of patrol pattern: decaying concentric circles, decaying radial lawnmower,
and semi-random. Each type of pattern has long- and short-range variants. The three types of patrol
pattern are shown in Figure B.7. Number of UAVs is the number of individual UAVs that can be
launched simultaneously by a full-strength UAS-GCU. During a simulation, if the UAS-GCU takes
casualties, the number of UAVs that it can operate decreases proportionately (e.g., if there are six
warfighters in the UAS-GCU, a maximum of six UAVs can be simultaneously operated). These two
defender-controlled tactical variables are the independent factors in this analysis. Measuring the
impacts of their manipulation is the means by which principles for sUAS deployment are derived.

Figure 5.2: Three patrol pattern types for defending sUAS (left to right: decaying concentric
circles, decaying radial lawnmower, and semi-random). Each pattern is applied in long and short
range versions.

UAS Metrics
In addition to sUAS patrol pattern and number of UAVs, there are two metrics that directly
track sUAS performance. Cumulative UAS flight time measures the time that each UAV is in
the air and adds it to an accumulating measure of how much time each UAV spends airborne.
UAS contacts with attackers records how many times a single UAV detects and begins tracking an
attacking unit. If two UAVs contact the same attacking squad simultaneously and both continue to
track it, this metric increases by two, not just one.
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Unit Metrics
There are several ways to measure the condition and accomplishments of the ground-unit
agents in the model. First, the number of survivors for both the defending and attacking teams, denoted surviving defenders and surviving attackers, is recorded for each simulation. Additionally,
surviving UAS-GCU defenders records the number of survivors in the defending UAS-GCU if the
defending platoon included a unit of that type. The warfighter’s life is of singular importance—in
terms of human, intelligence, and economic factors, the warfighter is the single most valuable asset
deployed by the armed forces. Consequently, high values for defending survival rates are desirable.
Though the destruction of life is always regrettable, because the primary objective of combat is to
deprive an enemy of the ability to operate [71], incapacitating opposing forces is necessary. Because of the model’s bias towards the viewpoint of the defending team, lower number of “surviving
attackers” are viewed more favorably in the the analysis. However, the model does not specify that
warfighters on either the attacking or defending team are “killed.” Rather, it leaves room for the
removal of combat forces through injury, capture, or other non-lethal means in addition to those
that are lethal.
In addition to the survival metrics, the number of attackers neutralized by IDF is also
recorded. When defenders engage attackers with IDF, the probability of neutralizing attacking
warfighters increases with the range at which the IDF occurs. This simulates the defender’s ability
to use larger caliber weapons against the attackers at range when the possibility of friendly fire is
negligible.
In addition to functionally defeating the attacking force, the defenders second objective
is to protect an area of responsibility (AoR) from attacker incursions. The extent to which the
defenders succeed in this objective is measured by the percent AoR remaining that has not been
overrun by attackers at the end of the simulation. The attacker’s ability to overrun the defender
AoR is related to the number of attacking squads that penetrate the physical limits of the AoR.
The metrics attacking squads that reach the AoR and attacking squads that reach the AoR intact
record this metric.
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Temporal Metrics
All temporal metrics are measured in minutes, referenced from the time that the simulation
begins. The temporal metrics used in this analysis provide snapshots of key moments within a simulation, acting as checkpoints from which other covariates may be organized and compared. The
timeline shown in Figure 5.3 provides a general guide to the progression of each of the temporal
metrics during a simulation, though the order of events shown in the figure is not representative of
the order of events in every simulation. All temporal metrics are presented in minutes.

Figure 5.3: A general representation of the timeline for a typical simulation. The instances of
several key moments are annotated.

The mission completion time is an excellent indicator of a mission’s overall outcome. If
a simulation ends by one of the teams quickly accomplishing their objective, it could indicate
that they accomplished their goal in a decisive manner, whereas if the simulation is drawn out,
the decisiveness of mission success can be called into question. The time limit for a simulation
is 250 in-model minutes, after which point any remaining attackers are forced to withdraw from
the engagement. Mission completion time is measured in in-model minutes and should not be
confused with the computer time required to run a simulation.
One of the keys to combat effectiveness preached by John Boyd is battlefield awareness
[78]. To quantify this concept, the percent of time attackers are tracked by defenders is recorded.
It is assumed that increased knowledge of opponent maneuvers leads to an improved ability to preempt and reaction to their actions. This metric is represented as the ratio of the time during which
the location of at least one attacking squad is known to the defenders to the mission completion
time.
The period of engagement between the attacking and defending teams is book-ended by
the time of first contact and the mission completion time. Time of first contact marks the moment
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at which a defending squad or UAV detects and begins either engaging with direct fires (DF) or
tracking an attacking unit.
As shown in Figure 5.3, another set of key moments during a simulation are times at which
both the IDF and DF elements of an engagement begin. Only the defenders may employ IDF, and
time of first IDF and time of last IDF record the first and last defender IDF during a simulation,
respectively. Because both teams employ DF, time of first defender DF, time of first attacker
DF, time of last defender DF, and time of last attacker DF record the first and last DF for both
teams. Because the use of DF generally alerts an opponent to a squad’s location, allowing them
to mutually engage, the time of first/last defender DF and the time of first/last attacker DF will
generally be similar.

Spatial Metrics
Spatial metrics are used to measure the progress and organization of each team as the
simulation progresses. They are intended to provide a high-level picture of the maneuvers and
organization of the two forces during the simulation. Figure 5.4 shows the simulation map setup
as it was for the simulations analyzed in this chapter with a few examples of these metrics. The
units in which the spatial metrics are presented vary and are given with each metric.
Because the simulation map is diverse and non-uniform, it is important to know from which
direction, or angle to attackers, from which the attackers will approach the defender AoR. This is
because environment factors like the presence and density flora or man-made structures can impact
the attacker’s speed, the ability of defending squads and UAVs to detect attackers, and the ability
of the attackers to find protection from defender UAV patrols and IDF. The angle to attackers is
measured in either radians or degrees from from zero to 2π (360◦ ) beginning at the horizontal axis
in the right-side hemisphere of Figures 5.1 and 5.4.
Of equal importance to the angle attack is the distance from the defending team at which
the attacking team is located. Distance of first contact records the straight-line distance in meters
at which a defending squad or UAV first makes contact with one of the attacking units. Though
multiple other distance metrics could be recorded, the distance at contact is particularly relevant,
as it indicates whether or not the attackers managed to pass the defender sUAS patrols without
being intercepted.
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Figure 5.4: A simulation frame with annotations for examples of spatial metrics: (A) defender location and dispersal, (B) attacker location and dispersal at setup, (C) attacker distance, (D) attacker
location and dispersal at first contact, and (E) attacker distance at first contact.

Concentration of force is one of the key components of a successful combat engagement,
typically governing the ability of a force to bring overwhelming firepower to bear against an opponent [50]. Consequently, the dispersal of the defending and attacking forces in the simulation
at key moments of the engagement could be indicative of their ability to win an engagement. For
the purposes of this analysis, dispersal is defined as the standard deviation in meters of the distance between each of squad on a team and the geometric centroid of their Cartesian distribution.
The mathematical definition for dispersal is given in Equation 5.1, where σ is the standard deviation, N is the number of squads, d is the absolute distance from the geometric centroid of the
team squads to the ith squad, and µ is the average absolute distance of the defending squads from
their geometric centroid. Max attacker dispersal measures the maximum dispersal of attacking
squads during the entire simulation. Max defender dispersal pre-AoR, max attacker dispersal
pre-AoR, max defender dispersal post-AoR, and max defender dispersal post-AoR reflect the de-
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fending and attacking squads’ dispersal both before and after the first attacking squad achieves the
defender AoR.
s
σ=

∑in=1 (di − µ)2
N

(5.1)

Fires Metrics
These metrics record the number of indirect and direct fires during the engagement between
the defending and attacking teams. Note that the defending platoon has access to IDF when they
are deploying one or more sUAS from a UAS-GCU and that the attacking platoon does not have
access to IDF.
Total IDF represents the total number of IDF directed by the defenders at attacking squads
at long, medium, and short range throughout a simulation. This metric is intended to measure
the impact of sUAS deployment on defender firepower capability. Because long-range IDF may
neutralize more attackers than short-range IDF, percent long-range IDF, percent medium-range
IDF, and percent short-range IDF are also recorded. The range of closest IDF and range of
furthest IDF are also observed as a means of determining the spatial spread of defender IDF.
The counterpart to IDF is DF, the principal means of engagement for infantry units. To
measure the degree to which DF influence a simulation’s outcome, total defender DF and total
attacker DF are recorded.

5.3

Results and Discussion
This section identifies inter-variable relationship trends using a correlation matrix and its

representative heat map of all the variables listed in the Methodology section. The correlation
matrix is used strictly as an exploratory tool to help identify these relationships for further, more
detailed examination. The relationships identified using the correlation matrix and others that involve direct comparisons between the effects of the UAV patrol pattern variants are then explored.
The qualitative description of these relationships is accomplished through a set of graphical analyses. While all of the variables listed in Methodology were included in the correlation matrix,
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only the most influential are included in the subsequent detailed discussion. Throughout this section, general principles and lessons learned are pointed out that could inform warfighter decision
making and future physical tests of sUAS applications.

5.3.1

Correlation Matrix Analysis
A correlation matrix was used as the primary means to identify inter-variable relationships

between both the two independent input variables and the set of system output metrics described in
the Methodology section. The matrix measures the pairwise relationships between variables into
an m-by-m (m is the number of variables) matrix with two primary types of information: 1) the
direction of correlation, either positive or negative, and 2) the degree of linear correlation, on the
scale −1 ≤ α ≤ 1 where α is the degree of correlation [89]. The correlation coefficients in the
correlation matrix represent the direction of correlation by their sign (positive or negative) and the
degree of correlation by their magnitude, where a coefficient closer to zero signifies low correlation
and a coefficient closer to |1| signifies high correlation. The correlation matrix only tracks linear
relationships. Thus, subsequent analyses will also explore some non-linear relationships that are
not suggested by the matrix.
For high-dimensional data, the correlation matrix information can be communicated graphically and summarily using a color map with a continuous color scale representing both direction
and degree of correlation. A qualitative representation of the correlation matrix is provided in the
heat map shown in Figure 5.5, where red (or black in gray-scale) represents high positive correlation and blue (or white in gray-scale) represents high negative correlation. The heat map indicates
a variety of relationships that are interesting enough to merit further exploration. Though certainly
not every relationship described in a 40-by-40 matrix of data can be feasibly explored in the context of this analysis, many of the most interesting and pertinent are introduced in the following
paragraphs.
Among the strongest and most potentially significant correlations it shows, the heat map in
Figure 5.5 shows positive correlations between the number of surviving defenders, the number of
UAVs deployed by the defenders, the number of attackers neutralized by IDF, and the total number
of IDF directed by the defenders at attackers. It also shows an equally strong negative correlation
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Mission Completion Time

Mission Completion Time

Figure 5.5: Heat map of the correlation matrix for all system inputs and output metrics.

between those metrics and the number of defender DF. These relationships could help reveal the
ideal uses for sUAS in the static-defense combat scenario being analyzed.
The percentage of total IDF directed at long range is positively correlated with the survival
rate for defending warfighters and the number of attackers neutralized by IDF. Conversely, the
percentage of total IDF directed at short range is inversely related to both of those metrics. There
is almost no correlation between medium-range IDF and defender survival or attacker casualties.
These trends, along with the positive correlation between defender survival and the number of
UAVs deployed, suggest that long-range IDF and increased UAV deployment could improve the
likelihood of defender survival and mission success.
The correlation matrix also reveals strong positive correlations between the cumulative
flight time for defending UAVs, the number of times that defenders tracked attackers, and (to a
lesser extent) the mission completion time. The fact that cumulative flight time and the number of
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times defenders tracked attackers are positively correlated shows the potential positive effects of
increasing UAV use generally. The existence of a positive correlation of mission completion time
with the other two variables is interesting, and requires more in-depth analysis to determine if it is
symptomatic of some unintended impact caused by increased UAV usage or if UAV usage simply
increases during simulations that are longer.
Though not as strong as the correlations discussed above, following are several other relationships that could be influential in small-unit success when deploying sUAS. They are related
in some degree to the three sets of correlations discussed in the previous paragraphs, and may be
caused by them.
• The number of UAVs deployed by the defenders is negatively correlated with the number of
attackers that achieve the defender AoR
• The quantity of resources expended during a simulation (i.e., the number of DF and IDF) is
positively correlated with mission completion time
• The percent of time during which defenders track attackers is negatively correlated with the
mission completion time
• Distance of first contact is positively correlated with mission completion time
• The percent of their original AoR controlled by the defenders at the end of a simulation
is positively correlated with the distance of first contact and negatively correlated with the
mission completion time
The correlation matrix does not suggest any significant relationships between any sUAS
patrol pattern and the other metrics. This is due in large part to the fact that attempts to represent
each patrol pattern with an indicator variable result in binary variables that provide unreliable
data on linear relationships. However, the results of initial analysis conducted [90] suggested that
patrol pattern could have significant influence when a single UAV was deployed with defenders.
Similar studies outside of the context of this thesis have also shown that optimizing sUAS patrol
method when multiple UAVs are involved in a coordinated search effort can influence the search’s
effectiveness [91, 92]. Thus, the relationship between patrol pattern and the other tactical variable,
the number of UAVs, will be investigated in more detail later in the chapter.
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Finally, the distinction between correlation and causation must be emphasized. The correlation matrix, as evidenced by its name, identifies correlative relationships between metrics, but
cannot indicate causation. The principles of sUAS deployment that this work seeks to derive, however, rely on causation—the decision-making warfighter must understand the causal relationships
between their actions and those actions’ consequences. As a result, the following, more detailed
analyses seek to identify causal relationships between various individual variables.
The inference of causality can be dangerous and precarious at best and must be derived from
an experiment in which treatment methods for various subjects were randomly administered [93].
Because the treatments (i.e., the number of UAVs and sUAS patrol method) in this analysis were
uniformly applied across all of the simulations, causality can be inferred within the scope of the
analyzed scenario within the model. Extension of the results or causal relationships suggested
by this analysis in external and real-world applications are hypothetical only and would require
experimentation and testing in those applications for validation.

5.3.2

Impact of Number of UAVs and Patrol Pattern on Defender Survival
The number of surviving defenders can be assumed to be one of, if not the preeminent,

fundamental measures for combat success and effectiveness. Gauging the input of the two primary
manipulable variables by the defenders, sUAS patrol pattern and the number of UAVs deployed by
the defenders, on defender survival is critical. The correlation matrix heat map suggests that the
number of UAVs deployed by the defenders is strongly and positively correlated with the number
surviving defenders. Figure 5.6 shows this relationship. As the number of UAVs increases from
one to five, the number of surviving defenders increases by two as each UAV is added. However,
if between five and nine UAVs are deployed, the mean number of surviving defenders does still
increase, but at a slower rate. If between seven and nine UAVs are deployed, the mean number of
survivors is approximately equal.
Figure 5.7 expands on the results shown in Figure 5.6 by showing the mean number of
surviving defenders by the number of UAVs and the patrol pattern used during a simulation. This
work assumes that the consistent improvement of saving the life of a single warfighter relative to
other patrol methods is significant. The chart reveals the generally dominant performance in terms
of defender survival of the short-range mower pattern across any number of UAVs, as discovered
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Figure 5.6: The relationship between the number of surviving defenders and the number of UAVs
deployed by the defenders at the beginning of a simulation. The thick sections of the box plots
represent the first and third quartiles of the data with the median line indicated near the box’s
center, while the smoothed line is the mean of the data.

previously [90]. However, the chart also reveals that, when only a single UAV is accessible to the
defenders, the short-range circular pattern is as effective as the short-range mower. Additionally,
when high numbers of UAVs are available, the long-range circular and long-range mower patterns
perform similarly to the short-range mower pattern. In fact, the long-range circular pattern slightly
out-performs the short-range mower in terms of average defender survival for the static-defense
combat scenario.
Tracking defender survival as a function of patrol pattern instead of number of UAVs is
also revealing. Figure 5.8 shows that, as the number of UAVs increases, the degree to which
that increase affects defender survival decreases, hinting that the law of diminishing returns may
apply to deploying increasing numbers of UAVs. The figure also shows that, as the number of
UAVs increases, the impact of patrol pattern on defender survival is lessened. When more UAVs
are deployed, the increased ability to cover large tracts of ground by any means, even if they are
inefficient, negates to some degree the effect provided by smarter tactics. The principle that sheer
numbers can sometimes outperform intelligent decision making is in effect.
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Figure 5.7: The relative relationship between the mean number of surviving defenders, the number
of UAVs deployed by the defenders, and the patrol pattern used for the deployed UAVs. Note
that the scale is relative—even the worst performing patrol pattern at the lowest number of UAVs
results in an average 24 surviving defenders.

5.3.3

Impact of Number of UAVs on IDF
The correlation matrix used to explore the model data indicates the degree of linear rela-

tionship between two variables. While that information is extremely useful in identifying general
trends, as previously discussed, it illuminates only a snippet of the interdependent nature of relationships between multiple variables and cannot shed light on the existence of cause-and-effect
relationships. The quantity of IDF and range at which they are delivered by the defenders could
both have a direct impact on metrics like defender survival, among others. The defenders’ ability
to employ IDF effectively could be conditional upon not only how many UAVs they can deploy,
but also the sUAS patrol method they employ. Figure 5.9 indicates that these multifaceted causeand-effect relationships may exist. As the number of UAVs deployed by the defenders increases, so
does the defender survival rate. Simultaneously, the number of attackers that achieve the defender
AoR without being functionally destroyed by defender IDF decreases. The parallel relationships
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Figure 5.8: An alternative view of the relationship between the mean number of surviving defenders, the number of UAVs deployed by the defenders, and the patrol pattern used for the deployed
UAVs.
between these three variables indicate that some other factor is influencing all three, causing their
correlation.
The series of Figures 5.10 through 5.14 demonstrates the cascading, causal effect that the
number of UAVs deployed can have on multiple combat effectiveness metrics. Figure 5.10 shows
that, as the number of UAVs increases, the focus of defender IDF shifts from short to long range.
Figure 5.11 indicates that, as the proportion of IDF delivered at long range increases, so does
the number of attackers neutralized by IDF. Figure 5.12 shows a similar correlation between an
increase in long-range IDF delivery and defender survival. Next, Figure 5.13 connects the results
from the previous two figures, directly comparing the number of surviving defenders with the
number of attackers neutralized by defender IDF and showing a strong positive correlation that
begins to match an exponential shape.
Through this chain of analyses, the impact of the number of UAVs on defender survival and
attacker neutralization that Figure 5.6 alludes to is more fully explained, and a causal relationship
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Figure 5.9: Impact of the number of UAVs on defender survival, the total number of defender IDF,
and the number of attacking squads that achieved the defender AoR without being functionally
neutralized by defender IDF. The thick sections of the box plots represent the first and third quartiles of the data with the median line indicated near the box’s center, while the smoothed line is the
mean of the data.
can be observed. Deploying more UAVs results in more long-range IDF, which leads to higher
numbers of attackers neutralized by IDF. By disrupting the attacking force with IDF, the defenders
reduce the threat it poses to them, reducing the likelihood that they incur casualties. Through this
series of consequences, the observation that increasing the number of UAVs operating simultaneously improves the defender survival rate. For decision-making warfighters, it is important to see
not only the end effect, the improvement to odds of defender survival, but also to understand the
intermediate steps. In so doing, the decision maker can manipulate not only the initial variable—
the number of UAVs—but also creatively find ways to further influence the intermediate variables
to further increase the likelihood of a positive outcome.
Following from the analysis just presented, another snapshot of the larger picture of UAV
quantity’s influence over defender survival, Figure 5.14 shows the relationship between the total
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Figure 5.10: The number of UAVs deployed by the defenders relative to the percent of total defender IDF delivered at short, medium, and long range.

number of IDF and DF directed by defenders at attackers and the number of surviving defenders.
Initial analysis of the heat map indicated, perhaps counterintuitively, that defender survival and the
number of defender DF were negatively correlated. The observation begs the question: “how can
delivering fewer fires against an opponent increase chances of survival?”
Figure 5.14 further details the negative correlation between IDF and DF, showing that a
small increase in the number of defender IDF corresponds with a much larger decrease in the number of defender DF. In combination with the analysis of IDF presented in the previous paragraphs,
this relationship is clarified. Figure 5.9 shows that, as the number of IDF increases, the number
of attackers that achieve the defender AoR decreases. If fewer attackers reach the AoR, and thus
come within DF range of the defenders, the resulting DF engagement will likely be milder than
if a larger number of attackers achieved the AoR. Naturally, if the engagement is shorter and less
intense, the number of defender DF will correspondingly decrease, as will the opportunity for defender casualties to occur as a result from the engagement. Thus, we see that it is not necessarily
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Figure 5.11: The number of attackers neutralized by defender IDF relative to the percent of total
defender IDF delivered at short, medium, and long range.

that platoons that engage in less DF experience fewer casualties because they engage in less DF,
but because they typically make use of more IDF, preempting the need for DF.
In the relationships shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.14 the cause-and-effect chain is apparent.
If the defenders increase the number of UAVs they deploy, they will likely also increase their
ability to employ long-range IDF against attackers. An increase in long-range IDF will improve
the defenders’ ability to neutralize attacker threats at distance, leading to fewer attacking squads
achieving the defender AoR. Finally, fewer direct threats from attackers within the defender AoR
will lead to fewer casualties for the defenders.

5.3.4

Impact of Number of UAVs and Patrol Pattern on Mission Completion Time
Another measure of interest is the time (i.e., mission completion time) that it takes for

either the defenders or attackers to complete their respective missions. That is, how long it takes
for the defenders to either neutralize all of the attackers or outlast them, or the time that it takes
the attackers to neutralize all of the defenders or capture 80% of their AoR. The correlation matrix
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Figure 5.12: The number of surviving defenders relative to the percent of total defender IDF
delivered at short, medium, and long range.

indicated a negative correlation between the amount of AoR still maintained by the defenders at
the end of the simulation and mission completion time. It also indicated a potentially significant
negative correlation between mission completion time and the percent of time that the defenders
knew the location of at least one attacker, a metric that is positively correlated with the number of
surviving defenders.
The generally negative correlation shown in Figure 5.15 between the duration of a simulation and the percent of the defender AoR still maintained by the defenders at the end of the
simulation is unsurprising. In drawn-out engagements, there is typically more time for the attackers to maneuver, resulting in them compromising a larger percentage of the defender AoR. Less
expected, however, is the influence of the number of UAVs deployed by the defenders has on both
the percent AoR remaining to them at simulation end and on total simulation duration. It seems
that, generally, when the defenders deploy less UAVs, simulations tend to be more drawn out, in
the 50 to 150 minute range, and the attackers tend to compromise more of the defending AoR.
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Figure 5.13: The relationship between the number of surviving defenders and the number of attackers neutralized by defender IDF. The thick sections of the box plots represent the first and third
quartiles of the data with the median line indicated near the box’s center, while the smoothed line
is the mean of the data..
When the defenders deploy more UAVs, the trend is for shorter engagements, centered at around
50 minutes and a much higher retention of AoR by the defenders.
The outlying subset of much longer simulations in the upper right quadrant of Figure 5.15
represents situations in which simulation duration extends to between 100 and 250 minutes (the
point at which the attackers’ time-frame expires and they must withdraw) and AoR retention is
high. This set of simulations primarily correspond with an unintended consequence of the rules of
war and one of the scenario assumptions. The defending team is disallowed from engaging attackers with IDF if the attackers are sheltering in buildings in order to preempt the possibility of civilian
casualties. Also, the scenario assumes that the attackers are unable to counter the defender’s sUAS
operations in any way.
During a simulation, if the attackers find themselves not engaged in DF with the defenders
but being tracked by a defending UAV, they will shelter in a building until the UAV is forced to
withdraw because of dwindling fuel. If only a few UAVs are deployed by the defenders, this tactic
will result in a slight extension of the simulation, but the attackers will have time in between UAV
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Figure 5.14: The negative correlation between the number of defender DF and IDF and their
relationship with the number of surviving defenders. The thick sections of the box plots represent
the first and third quartiles of the data with the median line indicated near the box’s center, while
the smoothed line is the mean of the data.
patrols to approach the defender AoR. However, when many defending UAVs are deployed, a UAV
with full battery can immediately assume responsibility for pinning down the attacking unit while
the UAV with exhausted fuel or battery returns to the AoR to recharge. Because defending groundbased units are strictly required to remain within their AoR and not to pursue attackers outside of it,
this situation usually persists until either a break in the UAV coverage occurs (a rare condition) or,
more likely, the attacking time-frame expires and the attackers are forced to abandon their mission.
The non-lethal but highly effective nature of this solution to removing the threat from attacking
units to the defenders is a secondary benefit of using high numbers of UAVs.
The outlying subset of much longer simulations in the upper right quadrant of Figure 5.15
shows that situations with attackers sheltering in buildings also has several other consequences. In
the majority of this subset of simulations, the percent of time that the defenders track the attackers
is much higher than average. Because the attackers spend most of their time sheltering in buildings
instead of compromising the defender AoR or neutralizing defenders, those statistics are also more
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Figure 5.15: Mission completion time in minutes relative to the percent of their original AoR that
defenders maintain at the end of the simulation, colored by the number of UAVs deployed by the
defenders.
favorable for the defenders. Also, the majority of the simulations in the subset have the attackers
approaching from the lower left quadrant of the simulation space. That space is predominantly
covered in flora but sparsely populated by buildings, suggesting that, though the defenders may
engage attackers hidden in flora with IDF, the flora may provide a similar net result to that provided
by buildings for attackers in terms of providing cover from UAV surveillance and defender IDF.
In addition to the subset of long-duration time simulations, a small subset of simulations
inhabit the bottom border of Figure 5.15 that shows the fallibility of the defender’s tactical approach to their mission in the scenario. This subset consists of simulations in which not all of
the defending warfighters are neutralized, but the attackers completely overrun the defending AoR
(represented by controlling 80% of its area). As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
defenders are tasked with prioritizing defender survival over defending their AoR. In these cases,
either no UAVs were deployed by the defenders or, in an initial direct engagement with the attackers, the UAS-GCU tasked with operating UAVs for the defenders was functionally destroyed.
In both cases, the defenders’ resistance to sallying out to prevent attackers from overrunning the
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AoR (a tactic that in previous scenario tests usually resulted in high defender casualties) allows
the attackers to accomplish their objective and “win” the simulation. This suggests that further
exploration needs to be conducted to design an effective contingency for when the preferred tactic
of tracking attackers with UAVs and engaging them with IDF fails.

Mission Completion

Figure 5.16: Median mission completion time in minutes relative to the median percent of the time
that defenders tracked at least one attacking unit, categorized by the UAV patrol pattern used and
colored by the number of UAVs deployed by the defenders.

The relationship between patrol pattern, number of defending UAVs, and their mission
completion time may also be viewed through the lens of the defenders’ battlefield awareness.
Figure 5.16 presents the median percent of mission time in which the defenders track at least one
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attacking unit. It does so through the dual lenses of the patrol pattern the defenders use for the
UAVs and how many UAVs they deploy.
Just as the defenders more successfully maintain their AoR when deploying more UAVs,
they are also more successful in detecting and tracking attacking units when more UAVs are deployed. For each of the patrol patterns, when more UAVs are deployed, the defenders track the
attackers for a larger fraction of the mission completion time. While the other five patrol patterns
have maximum median tracking percent times of about 65%, the long-range mower pattern seems
to perform better on average in this regard, with a maximum median of 70%. Though many cases
certainly exist in which a small number of UAVs proved very successful in tracking attackers and
cases in which a large number of UAVs were ineffective, there is a strong trend suggesting that
deploying more UAVs tends to increase the defenders’ ability to track attackers.
Significant observations can also be made regarding the degree to which sUAS patrol pattern and number of UAVs interact to influence the percent of mission time during which defenders
tracked attackers and mission completion time. The long-range patterns in Figure 5.16 exhibit
shorter mission completion times when either one UAV or more than five UAVs are deployed, but
longer times when between two and five UAVs are deployed.
The decrease in mission completion time when many UAVs are deployed is related to
the trends discussed in the last section—when more UAVs are deployed in patrol at long range,
outside of the defender AoR, the defenders can quickly detect, track, and neutralize the attacking
units. The shorter mission completion times observed when only one UAV is deployed at long
range corresponds with the attacking platoon’s increased likelihood to pass under the UAV’s patrol
without being detected and quickly and decisively engage the defending platoon. The percent of
time defenders track attackers is limited to the duration of the direct fires engagement, which is
a relatively low percentage of the mission completion time. When a medium number of UAVs is
deployed, however, the UAVs tend to disrupt the approach of at least part of the attacking platoon,
but not always all of it. As a result, the attackers disperse, take refuge in buildings or flora where
UAVs may not be able to track them, and eventually renew their approach along a different vector.
This dispersal and the disrupted attacker approach to the defender AoR draw out the engagement
time.
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For short-range sUAS patrol patterns shown in Figure 5.16, the impact of the interaction
with number of UAVs is more linear. When fewer UAVs are deployed, the impact on mission
completion time and detection ability is similar to long-range patrol patterns. As more UAVs are
deployed in short-range patterns, however, the mission completion time only becomes more drawn
out.
Short-range patrol patterns do not typically extend beyond the boundaries of the defender
AoR, meaning that, when the one or several UAVs detect the approaching attackers, they will have
to pursue the attackers beyond the range of their normal patrol pattern. Because the model assumes
that UAVs executing short-range patterns also have less battery capacity than those executing longrange patterns, the short-range-pattern UAVs cannot conduct such a pursuit to the extent that the
long-range-pattern UAVs can. Consequently, the short-range-pattern UAVs pursuing attacking
units beyond the UAVs’ normal operating range must break contact with them in short order to
return to the UAS-GCU and recharge or receive a new battery. During that time, the attackers will
renew their approach to the defender AoR. This process has a tendency to repeat itself until either
the attackers are neutralized by defender IDF or manage to slip past the sUAS patrol and directly
engage the defenders, extending the mission completion time.
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 indicate the existence of another cause-and-effect chain between
the number of surviving defenders, the percent of time the defenders tracked the attackers, mission completion time, the number of UAVs, and sUAS patrol pattern. Figure 5.17 shows that, as
the percent of mission completion time during which the defenders tracked at least one attacker
increases, generally so does the defender survival rate. Figure 5.18 shows that defender survival
generally improves when mission completion time is shorter. As the discussion surrounding Figure
5.16 revealed, when more UAVs are deployed in long-range patrols, the percent of time with an attacker tracked increases and the mission completion time decreases. Thus, deploying more UAVs
in long-range patrols improves defender battlefield awareness, which can minimize engagement
time, which improves the likelihood of defender survival.

5.3.5

Trade Analysis
The benefits of sUAS deployment from small-units of infantry do not come without cost.

One of the primary battlefield currencies is warfighter lives. Human life is, of course, priceless and
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Figure 5.17: Surviving defenders relative to the percent of time that defenders tracked at least one
attacking unit. The thick sections of the box plots represent the first and third quartiles of the data
with the median line indicated near the box’s center, while the smoothed line is the mean of the
data.
should be respected. For that reason alone, protecting warfighter lives is a paramount consideration that merits significant physical resource expenditure. In addition to the intrinsic value of life,
though, militaries expend countless hours, money, and technical expertise to train warfighters. The
exact cost of training and maintaining a single warfighter is difficult to calculate. In 2007, the National Defense Research Institute estimated that the yearly cost per work-year (including financial
compensation, training, manpower management, and other non-compensation considerations) for
a single warfighter could approach $175, 000 ($220, 000 in 2020) [94, 95]. Conversely, the RQ-11
“Raven” sUAS cost approximately $260, 000 in 2007 ($329, 000 in 2020) [96]. Thus, in purely
dehumanizing financial terms, a single RQ-11 “Raven” sUAS might cost more to operate than a
single warfighter might to train and maintain. Thus, the benefits of a single platoon operating multiple sUAS in order to better preserve warfighter life could be viewed negatively in a financial light
relative to the cost of training the warfighters to operate sUAS and purchasing and maintaining the
sUAS technology itself. The balance between reverence for human life and potentially life saving
equipment like sUAS is one that has long been considered by armed forces and will continue to be
accounted for relative to sUAS deployment from small-units.
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Figure 5.18: Surviving defenders relative to mission completion time in minutes. The thick sections of the box plots represent the first and third quartiles of the data with the median line indicated
near the box’s center, while the smoothed line is the mean of the data.

With the implementation of new technology, military branches faces several other financial
considerations. These include the cost of hardware and software, the cost to develop new technologies using military-internal or corporate partners, and the cost to upgrade and replace outdated
technology [97]. Additionally, institutional considerations like the time and resources required to
train warfighters how to use the technologies and warfighter willingness to adopt them must be
considered [23]. The sheer scale of supply, repair, and cognitive infrastructure required to deploy
any technology at the squad or platoon level in an organization as large as the US Army, for example, is tremendous [98]. Each of these and many other economic, resource, and social factors
would be influenced as more sUAS are deployed to small infantry units.
In addition to the more resource-oriented costs, deploying sUAS for daily operations with
small infantry units could profoundly change the way the both they and their opponents operate. Minimizing the cognitive overload—caused by simultaneously operating technology, making decisions, and being aware of physical surroundings—is a major factor to be considered as
sUAS deployment is implemented [84]. Also, becoming too technology-dependent could threaten
warfighters if the technology fails, becomes unmanageable, or atrophies traditional war-fighting
91

skills [99]. Finally, history suggests that, as new sUAS technologies and tactics are deployed,
opponents will find creative counters to them that range from technological to tactical to environmental [100]. Further work must be conducted to predict and preempt each of these tactical sUAS
challenges.

5.4

Conclusions
For the decision-making warfighter attempting to incorporate sUAS into small-unit tactics,

prescriptive, complicated decision-making tools can be more of an impediment than an aid. The
branches of armed forces around the world understand this challenge generally and have moved
to inject their training and operations manuals with descriptive processes that allow warfighters
to take stock of their decisions and, with the information they can gather, adapt specific tactical
approaches to their needs. This chapter aims to do the same for sUAS-specific decision making in
the context of the static-defense combat scenario under exploration.
The experiment conducted in this chapter produced a vast data set measuring the impact of
sUAS deployment on small-unit combat effectiveness during the static-defense scenario simulated
in the agent-based model. The framework’s exploration and analysis methods distilled from the
model-generated data a practical set of static-defense-scenario-specific application principles for
sUAS small-unit deployment that will help simplify warfighters’ decision-making process relative
to sUAS use in that scenario. These principles are application oriented—they do not pretend to be
applicable to other combat scenarios or even to be unassailable in the context of the static-defense
scenario. They are specific to the scenario explored in this analysis. They must also be tested in
physical experiments to be validated. They do, however, represent a simple set of concepts that can
be quickly and easily tested and validated, after which they will be just as quickly accessible and
easily learned by the warfighter because of their simplicity and functionality. The principles focus
on why sUAS should be used and how sUAS deployment can effect combat metrics and outcomes.
These emphases empower the warfighter to make informed decisions to achieve desired outcomes.
The principles for sUAS deployment are centered on the two sUAS deployment concept
variables that are explored in the analyzed static-defense combat scenario: the number of UAVs
deployed by the defenders and the sUAS patrol method implemented with those UAVs. The prin-
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ciples are listed below hierarchically from broader observations to more specific tactical considerations.
• Defenders’ ability to survive an engagement with an attacking force is positively impacted
by the deployment of sUAS by the defenders
• sUAS deployment can shorten engagement times, reducing the risk to warfighter lives and
objectives
• sUAS can be used to disrupt typical attacker behaviors, removing them as a threat without
having to use any type of violent force
• Deploying more UAVs typically reduces the need for direct fires engagements by improving
the defenders’ ability to disorganize and disrupt the attackers’ advance
• Deploying more UAVs on longer-range patrols increases the ability of defenders to detect
and engage attackers at increased distances with indirect fires, which in turn improves the
defenders capability to eliminate threats from attackers and improve their own likelihood of
survival
• When more UAVs are available for simultaneous patrol, the patrol method’s impact on improved defender survival is less exaggerated than when fewer UAVs are available
• When fewer UAVs are available for simultaneous patrol, a short-range circular or lawnmower
patrol pattern should be implemented
• When more UAVs are available for simultaneous patrol, either a short-range lawnmower or
a long-range circular or lawnmower patrol pattern should be implemented
As is the case with all data, analysis, and synthesis conducted in this thesis relative to the
static-defense scenario, the principles derived in this chapter and presented above only apply in
the context of the static-defense scenario and the agent-based model presented in Chapter 4. The
are included to showcase the framework’s ability to help decision makers define, model, and analyze the complex design spaces and scenarios in which sUAS could be deployed and to verify
its functionality. It would be unfair and incorrect, however, to suggest that the application principles listed above are not useful simply because of their limited scope of inference. This chapter’s
analysis shows that sUAS can save many lives and markedly improve fires capabilities and situational awareness in the context of the static-defense scenario. In the broader view, though, the
93

analysis and principles presented in this chapter illustrate the opportunity for decision makers to
use this framework in the context of other scenarios and sUAS deployment concepts. As the pool
of scenario-specific application principles is expanded through further use of the framework, patterns of similarity between principles will likely emerge. These scenario-shared principles, once
validated, can be used as the basis for a set of sUAS deployment universal principles that can be
included in tactical manuals, in warfighter training, and in combat applications with confidence
and extreme flexibility.
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CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis is intended to provide a means whereby the overwhelming implications of the
advent of sUAS onto the modern military landscape can be understood and sUAS combat potential
can be harnessed. Specifically, it develops and presents a decision support framework through
which a wide array of sUAS deployment concepts can be applied, analyzed, and evaluated in the
context of any conceivable combat scenario in which they might be applied. The framework’s
ultimate purpose is to distill intuitive, simple, and flexible scenario-specific application principles
for warfighters and decision-makers to implement in physical testing of sUAS deployment concepts
from the vast wealth of information generated by these analyses and evaluations. To that end, the
thesis also presents a case study implementation of the framework within the context of sUASsmall-unit deployment in a static-defense combat scenario.
The achievement of the thesis’ objectives can be measured by the theoretical quality and
effect of implementing the four primary framework steps introduced in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
That evaluation is discussed below. In summary, the framework steps are as follows:
Step 1: Definition for the sUAS-small-unit deployment design space, including input sUAS
deployment concept variables, small unit combat effectiveness metrics, and a combat scenario wherein sUAS could augment small unit combat capabilities
Step 2: A computer model for simulating and exploring the sUAS deployment design space
Step 3: Analysis of model-generated data evaluating the impact of sUAS deployment concepts on combat outcomes in the combat scenario
Step 4: Synthesis of the analyzed data into a set of scenario-, design-space-, and modelspecific principles for sUAS-small-unit deployment
Chapter 3 described the plan, requirements, and process employed to complete each deliverable and the development of the framework as a whole. The attention the framework development
process pays to considering warfighter needs in developing the sUAS-small-unit design space for
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a specific scenario and in developing the computer model for simulating that scenario are the fist
indication that the framework is properly oriented. Additionally, the framework’s basis in and reflection of theoretically sound, proven product development principles guarantees that it will help
even decision makers with no experience in user-oriented design to focus their concept exploration
process on the considerations and requirements that most important to them and the warfighters
they represent. In providing a tool that helps users focus their approach to evaluating sUAS impact
on small unit combat effectiveness, the framework promises high value by promoting efficiency
and focus.
The application of the framework and its four steps in the context of the static-defense
model presented in Chapters 4 and 5, shows the potential value of the framework when applied to
a specific sUAS deployment scenario. The framework was designed according to the requirements
of warfighters who have used or could use sUAS in real combat situations, a consideration that
is reflected in its results. The analyses reported in Chapters 4 and 5 on the static-defense combat
scenario show that, when deployed effectively and with consideration for changing combat environment, sUAS have the potential to cause shifts in the combat dynamic that will ultimately protect
warfighter lives. The advantages that sUAS can provide in terms of increased battlefield awareness
and firepower capability are evident in the increased combat effectiveness of the in-model defending units that deployed them. These impacts, constituted in the static-defense-scenario-specific
application principles derived from the analysis and presented at the end of Chapter 5, represent
real-life factors that affect the daily life and operations of modern and future warfighters. That the
framework developed in this thesis provides such valuable insight for the people who’s lives are directly affected by battlefield sUAS is compelling evidence of its potential. Figure 6.1 demonstrates
the frameworks application to the static-defense scenario as presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
The results and application principles presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are powerful within
the context of the agent-based model used to derive them and the static-defense scenario. However,
they are only one instance in possible thousands of use cases for the framework. The framework’s
true value, demonstrated through the static-defense scenario exploration in this thesis, is its flexibility in being applicable to any of variety of possible sUAS-small-unit deployment scenarios. As
the framework is applied to more scenarios, a growing set of scenario-specific application principles will accumulate. It is likely that some of the application principles will be shared between
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Figure 6.1: A summary of the implementation of the sUAS-small-unit decision support framework
in the context of the static-defense scenario. The thumbnail images represent components of the
work presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and are associated with the framework steps near which they
are located in the figure.

different scenarios. While the individual, scenario-specific principles will still have their inherent
value, these shared principles will form the basis of a set of general sUAS-small-unit deployment
principles that can be physically tested and validated and then included in tactics and operations
manuals and warfighter training courses. Thus, the framework’s greatest value is that it can be
used to explore sUAS-small-unit deployment in a variety of situations and identify general sUAS
deployment principles that will inform the development of future battle spaces.
Finally, the framework’s value is apparent in its ability to help relieve some of the burden
that warfighter decision makers bear. Deciding what technologies, tactics, and strategies should
be employed in a combat zone is one of the great burdens of military decision makers at all organizational levels. The human-centric nature of warfare means that their choices affect the lives
of people who live in combat zones, enemy combatants, the warfighters they command, and those
people’s families. Any means to lighten that burden, to help the decision-making warfighter protect and preserve that for which he or she fights and is responsible, is a means worth pursuing.
The framework presented in this thesis can be one of those burden-lightening means because of its
capacity to consider huge sets of possible sUAS deployment concepts and guide decision makers
through the process of identifying the concepts that are most likely to benefit warfighters and their
mission.
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6.1

Limitations and Future Work
The design and research deliverables presented in this thesis constitute a decision support

framework for sUAS-small-unit deployment and a successful test case of that framework. By
nature and design, the framework is an exploratory tool that reveals a design concept’s limitations
and flaws as well as its strengths. The analysis conducted herein reveals not only limitations in the
approach to analyzing the specific scenario design space discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, but in the
framework itself. Following is a discussion of some of those limitations and the future work that
could be accomplished to address them.

6.1.1

Modeling Considerations
The agent-based model (ABM) of the static-defense scenario is subordinate to the frame-

work, i.e., it represents the implementation of the second of the four framework steps in the context
of a static-defense scenario described in Chapter 4. This, in and of itself, is not an issue. However, as the work in this thesis stands upon its publication, the model only represents one instance
of the many possible sUAS-small-unit deployment scenarios that could be explored. One of the
model’s primary limitations is that it is built specifically around the static-defense combat scenario.
Though the scenario-specific nature of the model in this thesis allows for the simulation, exploration, and analysis of the sUAS deployment concepts considered in this work, it also limits the
application of the sUAS deployment application principles distilled through it to the static-defense
combat scenario. To examine a different scenario or any appreciably different set of sUAS deployment concepts, significant changes would need to be made to the ABM and, of course, the sUAS
deployment design space.
The limitation of the current model to a single combat scenario is not, however, a critical
flaw. Because the framework was created based on current military doctrine and the experiences
and requirements of veteran warfighters, its foundation and potential for growth are reliable and
trustworthy. Future work could include identification and development of foundational sets of
universal and common combat functions for both infantry units and sUAS. These basic model
components could be used as the basis upon which needed adaptations of the model to specific
sUAS deployment concepts and combat scenarios could be built. A basic model of this nature
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would increase the speed at which other scenarios and concepts could be explored. In future
work, a more flexible model should be developed that could consider multiple aspects of different
scenarios, allowing for a larger variety of specific scenarios to be tested.
Some of the mechanics in the framework’s modeling and analysis components of the framework application to the static-defense scenario are limited in application. For example, the model
does not simulate “directionality” in combat. In reality, if a defending squad observes an attacking
squad along its approach vector, common tactics for engaging that squad might include a fix-andflank or ambush approach that would provide the defending squad with a strong advantage over
the attacking squad. In the current model, however, the two squads would engage directly without
any consideration for the advantages provided by an asymmetric engagement. Future work should
explore the possibility of incorporating more detailed tactics, maneuvers, and spatial and temporal
awareness for agents in the model.
Additionally, though the agent-based model itself is stochastic (i.e., every model run is different because of the use of randomized setup and simulation seed numbers), the decision logic
trees employed by each agent and discussed in Chapter 4 are purely deterministic. The model, as
it stands, provides no room for human error or random events that might cause actions that are not
prescribed by the current decision trees. To better reflect reality, “chance nodes” (e.g., 8/10 times,
an agent will choose action 1, 2/10 it will choose action 2, even though action 1 is more desirable)
could be included in the agent decision-making logic process trees to introduce a degree of stochasticity into the agent decision-making and action-taking processes. This improvement to the model
could increase the computation power required to run a simulation, but would greatly improve its
validity in terms of accurately representing the inconsistency of human-centered processes.
Another model improvement consideration involves the current agent-based model’s ignorance of agent speed in the detection and casualty-causing probability functions. In reality, a squad
of infantry moving slowly across covered ground might be more difficult to detect than a squad
moving quickly through the same terrain. The model currently only considers the density of the
flora in the detection probability function, but should also consider speed. Similarly, a fast moving
target is much more difficult to hit than a slow moving target. The current casualty probability
function should be modified to include target speed as an influencing factor.
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The final modeling limitation that will be discussed here is the software package used to
develop the ABM used in the static-defense scenario application of the framework. NetLogo is
a marvellous tool for ABM and an invaluable introductory tool to the genre of ABM. However,
it is somewhat math-limited (particularly regarding array- and matrix-based computation) and the
high-level nature of its script often requires a creative application of the native NetLogo functions to implement complicated agent behavior. NetLogo also slows down when it must simulate
complex actions for many agents, an attribute that could hamper the implementation of more complex combat scenarios with many more agents than the platoon-level combat represented in the
static-defense combat scenario used in this thesis. Though workarounds do exist for each of these
software challenges, they may require a deeper knowledge of NetLogo’s substructures than framework designers and users may possess. Thus, it is proposed that future development of the ABM
computer model be conducted in a more ubiquitous object-oriented programming language like
Python, C# or MATLAB.

6.1.2

Framework Considerations
There are fewer framework considerations than there are suggestions for future work rel-

ative to modeling specific sUAS deployment scenarios. However, there are several potential improvements to the framework itself that could greatly expand its capability.
The framework’s primary statistical tool for model data exploration, the correlation matrix,
is limited to communicating the presence of linear relationships only. While the correlation matrix
is certainly a powerful tool, non-linear relationships (potentially the most interesting and impactful
type) also need to be considered in a reasonable analysis. For the purposes of this work, nonlinear relationships were identified on a case-by-case basis using scatter plot matrices and intuition.
In future instances of the framework, non-linear tools, potentially including adaptations of the
correlation matrix for non-linear and non-continuous data should be implemented.
Currently, the framework is combat scenario oriented. As evidenced by the exclusive focus on combat effectiveness metrics as model outputs in the application of the framework to the
static-defense scenario presented in this thesis, the framework does not specifically direct its users
to consider logistical and planning costs associated with sUAS deployment concepts. As discussed
in Chapter 5, combat effectiveness cannot be the only consideration for determining sUAS de100

ployment concept goodness—other factors like cost of training and equipment must come into the
equation. Future work in applying the framework should include an addendum to the framework itself that encourages its users to look beyond immediate battlefield impacts of sUAS to the financial
and other resource costs associated with sUAS concepts.
The final, and perhaps greatest limitation to the framework’s functionality in the context of
this thesis specifically is the lack of physical experimentation necessary to fully validate the framework’s results surrounding the static-defense scenario under consideration. A difficulty obtaining
physical, experimental validation is a challenge endemic to designing and simulating complex
systems-of-systems. Oftentimes, physical testing is resource-prohibitive. Consequently, extreme
caution and care must be and were taken to use other sources like similar models, available literature, and user experiences in validating the system’s components and development. In the case of
this model, that alternative validation took the form of consultation with military doctrine publications and veteran warfighters. However, in future work, physical testing will be required to fully
and confidently validate the framework and the principles it is used to distil for any scenario, not
just the static-defense scenario presented in this work. Possible experiments might include physical
testing, validation of model subsystems like the operational parameters of sUAS represented in the
model, or experiments in war game situations with the sUAS deployment concepts and principles
suggested by the framework.

6.1.3

Summary of Considerations for Future Work
Following is a summary list of potential future research activities that could be pursued rel-

ative to developing the framework and applying it to sUAS deployment concept scenarios. These
suggestions should provide a strong foundation to other research projects that could use the framework to perform more extensive analyses of the impact of sUAS on small unit combat effectiveness.
Modeling Considerations
– Development of a more scenario/design-space-flexible model for easier exploration of
many different sUAS use cases
– Implementation of “directionality” in combat interactions
– Stochastic “chance nodes” in agent decision-making logic processes
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– Agent speed as a factor in detection and casualty probability functions
– Exploration of software tools beyond NetLogo for modeling purposes
Framework Considerations
– Expansion of framework high-level analysis tools beyond the linear correlation matrix
– Expansion of concept-goodness considerations to include logistical and other noncombat-related sUAS concept costs
– Physical testing and validation of framework implementation results (e.g., application
principles)

6.2

Closing Argument
This thesis provided a framework to aid warfighter decision makers in their attempts to

explore and understand the impact of sUAS deployment on small unit combat effectiveness. Ultimately, new battlefield technology is only a distracting, shiny object that impedes warfighters,
unless the warfighters know how to use that technology to the best effect in the situation in which
they find themselves. Determining those best practices for sUAS deployment is a monumental task
that cannot be treated lightly or accomplished with physical experiments alone. This framework
provides a bridge, a filter, between the expansive set of sUAS deployment concepts and scenarios
and the warfighters who must test and those concepts to determine which of them should be implemented on the battlefield. The sUAS-small-unit deployment decision support framework is a tool
set for exploring and evaluating the myriad of possible sUAS deployment concepts and evaluating their usefulness in any given combat scenario. The framework illuminates those concepts that
show the greatest potential and generates principles for sUAS deployment that form the foundation
for physical testing and proving of those concepts before any decision is made regarding whether
or not they should be deployed in real combat.
If only the Byzantines had know in 1453 that their venerated walls were not a viable defense
against the Ottoman artillery. If only the Spanish could have foreseen in 1588 the vulnerability
of their anchorage to the ingenuity and desperation of the English admirals. If only the French
had understood in 1939 that the Maginot Line could simply be circumvented by a quick-moving
tank force deployed through presumably impassable terrain. History echoes with the “if only’s”
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of commanders and nations that were unable to comprehend the consequences of emerging and
ingenious blends of tactics and technology. Those echoes teach military decision makers that
they must find a way to explore and anticipate as many of the tactical implementations of new
technology as possible. If those technological implementations remain unexplored, due to inability
or to neglect, then the plans to counter and to use them cannot be made, and history will repeat
itself. The recent rise in sUAS availability and capability indicates that sUAS will become an
influential technological factor on future battlefields. Thus, the decision support framework for
sUAS-small-unit deployment presented in this thesis becomes part of the smart, efficient planning
process that will guarantee success in the future of warfare.
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APPENDIX A.

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH WARFIGHTERS

Author’s note: as per the interviewees’ express statements, the interviews reported on in
the notes in this appendix did not include any sensitive or confidential information relative to US
military operations or technologies. As far as possible and reasonable, all information included
in the interviews and the notes below can be verified in the military publications consulted in this
work or in other corporate or new media. The interviewees provided only unclassified information
and insight.

A.1

Captain Nick Baker, USMC
Interactions with Capt. Nick Baker, USMC comprised a set of informal personal and con-

sultations before and during model development while Capt. Baker and the author worked in the
same lab space in the Brigham Young University Department of Mechanical Engineering. They
are divided generally into five topic areas, which occurred in the order listed below beginning on
March 2019 and ending in February 2020.
1. Military literature, unit structure, and personal experience with sUAS
2. Fire team tactics in the open and terrain considerations
3. Maneuver warfare and patrol/observation tactics
4. In-model squad decision making process and rules of engagement
Due to planning oversight, these conversations were not recorded. What follows is a summary of each conversation in a questions-and-answer format based on notes taken by the author
during the interactions and follow-up discussions with Capt. Baker. Answers have been presented
as though Capt. Baker spoke them directly, though they typically paraphrase his actual comments.
Questions or comments by the author are indicated by “CC” while comments by the Capt. Baker
are indicated by “NB.”
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A.1.1

First Interview

CC How does the military depict or distinguish between units on a map?
NB They use “NATO Symbology.” Followed by demonstration of NATO symbology in the NATO
manual and a discussion of how it applies to different classes, sizes, and affiliations of units
on a strategic or operations map.
CC How is terrain/topology depicted and used in military planning?
NB You would probably want to represent it the same way that it appears in a topological map.
The type of terrain people are moving over affects how they move—it slows them down or
impedes their maneuvers. Typically, people will try to move along specific terrain features—
a ridge, a draw, a tree line—that given them an advantage of not being seen or in defending
against an attack.
CC What about tactics manuals, do you know of any that I should look at?
NB Yes, I can send you a few for the Marines. I don’t know about ones for the Army, but
you could probably find some by googling around—they’re usually published for everyone to see. There is a difference between Marine and Army tactics and operations though.
Marine squads use what are called “combined arms” tactics a lot more, even down at the
squad/platoon level. That means that each squad has a guy with a heavy weapon like a machine gun, and every platoon might have access to a mortar or other large-caliber weapon
to use in combination with other small arms. I think that the Army tends to have more homogenous squads and platoons, like a rifle squad just has rifles, maybe one guy with a light
machine gun. Then they have rifle platoons, and maybe, at the company level, they have
two or three rifle platoons and then a mortar or heavy weapons platoon or something. The
Marines tend to mix in things like that at the squad and platoon level because the assumption is that they may need to operate semi-independently rather than expecting to have the
support of a full company or something like that. Followed by a more in-depth review of a
USMC tactical handbook and brief search for Army and other NATO publications.
CC How are units organized in the Marines relative to the Army?
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NB Well, I’m not sure about the army, but Marine squads are made up of 12 people. That’s
divided into three fire teams of four, though those are kind of created on an ad-hoc basis as
needed. There’s a squad leader, usually a sergeant, an assistant squad leader, and another
NCO, each of whom take command of one of the three fire teams. A platoon is usually made
of three standard squads and a smaller command team—usually about 40 people. From
there, a company is made up of three platoons plus a command staff. I think the Army’s
squads only have nine guys.
CC What do you know about how UAVs have been used by the Marines?
NB I worked at the operations (i.e., company/battalion) level, so I never used them directly. I
knew guys that did though, and they had problems with them. Someone up the command
chain would say, “Hey, you need to start using these drones to help you while you’re out
on patrol. This X-method is how you’re supposed to use them.” So, they’d go out and use
them that way. They found out pretty quickly that, when they launched the UAV, it gave
the insurgent that were hidden out in the hills a perfect idea of where they were located and
pretty soon they would get hit with mortars. So, because they had to follow their orders for
how to use UAVs if the UAVs were operational, they would actually break them a little as
soon as they went out on patrol so that they wouldn’t have to use UAVs and telegraph to
the enemy where they were located. When they’d get back to base, they would just say that
the UAV needed to be repaired and didn’t work. So, to me, UAVs seem like something that
the “good idea fairy” came up with. The good idea fairy is a guy who gets in the brains of
operations and strategic-level commanders a lot. They think they’ve come up with this great
idea, which looks fantastic on paper, but actually really doesn’t work in real life. Because
it seems like such a good idea, it gets passed down to the guys who have to go out and do
things and they are the ones who have to discover that it really doesn’t work for whatever
reason.

A.1.2

Second Interview

CC How does a squad attack or defend when in the open (not fortified or dug-in)?
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NB Well, that’s really situation-dependent. But there are some basic concepts that usually get
applied in one form or another. One of those is the idea that you divide your force, say a
squad, into two groups. The first group is the larger, maybe it has two fire teams in it, but
it’s actually not the “main” force. Its job is to “fix” the enemy, to distract them and pin them
in place with fires. The other group, just one fire team, is actually the main force. Their job
is to maneuver in such a way that they can flank the enemy. The main force doesn’t come
directly from behind, because then you’d risk cross-fire, but will come around the side of the
enemy, who doesn’t know they’re there because they’re distracted by the fixing force, and
will flank them. Every action taken by the fixing force is to enable a successful maneuver
by the flanking, main force. Even though the main force is actually not the largest group,
its actions are what make the engagement successful. - followed by an in-depth discussion
of how this maneuver would play out in different situations (e.g., the squad is ambushed
while in column, the squad is ambushing, the squad is attacking a known force, the squad is
defending a known force).
CC How does terrain factor into decisions for squad tactics?
NB Usually, you’ll have planned your operation before you go out, so you’ll know where the
enemy will likely be moving and you’ll be able to identify a “dominant terrain feature.” A
dominant terrain feature is a piece of terrain that gives you an advantage over an enemy
deployed in any other area around it. These can include features like a wooded hill, a ridge
situated above a draw or valley that the enemy will likely pass through, a tree-line, etc. The
dominant terrain feature will typically provide you with a defensive advantage like extra
cover or concealment and will be difficult for your enemy to access from the place from
which they’ll likely be approaching. - followed by an in-depth discussion of how you might
set up a squad or platoon to defend a dominant terrain feature and how squad and fire team
fields of fire might be designed to maximize area coverage and minimize threat zones.

A.1.3

Third Interview

CC How does a platoon operate when in battle?
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NB Platoons use something called “maneuver warfare” to determine how they operate. The idea
is that, rather than just trying to kill all of the enemy is some all-out attack, a platoon can
use different maneuvers, like an ambush or flank-attack, to disrupt the enemy in such a way
that they can’t fight anymore. The objective becomes creating chaos and panic in the enemy
in order to remove them as an effective force more than just killing or capturing them. Each
squad or fire-team understands their role in achieving whatever the objective is and is allowed
to act semi-independently to achieve that goal, though always within a general plan so that
the actions of individual squads and platoons are still coordinated. Added post-interview:
typically, maneuver warfare relies on fast-paced, surprising attacks using combined arms,
flexibility, and decentralized command.
CC What about patrols, what do those look like at the platoon level?
NB That really depends on the situations (CC clarifies: in a hill-defense scenario). Okay, so,
you’d probably have one of your squads divided up into observation teams, usually two guys
but never just one, that would be spread out down or around the hill in the direction of the
enemy (and on your flanks and rear too). Then you’d have maybe one or two squad set up in
fire teams facing in all of the threat directions. You’d have a third squad, or what remains of
the platoon after everyone else is set up, waiting in reserve to react when the observation units
make contact with the enemy. The last group is really your main force–while the enemy are
engaged with the guys you have set out in static or observation positions, the last squad can
maneuver to flank or ambush the attackers. In a static defense like this, you really wouldn’t
have guys out patrolling, walking around, because then they’d be focusing their attention on
walking, not on looking for the enemy, and they might alert the enemy to your position.
CC Could you use UAVs to patrol in this kind of a situation?
NB Ya, it seems like you might, but again, you’d have to be careful so that they wouldn’t alert
the enemy to your exact position. You’d need to find a way to use them to deceive the enemy
or at least operate them in a way that wouldn’t give your position away.
CC How do you think I could measure relative firepower between opponents in the model?

115

NB Having the actual firepower is good, like what kind of weapons do they bring to the fight
and how those are different from each other, but you also need to consider the defensive
component of an engagement. For example, insurgents are really just wearing their street
clothes most of the time, whereas marines or soldiers are usually wearing full body armor
with helmets, etc.. So, while someone just wearing normal clothes who gets shot might get
seriously injured or killed, someone wearing full body armor could get shot and, while it
might hurt, be able to brush it off. You need to find a way to account for that in model,
especially if you’re going to have dissimilar forces fighting each other.

A.1.4

Fourth Interview

CC I’m trying to figure out how decision-making for individual squads in the model should go
and be presented. I have these decision-making “trees.” Do they make sense to you?
NB CC and NB talk through each of the decision making trees described in Chapter 3. Methodology. I think that you cover the high level concepts pretty well. It makes sense to have
a squad check to make sure that none of the other squads need help before it continues on
with its individual objective, and I think that the combat sequence makes sense. It makes
sense that the attackers withdraw and try another angle of attack if they’re at a disadvantage. I also like that the squads have to go through the process every time they’re going to
do something—like, you don’t just blindly continue in what you’re doing without considering the situation developing around you. This is obviously pretty high level, like, if you
were going to try to represent specific maneuvers, you’d want much more detail here. But if
you’re not including maneuvers, then this is a pretty decent high-level approximation of the
decisions a squad leader would have to go through.
CC What impact do the rules of war have on a battlefield decision-making?
NB Well, rules of war is a bit general. Different parts of the world are divided into zones that
have specific rules of engagement about how to treat combatants, non-combatants, etc. For
example, where we were in the Middle East, sometimes insurgents would deliberately hide in
or attack from heavily populated zones or civilian buildings like a mosque. We have express
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rules saying that we can’t engage them with indirect fires if they’re hiding in a civilian
building—like, you can’t just bomb an apartment complex or a mosque because your enemy
is hiding in there or even attacking you from it. You have to find another way to engage them
or else withdraw because the risk of non-combatant casualties is too high. There’s a lot of
gray area in things like rules of engagement, but when you’re making plans and reacting to
developing situations, you try to consider them, especially when they involve people who
aren’t fighting who could get hurt.

A.2

Major Mark Duffin, ret., US Army and National Guard
Interactions with Maj. Mark Duffin, retired US Army and National Guard were generally

limited to one interview and a series of follow-up phone calls during model development and
the writing process. The primary interview took place on November 17, 2019. Due to planning
oversight, the interview and subsequent phone calls were not recorded. What follows is a summary
of the interview and follow-up calls in a questions-and-answer format based on notes taken by the
author. Answers have been presented as though Maj. Duffin spoke them directly, though they
typically paraphrase his actual comments. Questions or comments by the author are indicated by
“CC” while comments by the Maj. Duffin are indicated by “MD.”

A.2.1

Primary Interview

CC Did you use UAVs during your tours of duty in the Middle East or Africa?
MD Yes. In fact, on one assignment, I oversaw the the operation of Raven UAVs.
CC Can you tell me about your experience and how you used them?
MD Yes, at a general level. So the Raven is a hand-deployed drone with a wingspan of about
three or four feet. We mostly used them for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(that’s ISR) work. So, we would use them to observe where insurgents might be moving,
to identify patterns in their movements so that we could increase our knowledge of their
habits. I don’t know that we ever used them in combat or engagement situations, where we
were observing an actual firefight, but we definitely used them to see what insurgents might
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be doing in preparation for our operations. We also used them to get a better idea of what
terrain and man-made features were present in an area that might be of interest to us or the
enemy.
CC So, in my model, I mostly use UAVs in a patrolling role where they go out and look for
approaching enemies. Is that a conceivable role for UAS?
MD Definitely. Especially if other strategic-level assets like a Predator type drone weren’t available, it would make sense to deploy a company or platoon-level asset like a small drone to
observe enemy maneuvers before an engagement. Though, because they fly so low, using
a small drone like a Raven to observe the enemy can tip them off to your observation and
change their behavior. That could be both advantageous or disadvantageous for you.
CC Did you ever use UAVs to make indirect fires targeting decisions?
MD So, you have to be really careful with that. Where there’s a life-or-death decision being made,
like, if a trigger is being pulled somewhere, a machine can’t do that, absolutely not. A human
being has to be on the other end somewhere making the ultimate decision of whether or not
to pull the trigger. Also, if a drone is observing some target, you’ll usually need some kind
of secondary authentication of the target’s nature—you can’t just trust the drone’s camera or
sensors. That typically involves a visual confirmation from someone on the ground. So, if
you were going to have the kind of a situation you are describing where a drone is helping
with artillery targeting, you’d need to have some other kind of ground or airborne spotter
who could confirm the target’s identity and location.

A.2.2

Follow-up Call

CC I just observed something neat in the model. When an attacking squad realizes they’ve been
spotted by a defending UAV, they will run away from the rest of the attacking platoon and
towards cover. Because the defenders can’t fire at attackers sheltering in a building, the
attackers won’t leave the building until the UAV has been forced to return to its operating
squad because its battery is running low. Sometimes, when the defenders are operating
multiple UAVs with near-continuous coverage of the attacking squads, the attacking squad
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will get pinned in the structure almost indefinitely, so they never even get a chance to make
contact with the defending squads. So it looks like the UAVs completely disrupt the attacker
approach, forcing them to changing their behavior and not attack the defenders or move to a
place where the defenders are certain of their whereabouts and they are not a threat.
MD That’s a cool result. It makes sense too, that the UAVs’ presence would change the attackers
behavior. Hypothetically, what might be really cool is if you could find a way to include in
the model a behavior where the defenders, now knowing where the attackers are, set up an
ambush for them and then “un-pin” them by moving the UAV away and making the attackers
think that its safe to continue their approach. Then, the attackers would be ambushed and
could be defeated in detail. That could be a neat future application for UAVs.
CC You’re right. I’ve actually observed something like behavior before too, though I didn’t
set things up deliberately in that way. When the UAV is forced to return to its operator to
get a new battery but a replacement hasn’t quite arrive to take its place, the attackers will
think they’re safe to continue their approach and will leave cover. Soon enough, though, the
replacement UAV arrives, catches the attackers in the open, and is used by the defenders to
target indirect fires on the vulnerable attacking squad.
MD Ya, that’s another way it could happen. I think that makes a lot of sense.
CC Thanks for letting me share, and for verifying that this observation makes sense tactically.
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APPENDIX B.

SELECTED SIMULATION SCREEN SHOTS

This abstract comprises a set of screenshots highlighting important moments during five
different simulations that represent common or interesting occurrences during many simulation
runs. It also includes visual representations of UAV launch and patrol behaviors and the six sUAS
patrol pattern variants. The intention of this appendix is to provide the reader with a visual connection to the data in the model runs. These simulations were created with the NetLogo agent-based
computer model represented in its entirety in Appendix C. For each of the simulations, four variable are defined: an environment setup seed number (Se ), a simulation seed number (Ss ), the number of UAVs operated by the defenders Nu , and the patrol pattern variant used during the simulation
P. Each of these variables is defined in Chapter 4 and the third and fourth variable are the sUAS
deployment concept variables referred to in Chapter 5. The environmental setup seed number is
the same for all simulations in this appendix, with Se = −414857330. The latter three variables are
defined in the caption for each figure. All simulations involve a platoon in static defense attempting
to either outlast or eliminate an attacking platoon.
In these figures, environmental components are as defined in Chapter B.2. Blue rectangles
represent defending agents (blue rectangle with a chevron is UAV, blue rectangle with a crossed
lines is squad) and red diamonds are attacking squads. Additionally, the blue and white lines that
appear in simulation frames where UAVs are deployed denote previous paths taken by UAVs.
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Figure B.1: A simulation wherein the attacking platoon’s approach is disrupted by defending UAVs
and the attackers are neutralized in detail by defender IDF. Key moments include: 1) starting positions, 2) the full-range deployment of the patrolling defending UAVs, 3) first contact between a
defending UAV and an attacking squad, 4) initial disruption of the attacking platoon’s formation
and approach by defending UAVs, 5) full disruption of the attacking platoon’s formation and approach and dissolution of the attacking platoon as a fighting unit, 6) simulation end. Ss = 2056,
Nu = 9, P = Short-Range Mower.
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Figure B.2: A simulation wherein the attacking platoon’s approach is intercepted by defending
UAVs, the attacking squads take shelter from the defending UAVs and IDF, become pinned in the
buildings, and are eventually destroyed by defending IDF as they attempt to pursue the approach.
Key moments include: 1) starting positions, 2) first contact between a defending UAV and an
attacking squad, 3) initial defender IDF drive attackers into buildings for shelter, 4) retreat of
defending UAVs to recharge or replace batteries and attempt by attacking squads to pursue their
approach, 5) second interception of attacking squads by defending UAVs and destruction of the
attacking force by IDF. Ss = 2458, Nu = 9, P = Long-Range Circles.
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Figure B.3: A simulation in which the attacking platoon is able to push through the patrolling
defending UAV to disrupt the defending platoons sUAS operation and formation. After an initial
engagement with heavy casualties, the attackers are repelled and the remaining attacking squad
evades the defenders. Key moments include 1) starting positions, 2) the full-range deployment of
the patrolling defending UAVs, 3) first contact between a defending UAV and an attacking squad, 4)
the attackers push through the patrolling defending UAV screen and engage the defending platoon
with direct fires, 5) retreat of the decimated attacking platoon, 6) occupation of the defending AoR
by the attacking platoon. Ss = 16, Nu = 7, P = Short-Range Circles.
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Figure B.4: A simulation in which the defending platoon is not equipped with sUAS. The attackers
approach, make contact with, and are eventually defeated by the defenders. Key moments include:
1) starting positions, 2) first contact between a defending squad and an attack squad, 3) the attacking squads attempt to concentrate fire on the defending squads but are defeated in detail, 4)
dissolution of the attacking force. Ss = 10, Nu = 0, P = None.
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Figure B.5: A simulation in which the defending platoon is not equipped with sUAS. The attackers
approach, engage with, and destroy the defending platoon. Key moments include: 1) starting positions, 2) first contact, 3) simultaneous assault by the attackers across the entire line of the defending
platoon, 4) the defending platoon is overwhelmed and neutralized by the attacking platoon.
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Figure B.6: Representations of the initial and maximum-distance deployments for 1-2) a single
UAV, 3-4) five UAVs, 5-6) nine UAVs.
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Figure B.7: Represenations of the six sUAs patrol pattern variants used in the analyses in this
work. They are 1) short-range circular, 2) long-range circular, 3) short-range mower, 4) long-range
mower, 5) short-range random, 6) long-range random.
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Figure B.8: Examples of different environmental seed (Se ) setups. Seed numbers are as follows:
1) Se = −2141296293 and Ss = −228998478, 2) Se = 1668850840 and Ss = 1865012912, 3)
Se = 1631387870 and Ss = −1454403601, 4) Se = 177052173 and Ss = −1652274757, 5) Se =
−986959552 and Ss = 646978074, 6) Se = 1289678205 and Ss = −1131162546.
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Figure B.9: Examples of different simulation seed (Ss ) setups. The environmental setup seed is
held constant at Se = −414857330. Seed numbers are as follows: 1) Ss = 6, 2) Ss = 8, 3) Ss = 3,
4) Ss = 1, 5) Ss = 16, 6) Ss = 4.
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APPENDIX C.

NETLOGO AGENT-BASED MODEL CODE

This appendix contains the NetLogo code for the agent-based computer model designed
for exploring the static-defense combat scenario described in Chapter 4. Chapters 4 and 5 provide descriptions for the variables within the model that are relevant to the scenario exploration.
Chapter 4 provides detailed explanations of the model’s agents, primary functions, and functional
objectives. The code begins on the following page.
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;;; use this code to observe all squads simultaneously via the UI <<ask squads [inspect self]>>
extensions []
breed [flora flor]
breed [buildings building]
breed [aors aor]
breed [squads squad]
breed [uavs uav]
breed [explosions explosion]
directed-link-breed [contacts contact]
directed-link-breed [ranged-contacts ranged-contact]
directed-link-breed [support-links support-link]
patches-own
[
elevation
aor-team
flora-present
green-density
]
turtles-own
[
]
squads-own
[
num-warfighters
attack-mult-weapon
attack-add-vehicle
attack-factor
defense-mult-armor
defense-add-vehicle
defense-add-building
defense-add-flora
defense-factor
combat-strength
speed-base
speed-mult-armor
speed-mult-vehicle
speed-mult-terrain
speed-factor
vision-base
vision-mult-terrain
vision-mult-time
vision-factor
stealth-base
stealth-add-vehicle
stealth-add-uas
stealth-add-building
stealth-add-flora
stealth-add-rain
stealth-add-time
stealth-factor
detection-base
detection-add-vehicle
detection-add-rain
detection-add-time
detection-factor
terrain-defense-rifle-states-vector ;fortifying, supporting, intercepting, in-defensive-combat, in-counterattack
terrain-defense-uasgcu-states-vector ;patrolling-uas, landing-uas
defensive-combat-states-vector ;in-contact, observing, firing, pursuing, withdrawing
counterattack-states-vector ;advancing, intercepting
fortified
fortified-buildings
fortified-flora
fortified-of-last-tick
fortified-buildings-of-last-tick
fortified-flora-of-last-tick
opponents
opponents-uavs
opponent-detected
opponent-detected-by-uav
hostile-uav-detected
hostile-uav-detected-previous-tick
combat-strength-disparity ; exact value of difference in combat strengths between self and opposing unit
combat-strength-advantage ; boolean indicator of combat strength advantage
indirect-fires-target
friendly-squads
friendly-squads-in-need
closest-friendly-squad-in-need
closest-friendly-squad-assailant
in-supporting-role
; boolean indicator for a squad that is linked in a support role to another friendly squad
number-of-uavs-deployed
standard-dev-detection
team-color
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previous-uav-launch-angle
]

previous-arrival-at-aor

uavs-own
[
parent-squad
air-speed ;patches per tick
payload-type ;0, 1, 2, 3, etc... You'll need to determine what these are eventually.
attritable? ; 0, 1; whether or not this is an attritable drone
battery-life ;ticks or time
patrol-start-time
decaying-patrol-index
incremental-increase
team-color
opponents
closest-opponent-uav
closest-defending-infantry-squads
closest-available-defending-infantry-squad
opponent-detected
previous-contact-indicator
standard-dev-detection
]

launch-angle

flora-own
[green-density-flora
]
aors-own
[
]
explosions-own
[
explosion-start-time
explosion-duration-time
]
globals
[
;;;;; setup globals ;;;;;
patches-to-meters
ticks-to-seconds
landscape-smoothness
aor-base-patch-defending
aor-base-patch-attacking
border-aors-defending
true-highest-patch
number-of-flora-centers
flora-centers
flora-areas
building-density ;maybe replace with a number of presets?
neighborhood-patches
size-of-defending-aor
aor-defending-color
aor-attacking-color
aor-radius-defending
aor-defending
aor-initial-defending
aor-radius-attacking
aor-attacking
aor-initial-attacking
building-defense-bonus
flora-defense-bonus
attacking-type
combatant-color-defending
combatant-color-insurgent
combatant-color-attacking
percent-UAS-GCU-defending
percent-UAS-GCU-insurgent
percent-UAS-GCU-attacking
number-of-squads-defending
number-of-squads-insurgent
number-of-squads-attacking
number-of-UAS-GCU-defending
number-of-UAS-GCU-insurgent
number-of-UAS-GCU-attacking
number-of-rifle-squads-defending
number-of-rifle-squads-insurgent
number-of-rifle-squads-attacking
defending-squads
defending-uas-gcu-squads
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attacking-squads
defending-uavs
attacking-uavs
;

uav-patrol-type-defending
;;;;; runtime globals ;;;;;
time-limit ; end condition
mission-time-limit ; end condition
parameters
run-number
percent-remaining-defending-aor
num-warfighters-defending
num-warfighters-attacking
universal-air-speed
universal-uav-payload
attritable-uavs
universal-uav-battery-life
uavs-option
number-of-uav-gcus-defending
number-of-uav-gcus-attacking
patrolling-defending-squads

;

number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-defending
number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-attacking
; covariates
percent-of-time-with-enemies-detected ;complete
time-in-contact-with-attacking ;complete
time-to-defeat-attacking ;complete
first-contact ;complete
time-of-first-contact ;complete
distance-of-first-contact ;complete
patch-of-last-contact ;complete
first-defender-df
first-attacker-df
number-of-uavs-launched-total-defending ;complete
number-of-uavs-launched-total-attacking ;complete
number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending ;complete
number-of-uavs-aborted-total-attacking ;complete
number-of-large-calliber-bombardments ;complete
number-of-medium-calliber-bombardments ;complete
number-of-small-calliber-bombardments ;complete
first-IF-indicator ;complete
time-of-first-IF ;complete
time-of-last-IF ;complete
range-of-furthest-IF ;complete
range-of-closest-IF ;complete
num-attackers-neut-by-IF ;complete
time-with-uas-airborn ;complete
mult-time-with-uas-airborn ;complete
initial-attacker-distance ;incomplete
dispersal-of-attackers-at-first-df ;complete
dispersal-of-attackers-at-first-contact ;complete
maximum-attacker-dispersal ;complete
dispersal-of-defenders-at-first-df ;complete
dispersal-of-defenders-at-first-contact ;complete
number-of-defender-df ;complete
number-of-attacker-df ;complete
time-of-first-defender-df ;complete
time-of-last-defender-df ;incomplete
time-of-first-attacker-df ;incomplete
time-of-last-attacker-df ;incomplete
number-of-times-UAS-tracked-attackers ;incomplete
maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-before-attackers-reach-aor
maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-before-attackers-reach-aor
maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-after-attackers-reach-aor
maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-after-attackers-reach-aor
attackers-have-entered-defending-aor ; ennabling indicator variable for the maximum-dispersal before/after aor covariates
remaining-warfighters-in-uas-gcu
number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor-intact
number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor
; coordinates of starting position
pxcor-defender-start
pycor-defender-start
pxcor-attacker-start
pycor-attacker-start

]
;;;;; setup procedures ;;;;;
to unpack-parameters
;; Convert the string input to a NetLogo list
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set run-parameters remove "," run-parameters; lists in Python are comma separated, and need to be space deliminated for NetLogo use
set parameters read-from-string run-parameters
;; Run parameters are the string passed by
set run-number item 0 parameters
set r-seed? false
set r-seed item 1 parameters
set second-r-seed? false
set auto-second-r-seed? false
set second-r-seed item 2 parameters
ifelse item 3 parameters = 0
[set uav-squads-on false]
[set uav-squads-on true]
set uav-patrol-type-defending item 3 parameters ; yes, this is correct; both the previous block and this one use item 3 parameters (this is no typo! item
set number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-defending item 4 parameters
end
to setup
clear-all
;;;;;;;;;; Block of global variables that can be overwritten by behavior space ;;;;;;;;;;
;setup globals
;;;;; notes on units of measurement ;;;;;
; 1 patch = 15 meters square
; 1 tick = 10 seconds
; thus, ground forces on foot move at ~ 1 patches per tick, or at 1.5 m/s, which
set patches-to-meters 15
set ticks-to-seconds 10
set number-of-flora-centers 8
set building-density 1 ; 0 is no density (desolate), 1 is low density (rural), 2 is high density (urban/suburban)
set aor-radius-defending 20 ; used indirectly to determine the radius within which attacking squads spawn around the defending aor
; runtime globals
set number-of-squads-defending 4;3
set attacking-type 1 ; 0 for insurgents, 1 for peer-attacking
ifelse attacking-type = 0
[set number-of-squads-insurgent 5];5]
[set number-of-squads-attacking 5];3]
ifelse uav-squads-on = true
[set number-of-uav-gcus-defending 1]
[set number-of-uav-gcus-defending 0]
set number-of-uav-gcus-attacking 0
;

set number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-defending 4
set number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-attacking 0

set universal-air-speed 4 ;
set universal-uav-payload 0 ; 0, 1, 2, etc. Probably identify these later...
set attritable-uavs 0 ; 0 is no, 1 is yes.
set universal-uav-battery-life 100 ; number of ticks?
; set uav-patrol-type-defending 5
;;;;;;;;;; End of block ;;;;;;;;;;
if unpack-params?
[ unpack-parameters ]
setup-seed
set landscape-smoothness 100
setup-landscape
setup-flora
setup-buildings
;
;
;
;

set combatant-color-defending blue
set combatant-color-insurgent red + 3
set combatant-color-attacking red
setup-aors
setup-second-seed
set combatant-color-defending blue
set combatant-color-insurgent red + 3
set combatant-color-attacking red
setup-aors
initialize-squad-variables
repeat number-of-rifle-squads-defending [ask one-of aor-initial-defending with [distance aor-base-patch-defending < 5] [sprout-squads 1 [setup-defending
repeat number-of-UAS-GCU-defending [ask one-of aor-initial-defending with [distance aor-base-patch-defending < 5] [sprout-squads 1 [setup-defending-UAS-G
ifelse attacking-type = 0
[repeat number-of-rifle-squads-insurgent [ask one-of aor-initial-attacking [sprout-squads 1 [setup-insurgent-rifle-squads]]]
repeat number-of-UAS-GCU-insurgent [ask one-of aor-initial-attacking [sprout-squads 1 [setup-insurgent-UAS-GCU-squads]]]]
[repeat number-of-rifle-squads-attacking [ask one-of aor-initial-attacking with [distance aor-base-patch-attacking < 5] [sprout-squads 1 [setup-attacking
repeat number-of-UAS-GCU-attacking [ask one-of aor-initial-attacking with [distance aor-base-patch-attacking < 5] [sprout-squads 1 [setup-attacking
set defending-squads squads with [team-color = combatant-color-defending]
set defending-uas-gcu-squads squads with [shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending"]
set attacking-squads squads with [team-color = combatant-color-attacking or team-color = combatant-color-insurgent]
ask squads
[if member? self defending-squads [set friendly-squads defending-squads]
if member? self attacking-squads [set friendly-squads attacking-squads]]
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;FOR SOME REASON THE IF STATEMENT IN INITIALIZE-SQUAD-VARIABLES WASN'T WORKING - SEE THAT FUNCTION FOR THE WORKAROUND I BUILT: set uavs-option 0; 1 is on
set patrolling-defending-squads 0; 0 is no patrolling, 1 is yes patrolling
;ask squads [inspect self]
set-initial-attacker-distance
reset-ticks
end
to setup-seed
if r-seed? [set r-seed new-seed]
random-seed r-seed
end
to setup-second-seed
if second-r-seed?
[set second-r-seed new-seed]
if auto-second-r-seed? and not second-r-seed? [set second-r-seed r-seed]
random-seed second-r-seed
end
to setup-landscape
ask patches [set elevation random-float 1.0]
repeat landscape-smoothness [diffuse elevation 1]
let min-elevation min [elevation] of patches
let max-elevation max [elevation] of patches
ask patches [set elevation 0.99999 * (elevation - min-elevation) / (max-elevation - min-elevation)]
ask patches [set pcolor scale-color gray elevation 0.0 1.0]
end
to setup-flora
set flora-defense-bonus 2
repeat number-of-flora-centers
[set flora-centers one-of patches
ask flora-centers [grow-flora]]
repeat 40 [ask patches with [flora-present = 1][grow-flora]]
set flora-areas patches with [flora-present = 1]
ask flora-areas [set green-density random-float 3.0]
repeat 3 [diffuse green-density 0.5]
ask flora-areas[sprout-flora 1 [set color (green + green-density )]]
ask flora
[set color lput 125 extract-rgb color
set shape "plant"
set green-density-flora [green-density] of patch-here
set heading 0
]
end
to grow-flora
ask n-of 2 neighbors [set flora-present 1]
end
to setup-buildings
set building-defense-bonus 5
let number-of-neighborhoods 0
let number-of-buildings-per-neighborhood 0
let radius-of-neighborhood 20
(ifelse
building-density = 0
[] ; do nothing, no buildings
building-density = 1
[set number-of-neighborhoods 10
set number-of-buildings-per-neighborhood 15]
building-density = 2
[set number-of-neighborhoods 40
set number-of-buildings-per-neighborhood 100]
[;else statement
])
set neighborhood-patches moore-offsets radius-of-neighborhood
ask n-of number-of-neighborhoods patches
[ask n-of number-of-buildings-per-neighborhood patches at-points neighborhood-patches
[sprout-buildings 1]
]
ask buildings
[
set color yellow
set color lput 200 extract-rgb color
set size 3
set shape "square 2"
]
end
to-report moore-offsets [n]
let result [list pxcor pycor] of patches with [abs pxcor <= n and abs pycor <= n]
report result
end
to setup-aors
let origin-patch one-of patches with [pxcor = 0 and pycor = 0]
let middle-patches [patches in-radius 50] of origin-patch
set aor-base-patch-defending one-of middle-patches with-max [elevation]
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let elevation-of-aor-base-patch [elevation] of aor-base-patch-defending
ask aor-base-patch-defending [set aor-team 1]
ifelse uniform-aors?
[ask aor-base-patch-defending [ask patches in-radius aor-radius-defending [set aor-team 1]]]
[repeat 24 [ask patches with [aor-team = 1][ask neighbors4 with [(elevation > (elevation-of-aor-base-patch - 0.15)) and (aor-team != 1)][set aor-team 1]
set aor-initial-defending patches with [aor-team = 1]
set size-of-defending-aor count aor-initial-defending
set aor-defending-color [52 93 169] ; blue with half transparency
set aor-defending-color lput 125 aor-defending-color
ask aor-initial-defending ;[set color aor-defending-color]
[sprout-aors 1 [set color aor-defending-color]]
;ask aors [set color lput 125 extract-rgb color]
ask aors [set shape "circle"]
set border-aors-defending aors with [count aors in-radius 1 < 5]
ifelse attacking-type = 0
[set aor-attacking-color combatant-color-insurgent]
[set aor-attacking-color combatant-color-attacking]
set aor-attacking-color lput 125 extract-rgb aor-attacking-color
let unavailable-attacking-aor-patches [patches in-radius (3 * aor-radius-defending)] of aor-base-patch-defending
set aor-initial-attacking patches with [not member? self unavailable-attacking-aor-patches]
;set aor-initial-attacking [patches with [not any? aors-here] in-radius (8 * aor-radius-defending)] of aor-base-patch-defending ; the initial attacking z
set aor-base-patch-attacking one-of aor-initial-attacking
set
set
set
set
end

pxcor-defender-start
pycor-defender-start
pxcor-attacker-start
pycor-attacker-start

[pxcor]
[pycor]
[pxcor]
[pycor]

of
of
of
of

aor-base-patch-defending
aor-base-patch-defending
aor-base-patch-attacking
aor-base-patch-attacking

;remember to reset number of squads per team after you've got the combat system figured out - 6/26/19
to initialize-squad-variables
set percent-UAS-GCU-defending number-of-uav-gcus-defending / number-of-squads-defending; can be 0/3, 1/3, 2/3, 3/3
ifelse attacking-type = 0
[set percent-UAS-GCU-insurgent number-of-uav-gcus-attacking / number-of-squads-insurgent]; can be 0/5, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 5/5
[set percent-UAS-GCU-attacking number-of-uav-gcus-attacking / number-of-squads-attacking]; can be 0/3, 1/3, 2/3, 3/3
set number-of-UAS-GCU-defending percent-UAS-GCU-defending * number-of-squads-defending
set number-of-rifle-squads-defending number-of-squads-defending - number-of-UAS-GCU-defending
ifelse attacking-type = 0
[set number-of-UAS-GCU-insurgent percent-UAS-GCU-insurgent * number-of-squads-insurgent
set number-of-rifle-squads-insurgent number-of-squads-insurgent - number-of-UAS-GCU-insurgent]
[set number-of-UAS-GCU-attacking percent-UAS-GCU-attacking * number-of-squads-attacking
set number-of-rifle-squads-attacking number-of-squads-attacking - number-of-UAS-GCU-attacking]
end
to setup-defending-rifle-squads
set shape "infantry_squad_defending"
;set shape "person"
set color combatant-color-defending
set team-color combatant-color-defending
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 1
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 0.8
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5 ; 5 is default - I have yet to implement this as a dynamic value 7/1/19
set vision-mult-time 5 ; 5 for day, 2.5 for night - I have yet to implement this as a changeable option 7/1/19
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas 0
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
end
to setup-defending-UAS-GCU-squads
set shape "uas_infantry_squad_defending"
;set shape "airplane"
set color combatant-color-defending
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set team-color combatant-color-defending
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 1
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 0.8
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas -0.5
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
set previous-uav-launch-angle 0
end
to setup-defending-UAS-3D-squads
set shape "uas_3D_squad_defending"
;set shape "car"
set color combatant-color-defending
set team-color combatant-color-defending
set size 10
set num-warfighters 11
set attack-mult-weapon 1
set attack-add-vehicle 5
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 1
set defense-add-vehicle 5
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 0.8
set speed-mult-vehicle 2
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle -0.5
set stealth-add-uas -0.5
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle -0.5
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
end
to setup-attacking-rifle-squads
set shape "infantry_squad_attacking"
;set shape "person"
set color combatant-color-attacking
set team-color combatant-color-attacking
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 1
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 0.8
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
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set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas 0
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
end
to setup-attacking-UAS-GCU-squads
set shape "uas_infantry_squad_attacking"
;set shape "airplane"
set color combatant-color-attacking
set team-color combatant-color-attacking
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 1
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 0.8
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas -0.5
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
set previous-uav-launch-angle 0
end
to setup-insurgent-rifle-squads
set shape "infantry_squad_insurgent"
;set shape "person"
set color combatant-color-insurgent
set team-color combatant-color-insurgent
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1.2
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 0.25
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 1
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas 0
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0

file:///J:/arlresearch/Thesis/uas-implementation-v8 code.html

8/22

5/18/2020

uas-implementation-v8 code.html

set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
end
to setup-insurgent-UAS-GCU-squads
set shape "uas_infantry_squad_insurgent"
;set shape "airplane"
set color combatant-color-insurgent
set team-color combatant-color-insurgent
set size 10
set num-warfighters 9
set attack-mult-weapon 1.2
set attack-add-vehicle 0
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
set defense-mult-armor 0.25
set defense-add-vehicle 0
set defense-add-building 0
set defense-add-flora 0
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
set speed-base 1
set speed-mult-armor 1
set speed-mult-vehicle 0
set speed-mult-terrain 0
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle + speed-mult-terrain)
set vision-base 1
set vision-mult-terrain 5
set vision-mult-time 5
set vision-factor vision-base * (vision-mult-terrain + vision-mult-time)
set stealth-base 1
set stealth-add-vehicle 0
set stealth-add-uas -0.5
set stealth-add-building 0
set stealth-add-flora 0
set stealth-add-rain 0
set stealth-add-time 0
set stealth-factor stealth-base + stealth-add-vehicle + stealth-add-uas + stealth-add-building + stealth-add-flora + stealth-add-rain + stealth-add-time
set detection-base 1
set detection-add-vehicle 0
set detection-add-rain 0
set detection-add-time detection-base + detection-add-vehicle + detection-add-rain
set previous-uav-launch-angle 0
end
to setup-uavs
set parent-squad myself
set color [color] of parent-squad
set team-color [color] of parent-squad
if [opponents] of parent-squad != nobody [set opponents [opponents] of parent-squad]
ifelse member? parent-squad defending-squads
[set shape "uas_defending"]
[set shape "uas_attacking"]
set
set
set
set

air-speed universal-air-speed ;patches per tick
payload-type universal-uav-payload ;0, 1, 2, 3, etc... You'll need to determine what these are eventually.
attritable? attritable-uavs ; 0, 1; whether or not this is an attritable drone
battery-life universal-uav-battery-life ;ticks or time

set patrol-start-time ticks
set decaying-patrol-index 0
set opponent-detected 0
set launch-angle [previous-uav-launch-angle] of parent-squad; + 100 + random(40)
end
;;;;; runtime procedures ;;;;;
to go
; victory conditions
update-victory-conditions
if percent-remaining-aor-defending < 0.2 or count defending-squads = 0 or count attacking-squads = 0
[set time-to-defeat-attacking ticks - time-of-first-contact
set percent-of-time-with-enemies-detected time-in-contact-with-attacking / ticks
show run-number
stop]
set defending-uavs uavs with [team-color = combatant-color-defending]
set attacking-uavs uavs with [team-color = combatant-color-attacking]
; primary procedures
defending-squad-procedures
if any? explosions [ask explosions [kill-explosion]]
attacking-squad-procedures
update-of-last-ticks ;always last procedure in 'go' function
set percent-remaining-defending-aor percent-remaining-aor-defending
set num-warfighters-defending number-warfighters-defending
set num-warfighters-attacking number-warfighters-attacking
; update covariates
if any? defending-uavs
[
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count-area-covered-by-uas-patrols
count-time-with-uas-airborn
count-mult-time-with-uas-airborn

]
if any? attacking-squads [measure-maximum-attacker-dispersal]
ifelse any? defending-uas-gcu-squads
[set remaining-warfighters-in-uas-gcu ([num-warfighters] of one-of defending-uas-gcu-squads)]
[set remaining-warfighters-in-uas-gcu 0]
tick
end
to update-victory-conditions
set defending-squads squads with [team-color = combatant-color-defending]
set attacking-squads squads with [team-color = combatant-color-attacking or team-color = combatant-color-insurgent]
end
to update-of-last-ticks
ask squads
[set fortified-of-last-tick fortified
set fortified-buildings-of-last-tick fortified-buildings
set fortified-flora-of-last-tick fortified-flora]
end
to defending-squad-procedures ; defending squad package of functions
ask defending-squads
[update-combat-strength; always first
set opponents attacking-squads
set opponents-uavs attacking-uavs
if opponent-detected = 0 [set color team-color]
if opponent-detected = 1
[
set color team-color - 10
if ticks mod 2 = 0 [set color color - 4]
]
if opponent-detected = 2
[
set color team-color + 2
if ticks mod 2 = 0 [set color color + 2]
]
;

if (shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending") and ticks <= 1 [set previous-uav-launch-angle 0]
if (shape = "uas-infantry-squad-defending") [count-number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu]
if any? attacking-squads in-radius 40 [detect-opponents] ;and opponent-detected = 0 [detect-opponents]
if opponent-detected = 0
[
ifelse distance aor-base-patch-defending >= 5
[return-to-base]
[support-friendly-units
ifelse in-supporting-role = 1
[move-to-support-friendly-units]
[if shape = "infantry_squad_defending" and patrolling-defending-squads = 1 [patrol-defending-squads]]
]
if (shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending") and (number-of-uavs-deployed < number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-defending) and (count defending-squads != 1
[launch-uavs
set attack-mult-weapon attack-mult-weapon - (number-of-uavs-deployed / 10)
]
if (shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending") and (number-of-uavs-deployed < number-of-uavs-airborn-per-gcu-defending) and (count defending-squads = 1
[launch-uavs
set attack-mult-weapon attack-mult-weapon - (number-of-uavs-deployed / 10)
]
if (shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending") and (count defending-squads = 1) and (patrolling-defending-squads = 1) [patrol-defending-squads]
if (shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending") and (indirect-fires-ability = true)
[ifelse indirect-fires-target != nobody and indirect-fires-target != 0
[if not any? [defending-squads in-radius 3] of indirect-fires-target [indirect-fires]]
[ask ranged-contacts [die]]
]
]
if first-contact != 1
[if opponent-detected = 1 ;or opponent-detected = 2
[set first-contact 1
set time-of-first-contact ticks
measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-contact
ifelse min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself] != nobody
[set distance-of-first-contact distance min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
]
[set distance-of-first-contact 9999]
]
]
if opponent-detected = 1
[
compare-combat-strength
if shape = "uas_infantry_squad_defending" ;and any? defending-squads with [shape = "infantry_squad_defending"]
[
if any? defending-squads with [shape = "infantry_squad_defending"]
[ifelse combat-strength-advantage = 1
[ifelse indirect-fires-target != nobody and indirect-fires-target != 0
[ifelse not any? [defending-squads in-radius 3] of indirect-fires-target
[indirect-fires
combat-fires]
[combat-fires]
]
[combat-fires]

file:///J:/arlresearch/Thesis/uas-implementation-v8 code.html

10/22

5/18/2020

uas-implementation-v8 code.html
if first-defender-df != 1
[set first-defender-df 1
set-time-of-first-defender-df
measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-df]
set-time-of-last-defender-df
set-number-of-defender-df]
[avoid-opposition-seek-cover]

]
]
if shape != "uas_infantry_squad_defending"
[ifelse combat-strength-advantage = 1
[combat-fires
if first-defender-df != 1
[set first-defender-df 1
set-time-of-first-defender-df
measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-df]
set-time-of-last-defender-df
set-number-of-defender-df]
[avoid-opposition-seek-cover]
]

]
;
;
;;
;;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;

lose-contact
if distance aor-base-patch-defending > aor-radius-defending / 2
[set opponent-detected 0
return-to-base]
if opponent-detected = 2
[compare-combat-strength
if combat-strength-advantage = 0 [avoid-opposition-seek-cover]
if combat-strength-advantage = 1 and distance aor-base-patch-defending < aor-radius-defending / 2 [intercept-opposition]
if distance aor-base-patch-defending > aor-radius-defending / 2
[set opponent-detected 0
return-to-base]
detect-opponents
;combat-fires
if not any? defending-uavs or not any? out-contact-neighbors [set opponent-detected 0]
]

]
; uav procedures... should probably make this a different function...
if any? defending-uavs
[
ask defending-uavs
[
if opponent-detected = 0 [set color team-color]
if opponent-detected = 1
[
set color team-color - 10
if ticks mod 2 = 0 [set color color - 4]
]
if opponent-detected = 2
[
set color team-color + 2
if ticks mod 2 = 0 [set color color + 2]
]
if opponent-detected = 0 and previous-contact-indicator != 1 ; basically, if you don't see anyone and you haven't seen anyone during this rotation
[detect-opponents ; should replace with a uav-detect function with a higher probability of detecting enemies in open ground, lower in trees, etc.
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 1 [uav-patrol-1]
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 2 [uav-patrol-15]
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 3 [uav-patrol-2]
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 4 [uav-patrol-25]
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 5 [uav-patrol-3]
if uav-patrol-type-defending = 6 [uav-patrol-35]
]
if opponent-detected = 0 and previous-contact-indicator = 1
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed
if distance parent-squad <= air-speed [die]; in-radius (air-speed) [die]
]
if opponent-detected = 1
[lose-contact ; should replace with a uav-lose-contact with its own probability equations
uav-track-opponent
if parent-squad != nobody [ask parent-squad [set indirect-fires-target min-one-of [out-contact-neighbors] of myself [distance self]]]
if previous-contact-indicator = 0 [
count-number-of-times-UAS-tracked-attackers
]
set previous-contact-indicator 1
set patch-of-last-contact patch-here
if first-contact != 1
[if opponent-detected = 1 ;or opponent-detected = 2
[set first-contact 1
set time-of-first-contact ticks
measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-contact
ifelse min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself] != nobody
[set distance-of-first-contact distance parent-squad ;min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance [parent-squad] of myself]
]
[set distance-of-first-contact 9999]
]
]

]
if opponent-detected = 2
[detect-opponents
uav-search-for-lost-opponent
]
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;die conditions
ifelse parent-squad != nobody
[
if [in-supporting-role] of parent-squad = 1 or [opponent-detected] of parent-squad = 1
[ask parent-squad [set number-of-uavs-deployed number-of-uavs-deployed - 1]
set number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending + 1
die
]
if (any? defending-squads in-radius (air-speed - 1)) and (one-of defending-squads in-radius (air-speed - 1) = parent-squad) ;and (ticks > patrol-st
[ask parent-squad [set number-of-uavs-deployed number-of-uavs-deployed - 1]
set number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending + 1
die
]
if ticks > (patrol-start-time + battery-life) ;and (opponent-detected = 1)
[ask parent-squad [set number-of-uavs-deployed number-of-uavs-deployed - 1]
set number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending + 1
die
]
]
[set number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending + 1
die
]

if any? defending-squads with [opponent-detected = 1] or any? defending-squads with [opponent-detected = 2] or any? defending-uavs with [opponent-detecte
[set time-in-contact-with-attacking time-in-contact-with-attacking + 1]
end
to attacking-squad-procedures ; attacking squad package of functions
ask attacking-squads
[update-combat-strength ;always first
set opponents defending-squads
set opponents-uavs defending-uavs
if opponent-detected = 0 [set color team-color]
if opponent-detected = 1
[
set color team-color + 2
if ticks mod 2 = 1 [set color color + 2]
]
if hostile-uav-detected = 2 and opponent-detected != 1
[
set color team-color + 112
if ticks mod 2 = 1 [set color color + 2]
]
if any? defending-squads in-radius 30 and opponent-detected = 0 [detect-opponents]
if any? defending-uavs in-radius 30 and opponent-detected = 0 [detect-opposing-uavs]
if distance aor-base-patch-defending < 20
[set attackers-have-entered-defending-aor 1
count-number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor]
if opponent-detected = 0 and hostile-uav-detected = 0
[
support-friendly-units
ifelse in-supporting-role = 1
[move-to-support-friendly-units]
[move-to-aor-enemies
capture-aor-enemies
ifelse attackers-have-entered-defending-aor = 0
[measure-maximum-dispersal-of-squads-before-attackers-reach-aor]
count-number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor]
[measure-maximum-dispersal-of-squads-after-attackers-reach-aor]
]
]

;

if opponent-detected = 0 and hostile-uav-detected = 1
[
avoid-opposition-uav-seek-cover
if not any? defending-uavs in-radius 10 [set hostile-uav-detected 0]
]

;
]

if opponent-detected = 1
[
compare-combat-strength
ifelse combat-strength-advantage = 1
[intercept-opposition
combat-fires
if first-attacker-df != 1
[set first-attacker-df 1
set-time-of-first-attacker-df]
set-time-of-last-attacker-df
set-number-of-attacker-df]
[avoid-opposition-seek-cover]
combat-fires
lose-contact
]

end

to update-combat-strength ; defending and attacking squad function
; update attack factor
set attack-factor num-warfighters * attack-mult-weapon + attack-add-vehicle
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; update defense factor
ifelse any? buildings-here
[set fortified-buildings 1]
[set fortified-buildings 0]
if fortified-buildings-of-last-tick = 0 and fortified-buildings = 1 [set defense-add-building defense-add-building + building-defense-bonus]
if fortified-buildings-of-last-tick = 1 and fortified-buildings = 0 [set defense-add-building defense-add-building - building-defense-bonus]
ifelse any? flora-here
[set fortified-flora 1]
[set fortified-flora 0]
if fortified-flora-of-last-tick = 0 and fortified-flora = 1 [set defense-add-flora defense-add-flora + flora-defense-bonus]
if fortified-flora-of-last-tick = 1 and fortified-flora = 0 [set defense-add-flora defense-add-flora - flora-defense-bonus]
set defense-factor num-warfighters * defense-mult-armor + defense-add-vehicle + defense-add-building + defense-add-flora
set combat-strength attack-factor + defense-factor
end
to update-speed-factor ; defending and attacking squad function - called by move-to-aor-enemies and ...
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt 180]
let gradient [elevation] of patch-ahead 1 - [elevation] of patch-here
let correction-factor 5; a correction factor to make the impact of elevation change more realistic
set speed-mult-terrain ( correction-factor * gradient )
set speed-factor speed-base * (speed-mult-armor + speed-mult-vehicle - speed-mult-terrain)
end
; WIP: still need to find way to disengage links when contact is broken by stealth or distance
to detect-opponents ; defending and attacking squad function
if (min-one-of opponents [distance myself]) != nobody
[
let dist distance (min-one-of opponents [distance myself])
set dist round(dist)
let chance-of-detecting detect-probability dist
let random-number random-float 1
if random-number <= chance-of-detecting
[
if member? self defending-squads or member? self attacking-squads
[set opponent-detected 1
create-contact-to min-one-of opponents [distance myself]]
if (member? self defending-uavs and not any? other defending-uavs in-radius (1.5 * air-speed) with [opponent-detected = 1]) or (member? self attack
[set opponent-detected 1
create-contact-to min-one-of opponents [distance myself]]]
]
end
to detect-opposing-uavs ;defending and attacking squad function
let dist distance (min-one-of opponents-uavs [distance myself])
set dist round(dist)
let chance-of-detecting 2 * (detect-probability dist)
let random-number random-float 1
if random-number <= chance-of-detecting
[set hostile-uav-detected 1
; could also make contact if you had anti-uas tech
]
end
; WIP: still need to implement stealth and detection factors - this is the raw detection probability curve - 6/26/19
to-report detect-probability [x] ; defending and attacking squad reporter
set standard-dev-detection 2.5
if member? self defending-uavs or member? self attacking-uavs
[set standard-dev-detection 4.5
if any? flora-here
[let density-of-flora-here item 0 ([green-density-flora] of flora-here)
set standard-dev-detection standard-dev-detection - density-of-flora-here]
if any? buildings-here
[set standard-dev-detection 0.5]
if standard-dev-detection <= 0
[set standard-dev-detection 0.1]
]
if member? self defending-squads or member? self attacking-squads
[set standard-dev-detection 2.5
if any? flora-here
[let density-of-flora-here item 0 ([green-density] of flora-here)
set standard-dev-detection standard-dev-detection - (density-of-flora-here / 2)]
if any? buildings-here and opponent-detected = 0
[set standard-dev-detection 0.5]
if ([shape] of min-one-of opponents [distance myself] = "uas_infantry_squad_defending" )
[set standard-dev-detection 1.5 * standard-dev-detection]
let
let
let
set

]

my-elevation [elevation] of patch-here
opposition-elevation [elevation] of [patch-here] of (min-one-of opponents [distance myself])
diff-elevation my-elevation - opposition-elevation
standard-dev-detection standard-dev-detection + 2 * diff-elevation

if standard-dev-detection <= 0
[set standard-dev-detection 0.1]

let mean-of-dist 0
let correction-factor 2.5 * standard-dev-detection ; brings probability of detection at 0 meters to 100% and at 100 m to very low
let normal-distribution-value correction-factor * (1 / sqrt(2 * pi * standard-dev-detection * standard-dev-detection)) * exp (-1 * (x - mean-of-dist) *
report normal-distribution-value
end
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to detect-uav-detected-opponents
let closest-defending-uav min-one-of defending-uavs [distance myself]
ifelse closest-defending-uav != nobody ;and [closest-opponent] of closest-defending-uav != nobody
[let uav-detected-opponent ([closest-opponent-uav] of closest-defending-uav)
if my-contacts = nobody [create-contact-to [closest-opponent-uav] of closest-defending-uav]
]
[set opponent-detected 0
ask my-contacts [die]]
end
; WIP: not started 6/29/19
to evade-pursuit ; seems like maybe this could be rolled into lose-contact and lose-contact probability? work on later 7/9/19; or tune down lose contact..
end
; WIP: not started 6/29/19
to evade-pursuit-probability
end
to lose-contact ; I think this works just as well for the evading detection as it does accidentally losing contact... both rolled into one. Confirm w/Dr. S
let closest-opponent min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
if closest-opponent != nobody
[
let dist distance closest-opponent ;(min-one-of opponents [distance myself])
set dist round(dist)
let chance-of-losing-contact lose-contact-probability dist
let random-number random-float 1
if (random-number <= chance-of-losing-contact) and (member? self squads)
[set opponent-detected 0
ask my-links [die]]
if (random-number <= chance-of-losing-contact) and (member? self uavs)
[set opponent-detected 2
ask my-links [die]]
]
end

if not any? opponents in-radius 20 [set opponent-detected 0] ; 10 is temporary - there's probably a better way to do this

; WIP: still need to implement stealth and detection factors - this is the raw detection probability curve - 6/26/19
to-report lose-contact-probability [x] ; defending and attacking squad report
let standard-dev 10
let mean-of-dist 0
let correction-factor 25 ; brings probability of detection at 0 meters to 100% and at 100 m to very low
let inverse-normal-distribution-value 1 - correction-factor * (1 / sqrt(2 * pi * standard-dev * standard-dev)) * exp (-1 * (x - mean-of-dist) * (x - mean
report inverse-normal-distribution-value
end
to compare-combat-strength ; defending and attacking squad function
let closest-opponent min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
if closest-opponent != nobody
[
let opponent-combat-strength [combat-strength] of closest-opponent
set combat-strength-disparity combat-strength - opponent-combat-strength
ifelse combat-strength-disparity >= -2
[set combat-strength-advantage 1]
[set combat-strength-advantage 0]
]
end
to intercept-opposition ; defending and attacking squad function
let closest-opponent min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
let potential-combat-strength combat-strength - building-defense-bonus
if closest-opponent != nobody
[ifelse fortified-buildings = 1
[let opponent-combat-strength [combat-strength] of closest-opponent
let potential-combat-strength-disparity potential-combat-strength - opponent-combat-strength

end

if potential-combat-strength > 0
[face closest-opponent
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]]
[face closest-opponent
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]]

to avoid-opposition-seek-cover ; defending and attacking squad function
let closest-opponent min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
let potential-combat-strength combat-strength + building-defense-bonus
if closest-opponent != nobody
[let opponent-combat-strength [combat-strength] of closest-opponent
let potential-combat-strength-disparity potential-combat-strength - opponent-combat-strength

end

ifelse potential-combat-strength-disparity > 0
[let closest-cover min-one-of buildings in-radius 10 [distance myself]
if closest-cover != nobody
[face closest-cover
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]]
[if member? self attacking-squads [tactical-retreat]
if member? self defending-squads [return-to-base]]]

to avoid-opposition-uav-seek-cover
let closest-cover min-one-of buildings in-radius 7 [distance myself]
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let closest-friendly-unit min-one-of other friendly-squads [distance myself]
ifelse closest-cover != nobody
[
face closest-cover
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
]
[
ifelse closest-friendly-unit != nobody
[
if hostile-uav-detected-previous-tick = 0
[
let indicator-var random 1
ifelse indicator-var >= 0.5
[rt 110 - random 40]
[lt 110 - random 40]
]
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
set hostile-uav-detected-previous-tick hostile-uav-detected
]
[
tactical-retreat
]
]

end
to tactical-retreat ; defending and attacking squad function
let inradius-border-aors border-aors-defending in-radius 10
ifelse inradius-border-aors != nobody and member? self attacking-squads
[let alternative-border-aors border-aors-defending with [not member? self inradius-border-aors]
let destination-border-aor min-one-of alternative-border-aors [distance myself]
if destination-border-aor != nobody
[face destination-border-aor
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]]
[rt 90 + random 180
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]
end
to return-to-base
face aor-base-patch-defending
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
end
; WIP 6/29/19 - I think this isn't terribly well balanced, and I'm sure it would be good to validate the equation somehow... it seems they inflict casualti
to-report inflict-casualty-probability [disparity-in-combat-strength] ; defending and attacking squad reporter function
let sigmoid-function-value disparity-in-combat-strength / (20 + abs (2 * disparity-in-combat-strength)) + 0.5
report sigmoid-function-value
end
; WIP 7/1/19 - does not include drones... maybe that should be another function entirely?
to combat-fires ; defending and attacking squad procedure
let probability-of-inflicting-casualty inflict-casualty-probability combat-strength-disparity
let random-number random-float 1
if 2 * random-number <= probability-of-inflicting-casualty and min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself] != nobody
[ask min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
[set num-warfighters num-warfighters - 1
if num-warfighters = 0 [die]]]
end
to indirect-fires
let probability-of-inflicting-casualty inflict-casualty-probability combat-strength-disparity
if indirect-fires-target != 0 and indirect-fires-target != nobody
[
if first-IF-indicator = 0
[
set time-of-first-IF ticks
set time-of-last-IF ticks
set range-of-furthest-IF distance indirect-fires-target
set range-of-closest-IF distance indirect-fires-target
set first-IF-indicator 1
]

]

if ticks > time-of-last-IF [set time-of-last-IF ticks]
if distance indirect-fires-target > range-of-furthest-IF [set range-of-furthest-IF distance indirect-fires-target]
if distance indirect-fires-target < range-of-closest-IF [set range-of-closest-IF distance indirect-fires-target]

let random-number random-float 1
if 2 * random-number <= probability-of-inflicting-casualty and indirect-fires-target != 0 and indirect-fires-target != nobody; min-one-of out-ranged-cont
[ask indirect-fires-target;min-one-of out-ranged-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
[
(ifelse
distance myself > 25 ; 30*patches-to-meters = 25*15 = 375 m
[let random-5 random 5
ifelse num-warfighters > 5
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-5
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-5]
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + num-warfighters
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - num-warfighters]
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set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-5
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-5
set number-of-large-calliber-bombardments number-of-large-calliber-bombardments + 1] ;
distance myself > 15 and distance myself <= 25 ; 15*patches-to-meters = 15*15 = 225 m
[let random-4 random 4
ifelse num-warfighters > 5
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-4
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-4]
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + num-warfighters
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - num-warfighters]
set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-4
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-4
set number-of-medium-calliber-bombardments number-of-medium-calliber-bombardments + 1]
distance myself > 5 and distance myself <= 15 ; 5*patches-to-meters = 5*15 = 75 m
[let random-3 random 3
ifelse num-warfighters > 5
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-3
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-3]
[set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + num-warfighters
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - num-warfighters]
set num-attackers-neut-by-IF num-attackers-neut-by-IF + random-3
set num-warfighters num-warfighters - random-3
set number-of-small-calliber-bombardments number-of-small-calliber-bombardments + 1] ;
;distance myself <= 15 [set num-warfighters num-warfighters - 1] ; I think they shouldn't
[])
set color 25
hatch-explosions 1 [setup-explosion]
if num-warfighters <= 0 [die]]]

e.g., 155 mm artillery

; e.g., 60 mm artillery

e.g., 30 mm mortars
be able to use them at all within a certain range of them

to support-friendly-units ; defending and attacking squad procedure
ifelse any? friendly-squads with [(opponent-detected = 1) and (combat-strength-advantage < 5)]
[set friendly-squads-in-need friendly-squads with [(opponent-detected = 1) and (combat-strength-advantage < 5)]
set closest-friendly-squad-in-need min-one-of friendly-squads-in-need [distance myself]
if closest-friendly-squad-in-need != nobody and closest-friendly-squad-in-need != 0
[set closest-friendly-squad-assailant min-one-of opponents [distance [closest-friendly-squad-in-need] of myself]
if closest-friendly-squad-assailant != nobody and closest-friendly-squad-assailant != 0
[create-support-link-to closest-friendly-squad-assailant
set in-supporting-role 1]]
]
[ask my-support-links [die]
set in-supporting-role 0]
end
to move-to-support-friendly-units
if closest-friendly-squad-assailant != nobody
[face closest-friendly-squad-assailant
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor]
end
to return-to-aor ; defending squad procedure
face min-one-of aors with [color = aor-defending-color] [distance myself]
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
end
to patrol-defending-squads
if any? border-aors-defending in-cone 3 60
[rt random 60]
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
end
to move-to-aor-enemies ; attacking squad function
let claimable-aors aors with [color = aor-defending-color]
if min-one-of claimable-aors [distance myself] != nobody
[
let ally-at-maximum-distance max-one-of attacking-squads [distance myself]
let maximum-distance distance ally-at-maximum-distance
ifelse count attacking-squads > 1 and maximum-distance > 20
[face ally-at-maximum-distance
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
]
[ifelse not any? claimable-aors in-cone 80 80
[set heading towards min-one-of claimable-aors [distance myself]]
[set heading towards min-one-of claimable-aors in-cone 80 80 [distance myself]]
update-speed-factor
fd speed-factor
]
;
ifelse not any? claimable-aors in-cone 80 80
;
[set heading towards min-one-of claimable-aors [distance myself]]
;
[set heading towards min-one-of claimable-aors in-cone 80 80 [distance myself]]
;
update-speed-factor
;
fd speed-factor
]
end
to capture-aor-enemies ; attacking squad function
; if attackers-have-entered-defending-aor = 0 [set attackers-have-entered-defending-aor 1]
ask patch-here [set aor-team 0]
ask neighbors [set aor-team 0]
ask aors with [aor-team = 0] in-radius 2
[if color != aor-attacking-color [set color aor-attacking-color]]
end
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to launch-uavs
hatch-uavs 1 [setup-uavs]
set number-of-uavs-deployed number-of-uavs-deployed + 1
ifelse member? self defending-squads
[set number-of-uavs-launched-total-defending number-of-uavs-launched-total-defending + 1]
[set number-of-uavs-launched-total-attacking number-of-uavs-launched-total-attacking + 1]
end
to uav-patrol-1 ; small decaying circles
let incremental-turn 8.5
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody)
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 45 - random 90]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 30 - random 60]
[rt random 360]
]
];[set heading launch-angle];[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 17)) ; 2
[fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 17)) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 17) + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;2 and 3
[rt (90 + incremental-turn) ;100
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 17) + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 2 * battery-life / 5) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;3
[rt (incremental-turn) + decaying-patrol-index ;20
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + 2 * battery-life / 5)
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
set decaying-patrol-index decaying-patrol-index + 0.2
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-patrol-15 ; large decaying circles
let incremental-turn 7
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody)
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 90 - random 180]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 45 - random 90]
[rt random 360]
]
];[set heading launch-angle];[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 10)) ; 2
[fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 10)) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 10) + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;2 and 3
[rt (90 + incremental-turn) ;100
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + (battery-life / 10) + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 2 * battery-life / 3) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;3
[rt (incremental-turn) + decaying-patrol-index ;20
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + 2 * battery-life / 3)
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
set decaying-patrol-index decaying-patrol-index + 0.05;25
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-patrol-2 ; fanning, short lawn-mower
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody)
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 90 - random 180]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 45 - random 90]
[rt random 360]
]
];[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
let distance-denominator 15
let curve-correction-angle 5
let first-turn-lim 1.75
let second-turn-lim 2.9
let third-turn-lim 3.95
let fourth-turn-lim 4.9
; let fifth-turn-lim 4.0
; move away from launch point and 80 deg turn
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator)) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) [fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator)) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator) + 1) and
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; execute first half strafe and
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
[rt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +

180 deg turn
battery-life / (distance-denominator) + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-den

;execute second full strafe and
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
[lt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +

180 deg turn
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 3) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-lif

first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life / d
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 2) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life

second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 3) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li
second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 4) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li
second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 5) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li

;execute third full strafe and 180 deg turn
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 6) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-lif
[rt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 6) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 7) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 8) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
;execute fourth/final full strafe and 180 deg turn
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 10) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-li
[lt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
; if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 10) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery
; if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 11) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-li
; if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 12) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-li
;
; if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 14) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-l
;
[lt curve-correction-angle
;
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
;return to launch-point
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 10)
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
;

set decaying-patrol-index decaying-patrol-index ;+ 0.1
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-patrol-25 ; fanning, long lawn-mower
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody)
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 90 - random 180]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 45 - random 90]
[rt random 360]
]
];[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
let
let
let
let
let
let
let
let

distance-denominator 8
curve-correction-angle 5
first-turn-lim 1.75
second-turn-lim 2.8
third-turn-lim 3.865
fourth-turn-lim 4.820
fifth-turn-lim 5.725
sixth-turn-lim 6.475

; move away from launch point and 80 deg turn
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator)) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) [fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator)) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + battery-life / (distance-denominator) + 1) and
; execute first half strafe and
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
[rt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +

180 deg turn
battery-life / (distance-denominator) + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-den

;execute second full strafe and
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
[lt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +
if (ticks > patrol-start-time +

180 deg turn
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 3) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-lif

first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life / d
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 1) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life
first-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 2) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + first-turn-lim * battery-life

second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 3) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li
second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 4) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li
second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 5) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-li

;execute third full strafe and 180 deg turn
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + second-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 6) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-lif
[rt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 6) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 7) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 8) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life
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;execute fourth/final full strafe and 180 deg turn
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + third-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 10) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-li
[lt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 10) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-l
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 11) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-l
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 12) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fourth-turn-lim * battery-l
if (ticks > patrol-start-time
[rt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if (ticks > patrol-start-time
if (ticks > patrol-start-time
if (ticks > patrol-start-time

+ fourth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 14) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-li
+ fifth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 14) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-lif
+ fifth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 15) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-lif
+ fifth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 16) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-lif

if (ticks > patrol-start-time + fifth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 18) and (ticks <= patrol-start-time + sixth-turn-lim * battery-lif
[lt curve-correction-angle
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
;return to launch-point
if (ticks > patrol-start-time + sixth-turn-lim * battery-life / distance-denominator + 18)
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
;

set decaying-patrol-index decaying-patrol-index ;+ 0.1
set pen-size 2.3
pen-down
end
to uav-patrol-3 ; short range random - straight lines
let radius-air-speed-multiplier 5
let bounded-area-radius radius-air-speed-multiplier * air-speed
let angle-options list (90 + random 30) (210 + random 30)
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 90 - random 180]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 45 - random 90]
[rt random 360]
]
]
let distance-to-parent-squad distance parent-squad
if (distance-to-parent-squad < (bounded-area-radius - air-speed / 2)) and (ticks <= (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-spe
[;rt random 15
;lt random 15
fd air-speed]
if (distance-to-parent-squad >= (bounded-area-radius - air-speed / 2)) and (ticks <= (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-sp
[rt 120 + random 10
;rt one-of angle-options
;lt one-of angle-options
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
if ticks > (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-speed-multiplier))
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-patrol-35 ; long range random - straight lines
let radius-air-speed-multiplier 10
let bounded-area-radius radius-air-speed-multiplier * air-speed
let angle-options list (90 + random 30) (210 + random 30)
if (ticks <= patrol-start-time + 1) and (patch-ahead 1 != nobody) ;[rt launch-angle];[rt random 360]
[
ifelse first-contact = 0
[face aor-base-patch-attacking
rt 90 - random 180]
[
ifelse patch-of-last-contact != 0 and patch-of-last-contact != nobody;min-one-of opponents [distance myself] != nobody
[face patch-of-last-contact;min-one-of opponents [distance myself]
rt 45 - random 90]
[rt random 360]
]
]
let distance-to-parent-squad distance parent-squad
if (distance-to-parent-squad < (bounded-area-radius - air-speed / 2)) and (ticks <= (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-spe
[;rt random 15
;lt random 15
fd air-speed]
if (distance-to-parent-squad >= (bounded-area-radius - air-speed / 2)) and (ticks <= (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-sp
[rt 120 + random 10
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;rt one-of angle-options
;lt one-of angle-options
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
if ticks > (patrol-start-time + universal-uav-battery-life - (1 + radius-air-speed-multiplier))
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-search-for-lost-opponent
ifelse ticks <= patrol-start-time + (2 * battery-life / 3) and incremental-increase > -10
[rt 10 + incremental-increase
fd air-speed / 2
rt 10 + incremental-increase
set incremental-increase incremental-increase - 0.25
]
[face parent-squad
fd air-speed]
if patch-ahead 1 = nobody [rt random 360]
set pen-size 1
pen-down
end
to uav-track-opponent
set closest-opponent-uav min-one-of out-contact-neighbors [distance myself]
if (closest-opponent-uav != nobody) ;and (ticks < patrol-start-time + 2 * battery-life)
[face closest-opponent-uav
fd [speed-factor] of closest-opponent-uav
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;

]
end

let closest-defending-infantry-squad min-one-of defending-squads with [(shape = "infantry-squad-defending") and (opponent-detected = 0) and (not paren
set closest-defending-infantry-squads defending-squads with [shape = "infantry_squad_defending"]
set closest-available-defending-infantry-squad min-one-of closest-defending-infantry-squads with [opponent-detected = 0] [distance myself]
if closest-available-defending-infantry-squad != nobody
[ask closest-available-defending-infantry-squad
[set opponent-detected 2
create-contact-to [closest-opponent-uav] of myself]
]

to setup-explosion
set explosion-start-time ticks
set explosion-duration-time ticks + 3
set shape "explosion-shape"
set color 25
set color lput 250 extract-rgb color
set size 17.5
end
to kill-explosion
ifelse ticks mod 2 = 0
[set color 46
set color lput 200 extract-rgb color]
[set color one-of [15 25]
set color lput 200 extract-rgb color]
if ticks >= explosion-duration-time [die]
end
;;;;; covariate updaters ;;;;;
;to count-area-covered-by-uas-patrols
; let ninety-percent-detection-diameter 9
; set area-coverd-by-uas-patrols area-coverd-by-uas-patrols + (pi * ninety-percent-detection-diameter * ninety-percent-detection-diameter / 4) * (count de
;end
to count-time-with-uas-airborn
set time-with-uas-airborn time-with-uas-airborn + 1
end
to count-mult-time-with-uas-airborn
set mult-time-with-uas-airborn mult-time-with-uas-airborn + 1 * (count defending-uavs);
end
to count-number-of-times-UAS-tracked-attackers
set number-of-times-UAS-tracked-attackers number-of-times-UAS-tracked-attackers + 1
end
to set-time-of-first-attacker-df
set time-of-first-attacker-df ticks
end
to set-time-of-last-attacker-df
set time-of-last-attacker-df ticks
end
to set-time-of-first-defender-df
set time-of-first-defender-df ticks
end
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to set-time-of-last-defender-df
set time-of-last-defender-df ticks
end
to set-number-of-defender-df
set number-of-defender-df number-of-defender-df + 1
end
to set-number-of-attacker-df
set number-of-attacker-df number-of-attacker-df + 1
end
to set-initial-attacker-distance
ask aor-base-patch-defending [set initial-attacker-distance distance aor-base-patch-attacking]
end
to measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-df
ask attacking-squads [
let x-centroid-attackers mean [xcor] of attacking-squads
let y-centroid-attackers mean [ycor] of attacking-squads
let std-dev 0
if count attacking-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-attackers y-centroid-attackers] of attacking-squads]
set dispersal-of-attackers-at-first-df std-dev
]
ask defending-squads [
let x-centroid-defenders mean [xcor] of defending-squads
let y-centroid-defenders mean [ycor] of defending-squads
let std-dev 0
if count defending-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-defenders y-centroid-defenders] of defending-squads]
set dispersal-of-defenders-at-first-df std-dev
]
end
to measure-dispersal-of-squads-at-first-contact
ask one-of attacking-squads [
let x-centroid-attackers mean [xcor] of attacking-squads
let y-centroid-attackers mean [ycor] of attacking-squads
let std-dev 0
if count attacking-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-attackers y-centroid-attackers] of attacking-squads]
set dispersal-of-attackers-at-first-contact std-dev
]
ask defending-squads [
let x-centroid-defenders mean [xcor] of defending-squads
let y-centroid-defenders mean [ycor] of defending-squads
let std-dev 0
if count defending-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-defenders y-centroid-defenders] of defending-squads]
set dispersal-of-defenders-at-first-contact std-dev
]
end
to measure-maximum-dispersal-of-squads-before-attackers-reach-aor
ask attacking-squads [
let x-centroid-attackers mean [xcor] of attacking-squads
let y-centroid-attackers mean [ycor] of attacking-squads
let std-dev 0
if count attacking-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-attackers y-centroid-attackers] of attacking-squads]
if std-dev > maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-before-attackers-reach-aor [set maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-before-attackers-reach-aor std-dev]
]
ask defending-squads [
let x-centroid-defenders mean [xcor] of defending-squads
let y-centroid-defenders mean [ycor] of defending-squads
let std-dev 0
if count defending-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-defenders y-centroid-defenders] of defending-squads]
if std-dev > maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-before-attackers-reach-aor [set maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-before-attackers-reach-aor std-dev]
]
end
to measure-maximum-dispersal-of-squads-after-attackers-reach-aor
ask attacking-squads [
let x-centroid-attackers mean [xcor] of attacking-squads
let y-centroid-attackers mean [ycor] of attacking-squads
let std-dev 0
if count attacking-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-attackers y-centroid-attackers] of attacking-squads]
if std-dev > maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-after-attackers-reach-aor [set maximum-dispersal-of-attackers-after-attackers-reach-aor std-dev]
]
ask defending-squads [
let x-centroid-defenders mean [xcor] of defending-squads
let y-centroid-defenders mean [ycor] of defending-squads
let std-dev 0
if count defending-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-defenders y-centroid-defenders] of defending-squads]
if std-dev > maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-after-attackers-reach-aor [set maximum-dispersal-of-defenders-after-attackers-reach-aor std-dev]
]
end
to measure-maximum-attacker-dispersal
ask one-of attacking-squads [
let x-centroid-attackers mean [xcor] of attacking-squads
let y-centroid-attackers mean [ycor] of attacking-squads
let std-dev 0
if count attacking-squads > 1 [set std-dev standard-deviation [distancexy x-centroid-attackers y-centroid-attackers] of attacking-squads]
if std-dev > maximum-attacker-dispersal [set maximum-attacker-dispersal std-dev]
]
end
;to count-number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu
; if any? squads with [shape = "uas-infantry-squad-defending"]
; [ask one-of squads with [shape = "uas-infantry-squad-defending"] [set number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu [num-warfighters] of self]]
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;end
;to count-number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu
; set number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu num-warfighters
;end
to-report number-warfighters-in-uas-gcu
ifelse any? defending-uas-gcu-squads
[report [num-warfighters] of one-of defending-uas-gcu-squads]
[report 0]
end
to count-number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor
if previous-arrival-at-aor != 1
[set previous-arrival-at-aor 1
set number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor + 1
if num-warfighters = 9 [set number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor-intact number-of-attacking-squads-that-reached-aor-intact + 1]]
end
;;;;; victory condition and covariate reporters ;;;;;
to-report percent-remaining-aor-defending
let aor-remaining-defending aors with [color = aor-defending-color]
let percent-aor-remaining-defending count aor-remaining-defending / count aor-initial-defending
report percent-aor-remaining-defending
end
to-report number-warfighters-defending
let number-of-warfighters-remaining-defending sum [num-warfighters] of defending-squads
report number-of-warfighters-remaining-defending
end
to-report number-warfighters-attacking
let number-of-warfighters-remaining-attacking sum [num-warfighters] of attacking-squads
report number-of-warfighters-remaining-attacking
end
to-report number-of-defending-uavs-launched
report number-of-uavs-launched-total-defending
end
to-report number-of-defending-uavs-aborted
report number-of-uavs-aborted-total-defending
end
to-report long-range-artillery-bombardments
report number-of-large-calliber-bombardments
end
to-report medium-range-artillery-bombardments
report number-of-medium-calliber-bombardments
end
to-report short-range-mortar-bombardments
report number-of-small-calliber-bombardments
end
to-report attacker-detected
ifelse [opponent-detected] of one-of defending-squads = 1 or [opponent-detected] of one-of defending-uavs = 1
[report 1]
[report 0]
end
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